It is perhaps ironic that the Anglo-American reception of G. W. F. Hegel’s the Philosophy of Right first published in 1821 has developed along its own dialectical path.¹ In essence, Hegel’s dialectic unfolds in the following way: we begin with an initial standpoint, we then next move toward a consideration of its opposite standpoint, and then we arrive at a middle position between these initial two extremes. The ensuing reception of the Philosophy of Right curiously follows a similar tale of moving from one position to its opposite, only to settle at a middle position between the two earlier extremes....

Hegel never intended his Philosophy of Right to stand on its own, but instead it was meant to be read against the backdrop of his larger philosophical system, which he lays out in his Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences. Hegel’s intentions are clear from the first passages in the preface to the Philosophy of Right, where he says:

This textbook is a more extensive, and in particular a more systematic, exposition of the same basic concepts which, in relation to this part of philosophy, are already contained in a previous work designed to accompany my lectures, namely my Encyclopaedia of...

Hegel’s views on property are one of the most misunderstood aspects of his thought. We can best correct these misunderstandings only by interpreting his comments on property in full light of their place in the Philosophy of Right and the place of the Philosophy of Right within Hegel’s larger philosophical system.

Hegel’s Philosophy of Right is divided into three parts, each related to one another dialectically.¹ These parts are ‘abstract right [abstrakte Recht]’ (PR, §§ 34–104), ‘morality [Moralität]’ (PR, §§ 105–41), and ‘ethical life [Sittlichkeit]’ (PR, §§ 142–360). Most commentators have restricted their analyses of Hegel’s theory...

Amongst contemporary theorists, the most widespread interpretation of Hegel’s theory of punishment is that it is a retributivist theory of annulment, where punishments cancel the performance of crimes.¹ The theory is retributivist because it holds both that (a) criminals can be punished only if punishment is deserved and (b) the value of punishment must be proportional to the nature of its corresponding crime, rather than to any consequentialist considerations. Thus, Antony Duff says:

[Retributivism] justifies punishment in terms not of its contingently beneficial effects but of its intrinsic justice as a response to crime; the justificatory relationship holds between present...

Hegel’s views on morality have attracted much controversy, particularly with regards to his criticisms of Kant’s moral theory. Famously, Hegel accused Kantian morality of being overly formalistic and lacking in content. Kant’s defenders have argued that Hegel’s criticisms fall wide of the mark, while Hegel’s admirers, such as F. H. Bradley, claim his criticisms ‘annihilated’ Kant’s theory.¹ Both sides offer a compelling picture and the debate between the two is seemingly intractable, with neither side willing to concede much ground.

This chapter offers a new position on this old debate. I agree with Kant’s defenders that Hegel’s criticisms are at...

Perhaps one of the areas of Hegel’s political philosophy that has received the least attention is his theory of the family.¹ This lack of attention is certainly not the result of agreement with his readers. In fact, Hegel’s views have attracted much criticism.² This criticism concerns Hegel’s defence of the traditional family: a husband and wife raising children in a monogamous relationship where only the husband engages in activities outside the home, such as employment or full political participation. Such views have brought the ire of feminists, in particular, leading one feminist critic to argue that we should all ‘spit...

Hegel’s legal philosophy has been categorized in various ways. Different commentators claim Hegel’s theory endorses natural law,¹ legal positivism,² the historical school of jurisprudence,³ a precursor of Marxist legal theory,⁴ postmodern critical theory⁵ or even transcendental idealist legal theory.⁶ In my previous work, I have argued that Hegel’s legal philosophy occupies a space in between natural law and legal positivism.⁷ I no longer hold this view and present a new picture of Hegel’s legal theory in this chapter.

I will defend the position that Hegel is a natural lawyer, although not of a more familiar variety. Natural lawyers argue that...

Perhaps one of the most controversial aspects of G. W. F. Hegel’s Philosophy of Right for contemporary interpreters is its discussion of the constitutional monarch [der konstitutionell Monarch].¹ This is true despite the general agreement amongst virtually all interpreters that Hegel’s monarch is no more powerful than modern constitutional monarchies, such as those found in Britain.² This common view has only recently come into vogue, as Hegel’s monarch had long been seen as evidence of Hegel’s defence of the reactionary Prussian authority of his time. The view of Hegel as a reactionary was put forward most forcefully (and famously) by...

Hegel’s controversial views on war have been the main focus of interest in his theory of international relations as a whole, perhaps the most neglected area of Hegel’s political thought.¹ The controversy surrounding Hegel’s discussion of war centres on the question of whether or not Hegel advocates war as a state policy. Earlier commentators, particularly in the aftermath of the Second World War, believed that Hegel defends a state eager to wage war. Thus, for example, Bertrand Russell says: ‘Hegel’s doctrine of the State . . . [is] a doctrine which, if accepted, justifies every internal tyranny and every external...

Ever since the publication of Benedetto Croce’s What is Living and What is Dead of the Philosophy of Hegel, commentators on Hegel’s philosophy traditionally conclude their studies with an assessment of the merits of Hegel’s project.¹ This study will be no different.

In this book, I have argued for a systematic reading of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. This reading is both consistent with Hegel’s own self-understanding of his project and offers a more robust interpretation of the Philosophy of Right, providing a clear advance on existing studies of this important text. A principal target throughout has been Allen Wood’s influential...