In 1973, the Supreme Court of Canada in R.v. Calder rendered a legal decision that would have significant consequences for Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples in Canada. In that decision, a majority of the court for the first time recognized the legal existence of “Aboriginal title to land” (Macklem, 2001: 268–9). As a result, “the federal government was forced to reconsider at least some elements of its policy on land claims because of Calder, a decision that confirmed that Indian title is a valid right in common law” (RCAP, 1996: 533; see also Macklem, 2001: 269). Reflecting on the court’s...

This chapter sets the stage for the rest of the book by first describing the institutional framework and players involved in the comprehensive land claims process and then specifying the preferences and incentives of the Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal actors. It finds that the institutional framework of the modern treaty process privileges the government actors over the Aboriginal ones. As a result, Aboriginal participants who want to complete treaties must somehow convince the Crown that a completed treaty is a preferable outcome. On the basis of these findings, subsequent chapters examine the experiences of four particular Aboriginal groups in order to...

In the mid-to late 1970s, both the Innu and the Inuit in Labrador submitted statements of intent to begin negotiating comprehensive land claims agreements with the Canadian Crown. As part of their original submissions, both groups claimed the Voisey’s Bay area, which in 1994 was found to contain a multi-billion-dollar nickel deposit. Some commentators at the time believed that this discovery, combined with the provincial government’s strong interest in mining-based economic development in Labrador, would allow the Inuit and the Innu to complete land claims settlements. Indeed, these were the lessons gleaned from the negotiations in Quebec by the James...

In contrast to other Aboriginal groups in Canada, the fourteen First Nations in the Yukon Territory¹ decided to negotiate an Umbrella Final Agreement (UFA) with the federal and Yukon governments. Once the UFA was completed, each Yukon First Nation was to use it as a tem plate for negotiating individual final agreements. Although each First Nation could negotiate specific provisions that gave the template provisions greater relevance to particular circumstances and interests, many things were unchangeable, including the number and type of powers, lands, and jurisdictions.

Throughout the Yukon process, government and Aboriginal policy-makers were optimistic about completing the Yukon...

Rather than being a normative critique of the modern treaty process, the main goal of this Rather than being a normative critique of the modern treaty process‚ the main goal of this book was to generate a social scientific explanation of modern treaty settlements versus non-settlements in Canada. Based on the experiences of four Aboriginal groups in the Yukon Territory and in Labrador, I argue that an Aboriginal group is more likely to complete a comprehensive land claims agreement in the presence of four factors (compatible goals with governments, minimal confrontational tactics, Aboriginal group cohesion as it relates to treaty...

Comprehensive land claims agreements are fundamentally important and contested tools of public policy. Much of the literature on modern treaties has taken a normative perspective in which value judgments have been assigned to the different processes and outcomes produced. As well, a rich body of scholarship has emerged alongside the normative literature that has examined inductively the evolution of these negotiations into treaty settlements. This book has tried to add to these literatures by taking a different approach to the subject, one that is more explanatory than normative, and one that is more deductive than inductive. At the root of...

Since the completion and submission of this book manuscript to University of Toronto Press for publication, a number of important developments relating to the Labrador Innu have occurred. Originally, the Innu research for this book was undertaken in 2006. Based on that research, I found that for much of their negotiating history, the Innu have not been able to achieve the necessary strategies to complete a treaty. However, I also found that post-2001, there was some evidence that the Labrador Innu were starting to experience some internal changes that would potentially improve their ability to complete a treaty. The results...