The idea is nowadays current that recent work in neurophysiology strongly counterindicates the doctrine of free will. The present piece seeks to exhibit the incorrectness of this view.
The Journal of Speculative Philosophy publishes systematic and interpretive essays about basic philosophical questions. Scholars examine the constructive interaction between Continental and American philosophy, as well as novel developments in the ideas and theories of past philosophers that have relevance for contemporary thinkers. The journal also features discussions of art, religion, and literature that are not strictly or narrowly philosophical. Book reviews are included in each issue.
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