By providing a chronological overview of English-language feminist engagements with Rawls fromA Theory of Justice (TJ)onward,¹ this “biography of a bibliography” displays the range of issues canvassed by feminist readers of Rawls as well as their wide disagreement about the value of his corpus for feminist purposes. As we shall see, feminist responses to Rawls’s first articulation of his theory of justice were, for the most part, critical yet hopeful. This early debate coalesced around such themes as whether his principles of justice extend to family relations; what it requires for a family to be just; and what...

As the introduction to this volume shows, John Rawls’s turn, if that is what it was, to political liberalism from the comprehensive liberalism ofTJwas not generally greeted as a welcome turn of events by many feminists. According to the standard interpretation, Rawls, buffeted by the criticisms of communitarians and conservative religious attacks on liberalism, retreated from the bold universal egalitarian theory of his early work to a more limited, cautious, and conciliatory approach in the later work. Among the losers, claim many feminists, were women (Okin 1994; Nussbaum 2003).

What is odd about this interpretation of events is...

As indicated in the introduction to this volume, Rawls has been enormously influential in contemporary political philosophy, and his ideas and methods continue to shape philosophical debates about justice, liberty, equality, autonomy, and democracy. Given the centrality of Rawlsian concepts to these debates, feminist political theorists must consider how and whether Rawls’s work can be employed for feminist ends. Because he moves beyond a narrow focus on individuals and emphasizes the importance of the “basic structure” of society, Rawls’s theory of justice—and his later work on political liberalism—may appear promising to feminists seeking to rectify inequalities in society’s...

InTJ, Rawls famously wrote that self-respect is “perhaps the most important primary good” (440). Indeed, he adduced its primacy to defend his theory of justice in a number of places. But as subsequent discussion has shown, he was imprecise in defining “self-respect,” using the term interchangeably with “self-esteem.” Moreover, he failed to examine systematically the implications of its primacy; while he claimed that equal liberties, equal opportunity, the difference principle, and the contract model itself supported self-respect, he did not inquire whether there were other important social determinants that should, in consistency, be treated as social bases and distributed...

In Section 50 ofJFR, titled “The Family as a Basic Institution,” Rawls replies to Okin’s feminist critique ofTJ. He states, “If we say the gender system includes whatever social arrangements adversely affect the equal basic liberties and opportunities of women, as well of those of their children as future citizens, then surely that system is subject to critique by the principles of justice” (JFR, 167–68). As the introduction to this volume demonstrates, the question of how Rawlsian justice might secure gender equality has been discussed by many feminists, most notably Okin. However, the Rawls-Okin debate raises more...

When political theorists and philosophers take up the question of disability, they generally do so with regard to questions of justice:allocationof resources to disabled people (whether directly through accommodation, subsidy, or health care, or indirectly, say, through scientific research);distributionof resources (which disabilities or illnesses should receive more dollars, which less; how do we decide from which other programs or areas to take resources in order to pay for that?);entitlementto resources (should public buses be fitted for wheelchair lifts if extremely few residents use wheelchairs?); andadequacyof resources (in granting disability payments through Social...

InFrontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership(2006), Martha Nussbaum advances a feminist critique of Rawls’s theory of international justice. While she identifies herself as a student of Rawls and dedicates the book to his memory, Nussbaum seeks to show the insufficiency of his theory of international justice, particularly as found in hisLP, when it comes to defending the rights of women in developing countries. She contends that this insufficiency is mainly due to his use of social contract theory, and its attendant concepts of basic human rights, nationality, and the public-private distinction. In contrast, she offers an...

In this chapter, I look at Jean Hampton’s “feminist contractarianism” to explore what she means by the term “contractarian” and to evaluate the extent to which her work can provide resources for feminism. I start by considering Hampton’s proposed contract in order to draw out some critical distinctions between her Kantianism and that of Rawls. Crucially, Hampton keeps the image of what it means to respectoneselfas a free and equal person in play, as providing a test that should be repeated whenever anyone wants to decide if a particular relationship is just. This is in contrast with Rawls,...

As we have seen in the introduction to this volume, inPLRawls argues for a turn in political philosophy from conceiving liberalism as a comprehensive moral doctrine to conceiving it as a public political philosophy. This reflects the conviction that coercive state action is justified—when constitutional essentials and basic justice are at stake—only if supported by “public reasons” (PL, 227–30). Public reasons are not the particular reasons of any one comprehensive moral doctrine. They are reasons sharable by the many reasonable comprehensive moral doctrines citizens hold. Some feminist liberals have recommended that feminists develop feminism as...