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TY - CHAP
TI - Example:
AU - Prisner, Erich
AB - This chapter is a continuation of Chapter 7, where we described versions of the games ELECTION(*c, d, e|c₁, d₁, e₁| a, b*). We did not discuss the many versions that don’t have pure Nash equilibria, but now mixed strategies allow us to take a different tack. Since we can model these games as two-person zero-sum games, von Neumann’s and Robinson’s theorems apply, and the mixed Nash equilibria are meaningful. We will use the Excel sheet Election2.xlsm, where the payoff matrix is calculated automatically, and where we implement Brown’s fictitious play method to approximate mixed Nash equilibria. We lay a foundation
EP - 224
ET - 1
PB - Mathematical Association of America
PY - 2014
SN - null
SP - 220
T1 - Election II
T2 - Game Theory Through Examples
UR - http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.4169/j.ctt6wpwgj.33
Y2 - 2020/09/28/
ER -