@inbook{10.2307/j.ctt7s8bv.12,
 ISBN = {9780691140537},
 URL = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt7s8bv.12},
 abstract = {In this second part of the book I set out to defend a luck egalitarian account of justice in health proper. The previous chapter contrasted that luck egalitarian approach with a Rawlsian approach (fair equality of opportunity for health). I argued that the Rawlsian approach is vulnerable to two crucial objections and that this ought to lead us to dismiss it as an account of justice in health. But how does the luck egalitarian account cope with the objections that have led us to reject FEO for health? In particular, luck egalitarianism, I have already conceded, is as vulnerable to},
 bookauthor = {Shlomi Segall},
 booktitle = {Health, Luck, and Justice},
 pages = {111--120},
 publisher = {Princeton University Press},
 title = {Equality or Priority in Health?},
 year = {2010}
}