|
ACCELERATING COMBAT POWER IN AFGHANISTAN
|
2009 |
|
Afghanistan Order of Battle 2009-2012
|
2012 |
|
Afghanistan Order of Battle 2013
|
2013 |
|
Afghanistan Order of Battle 2013
|
2013 |
|
Afghanistan Order of Battle 2013
|
2013 |
|
Afghanistan Order of Battle 2013
|
2013 |
|
Afghanistan Order of Battle 2013
|
2013 |
|
Afghanistan Order of Battle 2013
|
2013 |
|
Afghanistan Order of Battle 2013
|
2013 |
|
Afghanistan Order of Battle 2013
|
2013 |
|
Afghanistan Order of Battle 2013
|
2013 |
|
Afghanistan Order of Battle 2013
|
2013 |
|
Afghanistan Order of Battle 2013
|
2013 |
|
Afghanistan Order of Battle 2014
|
2014 |
|
Afghanistan Order of Battle 2014
|
2014 |
|
Afghanistan Order of Battle 2014
|
2014 |
|
Afghanistan Order of Battle 2014
|
2014 |
|
Afghanistan Order of Battle 2014
|
2014 |
|
Afghanistan Order of Battle 2014
|
2014 |
|
Afghanistan Order of Battle 2014
|
2014 |
|
Afghanistan Order of Battle 2014
|
2014 |
|
Afghanistan Order of Battle 2014
|
2014 |
|
Afghanistan Order of Battle 2014
|
2014 |
|
Afghanistan Order of Battle 2014
|
2014 |
|
Afghanistan Order of Battle 2014
|
2014 |
|
Afghanistan Order of Battle 2015
|
2015 |
|
Afghanistan Order of Battle 2015
|
2015 |
|
Afghanistan Order of Battle 2015
|
2015 |
|
Afghanistan Order of Battle 2015
|
2015 |
|
Afghanistan Order of Battle 2015
|
2015 |
|
Afghanistan Order of Battle 2015
|
2015 |
|
Afghanistan Order of Battle 2015
|
2015 |
|
Afghanistan Order of Battle 2015
|
2015 |
|
Afghanistan Order of Battle 2015
|
2015 |
|
Afghanistan Order of Battle 2015
|
2015 |
|
Afghanistan Order of Battle 2015
|
2015 |
|
Afghanistan Order of Battle 2016
|
2016 |
|
Afghanistan Order of Battle 2016
|
2016 |
|
Afghanistan Order of Battle 2016
|
2016 |
|
Afghanistan Order of Battle 2016
|
2016 |
|
Afghanistan Order of Battle 2016
|
2016 |
|
Afghanistan Order of Battle 2016
|
2016 |
|
Afghanistan Order of Battle 2016
|
2016 |
|
Afghanistan Order of Battle 2016
|
2016 |
|
Afghanistan Order of Battle 2017
|
2017 |
|
AFTER THE SURGE::
TASK FORCE RAIDER’S EXPERIENCE IN IRAQ
|
2010 |
|
AL QAEDA AND ISIS::
EXISTENTIAL THREATS TO THE U.S. AND EUROPE
|
2016 |
|
AL-QAEDA IN IRAQ RESURGENT:
THE BREAKING THE WALLS CAMPAIGN, PART I
|
2013 |
|
AL-QAEDA IN IRAQ RESURGENT, PART II
|
2013 |
|
ANALYSIS OF THE AFGHAN DEFENSE APPOINTMENTS
|
2010 |
|
“AN ARMY IN ALL CORNERS” ASSAD’S CAMPAIGN STRATEGY IN SYRIA
|
2015 |
|
ASSAD STRIKES DAMASCUS:
THE BATTLE FOR SYRIA’S CAPITAL
|
2014 |
|
BALANCING MALIKI:
SHIFTING COALITIONS IN IRAQI POLITICS AND THE RISE OF THE IRAQI PARLIAMENT
|
2009 |
|
BUILDING SECURITY FORCES AND MINISTERIAL CAPACITY::
IRAQ AS A PRIMER
|
2009 |
|
THE CAMPAIGN FOR HOMS AND ALEPPO:
THE ASSAD REGIME’S STRATEGY IN 2013
|
2014 |
|
CONSOLIDATING PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES IN SOUTHERN AFGHANISTAN
