@inbook{10.7758/9781610446792.15,
 ISBN = {9780871546593},
 URL = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7758/9781610446792.15},
 abstract = {The static general equilibrium model has left us with a fundamental proposition in welfare economics: If “external effects” are absent from consumption and production, then a competitive equilibrium allocation is also a Pareto optimal allocation. Much of social policy may be thought of as an attempt to cope with or exploit these externalities. Phelps’s paper on game-equilibrium growth focuses on adynamiceconomy with consumption externalities. Individuals are neither perfectly selfish nor perfectly altruistic. The utility function of a generation depends upon its own consumption and upon the consumption of each of the future generations.Since Phelps’s generations are not},
 author = {Karl Shell},
 booktitle = {Altruism, Morality, and Economic Theory},
 pages = {141--146},
 publisher = {Russell Sage Foundation},
 title = {Comment},
 year = {1975}
}