As this book is going to print, events of enormous historical significance are sweeping Europe. One of the consequences of these developments is the reemergence of a phenomenon, nationalism, which since 1945 has more or less lain dormant. As postwar Europe split into two rival blocs, the respective members set aside historic differences in the interest of unity and security. Traditional national and ethnic rivalries either receded in importance as they gave way to efforts at integration, as was the case in the West, or were forcibly repressed, as in the case of the East. Nationalism had become an anachronism,...

Near an iron trestle bridge, small groups of uniformed Germans stood waiting in the snow. Their field-gray overcoats harmonized with the low, overcast January sky. Halfway across the bridge spanning the frozen San River, near the ancient Polish town of Przemysl, was a figure dressed in brown and wearing a peaked cap with a small red star, marking him as a soldier in the Soviet Red Army and, at least for the time being, as an ally of the Germans. At the far end of the bridge stood a few other brown forms. These allies in gray and brown occasionally...

The ceremonies at Przemysl also commemorated Himmler’s successful quest to become the preeminent Reich authority in allVolksdeutschematters. Before his encounter with the VolhynianVolksdeutscheand before enlisting them as auxiliaries to serve SS purposes, he had already extended his personal authority over them. An important early step in this process was centralizing control over the myriad of groups and individuals inside the Reich promoting theVolksdeutschecause. Himmler did not initiate the process but rather discovered it in progress and directed it to its conclusion and to his advantage. His principal instrument in this effort was an office...

For the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle, as for all organizations in the Third Reich, Adolf Hitler was the ultimate authority. As Führer, he was the leader of the NSDAP and the “movement.” As Reich chancellor, he was the head of the government and all its ministries and agencies. Originating at a common source, his authority filtered down through two channels, the Nazi party and the state. Although neither he nor his subordinates always respected the distinction between party and state, at times he found it useful. The state provided a counterbalance to the party. Within the party, certain individuals had built up...

Having an SS officer of Werner Lorenz’s stature directing the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle was an important preliminary step in Himmler’s campaign to extend his influence over the German minorities of Europe. By no means was this step an end goal. Much still remained to be done before Himmler could claim theVolksdeutscheas his exclusive auxiliaries and exploit them for SS purposes. Kursell and others had already initiated efforts to nazify the minorities, and the new leaders actively continued the effort. But nazification abroad required completing theGleichschaltungat home.

In pursuit of this objective, Lorenz focused on securing direct VoMi...

TheGleichschaltungofVolkstumactivities in the Reich, as performed by Himmler’s SS subordinates at VoMi, prepared the way for the nazification of the minorities abroad. As VoMi brought Reich organizations and individuals in line, it also guided the minorities onto the correct political path. Once converted to National Socialism, or at least to sympathy with the Nazi cause and to accepting Adolf Hitler as their Führer, theVolksdeutscheof Europe could be exploited in the interests of the Third Reich—or more specifically, as Himmler hoped, the interests of the SS.

Before the war, it was Hitler’s foreign policy,...

With the exception of the South Tyroleans and the Carpathian Germans, theVolksdeutschediscussed so far achieved their principal revisionist goals of unifying their homelands with the Reich and joining the main body of theVolkas Reich citizens. Hitler’s expansive foreign policy happened to coincide with their revisionist expectations. But with a few exceptions, for the rest of Europe’sVolksdeutsche—those living in the Baltic States, southeastern Europe, the west, and the Soviet Union—their hopes for some sort of unification with the Reich did not materialize, either in the prewar period or even during the war years. Hitler’s...

On 6 October 1939, shortly after Germany’s annihilation of Poland, Hitler stood before the Reichstag and proclaimed that with the recent victory, Germany’s territorial demands had been satisfied and that he was henceforth interested only in peace. As evidence of his peaceful intentions, he solemnly announced that he would shortly resettle the remaining Germans of eastern Europe to the Reich and its newly acquired territories, thereby eliminating a potential source of friction and conflict.¹ The Nazi party newspaper, theVolkischer Beobachter,hailed his proposal as the “Magna Carta” of the European east.²

Although it is doubtful that Hitler’s resettlement program...

Hitler’s decision to resettle theVolksdeutscheappeared at first glance to be a reversal of Reich policy toward the minorities. Before 6 October 1939, it was assumed that his policy was revisionist, aiming to unite theVolksdeutschewith the main body of theVolkthrough annexations. This had been the case with theAnschlussof Austria, the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, the reincorporation of the Memelland, and the invasion of Poland. The resettlement program therefore came as a surprise. Those most astonished and perplexed by the Führer’s apparent reversal were the remainingVolksdeutsche,most of whom had viewed his expansion to...

The primary reason for resettling theVolksdeutscheof Italy, the Baltic States, and eastern Poland was Hitler’s concern that they could create difficulties with his allies, Stalin and Mussolini, and would thereby disrupt his foreign policy plans. But quite different considerations determined the wartime fates of the rest of Europe’sVolksdeutsche,especially those of southeastern Europe. Instead of being seen as potential sources of conflict, they were regarded as crucial, mostly positive links between the Reich and the states and peoples of the region. It was not in the Reich’s interest to remove them. But there were several exceptions to...

When the resettlers answered the call of the Führer, packed their belongings on wagons, trains, and boats, and bid a final farewell to their ancestral homelands, they had some misgivings about their future, but overall they felt confident that their lives would somehow go on. Few, however, could have imagined what awaited them. As they experienced the harsh realities of life in the Third Reich, the euphoria of the initial welcomes, especially for those privileged to have someone of Himmler’s stature present at their arrival, quickly dissipated.

They first encountered a bewildering series of physical, racial, occupational, and political examinations...

Resettlement did not eliminate all German minorities from foreign lands. TheVolksdeutscheof Slovakia, Hungary, most of Rumania, the two successor states of partitioned Yugoslavia (Croatia and Serbia-Banat), Denmark, and the Soviet Union remained in their homelands. Reich policy toward these groups continued as in the prewar period, preserving them as distinct ethnic-racial entities and using them as Reich interests required. Far more, however, was expected of them. TheseVolksdeutsche, no less than Reich Germans and the resettlers, would have to contribute to the war effort, as defined and directed by Himmler and the SS. Consequently VoMi assumed dual and...

After prewar territorial changes, resettlements, and the earliest hostilities, only seven major groups ofVolksdeutscheremained as national minorities into the war years: in Slovakia, Hungary, Rumania, the two successor states of Yugoslavia (Croatia and Serbia-Banat), Denmark, and the Soviet Union. The termminority, with its negative connotation of second-class citizens, referred only to their numerical size. The Reich’s military presence and dominant influence in these states helped elevate them to a privileged status equal to or even superior to that of the majority nationalities. They paid a price for their improved status, however, in contributions to the Reich’s war...

As early as March 1943, shortly after Himmler’s initial order to evacuate theVolksdeutschefrom Russia, Lorenz alerted minority leaders Schmidt, Altgayer, and Karmasin about the possibility of evacuatingVolksdeutschefrom southeastern Europe.¹ Planning for an evacuation was an extremely sensitive matter, since any preparations of this sort—especially at this early date—smacked of defeatism and ran counter to Hitler’s intent to fight to the end. Consequently, all references to evacuation were couched in provisional terms, implying a later return, once the military situation improved.

According to VoMi’s master plan, its RKFDV sections as well as those dealing with...