|
2010 |
|
COUNTERINSURGENCY IN HELMAND:
PROGRESS AND REMAINING CHALLENGES
|
2011 |
|
COUNTERINSURGENCY IN KANDAHAR:
EVALUATING THE 2010 HAMKARI CAMPAIGN
|
2010 |
|
Defining Success in AFGHANISTAN
|
2011 |
|
ESCALATION INTERVENTION:
PART 2
|
2011 |
|
The Fragmentation of the Sadrist Movement
|
2009 |
|
THE FREE SYRIAN ARMY
|
2013 |
|
THE HAQQANI NETWORK:
FROM PAKISTAN TO AFGHANISTAN
|
2010 |
|
THE HAQQANI NETWORK:
A STRATEGIC THREAT
|
2012 |
|
THE HAQQANI NETWORK IN KURRAM:
THE REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF A GROWING INSURGENCY
|
2011 |
|
HEZBOLLAH IN SYRIA
|
2014 |
|
IRANIAN INFLUENCE:
IN THE LEVANT, EGYPT, IRAQ, AND AFGHANISTAN
|
2012 |
|
IRANIAN NAVAL AND MARITIME STRATEGY
|
2013 |
|
IRANIAN STRATEGY IN SYRIA
|
2013 |
|
IRAN’S TWO NAVIES:
A MATURING MARITIME STRATEGY
|
2011 |
|
IRAQ ORDER OF BATTLE 2011
|
2011 |
|
IRAQ’S 2014 NATIONAL ELECTIONS
|
2014 |
|
IRAQ’S SUNNIS IN CRISIS
|
2013 |
|
THE IRRECONCILABLES::
THE HAQQANI NETWORK
|
2010 |
|
THE ISIS DEFENSE IN IRAQ AND SYRIA::
COUNTERING AN ADAPTIVE ENEMY
|
2015 |
|
ISIS Forecast::
Ramadan 2016
|
2016 |
|
ISIS GOVERNANCE IN SYRIA
|
2014 |
|
ISIS’S GLOBAL STRATEGY::
A WARGAME
|
2015 |
|
THE ISLAMIC STATE::
A COUNTER-STRATEGY FOR A COUNTER-STATE
|
2014 |
|
THE ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ RETURNS TO DIYALA
|
2014 |
|
JABHAT AL NUSRA AND ISIS::
SOURCES OF STRENGTH
|
2016 |
|
KUNAR AND NURISTAN:
RETHINKING U.S. COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS
|
2009 |
|
MALIKI’S AUTHORITARIAN REGIME
|
2013 |
|
MARJAH’S LESSONS FOR KANDAHAR
|
2010 |
|
THE NORTHERN ALLIANCE PREPARES FOR AFGHAN ELECTIONS IN 2014
|
2013 |
|
OPERATION MOSHTARAK::
PREPARING FOR THE BATTLE OF MARJAH
|
2010 |
|
OPERATION MOSHTARAK::
TAKING AND HOLDING MARJAH
|
2010 |
|
THE QUETTA SHURA TALIBAN IN SOUTHERN AFGHANISTAN::
ORGANIZATION, OPERATIONS, AND SHADOW GOVERNANCE
|
2009 |
|
THE RESURGENCE OF ASA’IB AHL AL-HAQ
|
2012 |
|
REVERSING THE NORTHEASTERN INSURGENCY
|
2011 |
|
ROOTS OF REBELLION:
PART I
|
2011 |
|
SECTARIAN AND REGIONAL CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST
|
2013 |
|
SECURING HELMAND:
UNDERSTANDING AND RESPONDING TO THE ENEMY
|
2009 |
|
A STRATEGY TO DEFEAT THE ISLAMIC STATE
|
2014 |
|
THE STRUGGLE FOR SYRIA IN 2011:
AN OPERATIONAL AND REGIONAL ANALYSIS
|
2011 |
|
SYRIAN ARMED OPPOSITION POWERBROKERS
|
2016 |
|
SYRIA’S ARMED OPPOSITION
|
2012 |
|
SYRIA’S MATURING INSURGENCY
|
2012 |
|
SYRIA’S POLITICAL OPPOSITION
|
2012 |
|
THE TALIBAN'S CAMPAIGN FOR KANDAHAR
|
2009 |
|
THE TIDE TURNS:
PART 4
|
2011 |
|
UNCERTAIN FUTURE FOR THE SONS OF IRAQ
|
2010 |
|
THE U.S. IN IRAQ BEYOND 2011:
A DIMINISHING BUT STILL VITAL ROLE
|
2011 |
|
UZBEK MILITANCY IN PAKISTAN’S TRIBAL REGION
|
2011 |
|
WILL THE MARINES PUSH INTO NORTHERN HELMAND?
|
2010 |