@inbook{10.4169/j.ctt6wpwgj.33,
URL = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.4169/j.ctt6wpwgj.33},
abstract = {This chapter is a continuation of Chapter 7, where we described versions of the games ELECTION(c, d, e|c₁, d₁, e₁| a, b). We did not discuss the many versions that don’t have pure Nash equilibria, but now mixed strategies allow us to take a different tack. Since we can model these games as two-person zero-sum games, von Neumann’s and Robinson’s theorems apply, and the mixed Nash equilibria are meaningful. We will use the Excel sheet Election2.xlsm, where the payoff matrix is calculated automatically, and where we implement Brown’s fictitious play method to approximate mixed Nash equilibria.We lay a foundation},
author = {Erich Prisner},
booktitle = {Game Theory Through Examples},
edition = {1},
pages = {220--224},
publisher = {Mathematical Association of America},
title = {Example: Election II},
year = {2014}
}