How Much Is Enough?

How Much Is Enough?: Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969

Alain C . Enthoven
K. Wayne Smith
Copyright Date: 1971
Edition: 1
Published by: RAND Corporation
Pages: 394
https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/cb403
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  • Book Info
    How Much Is Enough?
    Book Description:

    Originally published in 1971, and now published with a new foreword, this is a book of enduring value and lasting relevance. The authors detail the application, history, and controversies surrounding the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS), used to evaluate military needs and to choose among alternatives for meeting those needs.

    eISBN: 978-0-8330-4814-1
    Subjects: Political Science, Technology, Management & Organizational Behavior

Table of Contents

  1. Front Matter
    (pp. i-vi)
  2. Introduction to the New Edition
    (pp. vii-viii)

    Resource allocation issues have long loomed large in Department of Defense (DoD) deliberations. As such, they continue to be the subjects of much of the RAND Corporation’s research on behalf of the DoD.How Much Is Enough?grew out of our early experience in fashioning workable methods for systematically evaluating the choices posed in allocating resources. It is being brought back into print by RAND now as both a classic account of the application of new and powerful means of analysis and a cautionary history of the controversies that inevitably arose from those efforts. The question and the lessons of...

  3. Foreword to the New Edition
    (pp. ix-xvi)
    Kenneth J. Krieg and David S.C. Chu

    We are honored by the opportunity to write a foreword to this new edition ofHow Much Is Enough?A work of enduring value and lasting relevance, it is both a classic account of the application of powerful ideas to the problem of managing the Department of Defense (DoD) and a cautionary history of the controversies inspired by that successful effort. Our hope is to provide its readers an appreciation of its ideas, the way in which they were applied, how they have continued to shape the nation's defenses, and why they are as powerful today as they were in...

  4. Preface
    (pp. xvii-xxii)
    Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith
  5. Table of Contents
    (pp. xxiii-xxviii)
  6. CHAPTER 1 Unfinished Business, 1961
    (pp. 1-30)

    The defense budget is today a matter of increasing public debate and concern. For a decade after Sputnik, however, the public mood in the United States was one of support for almost anything proposed in the name of national security. During this period, the Secretary of Defense was under constant pressure to spend more money than he believed necessary. In practically every conflict between the Secretary of Defense and the Congress over spending, the Congress wanted to spend more. The Armed Services Committees were rarely challenged by the rest of the Congress. Their main theme was that the military leaders...

  7. CHAPTER 2 New Concepts and New Tools to Shape the Defense Program
    (pp. 31-72)

    By January 1961, there was widespread recognition of the need for improvement in defense management. Through studies done at The Rand Corporation, the Harvard Business School, and elsewhere, many of the weaknesses in the current approach to defense management had been identified. Congressional leaders had expressed a desire for reforms. The 1958 Act had provided the Secretary of Defense with the legal authority he needed if he was to play an active part in shaping the defense program, but it had not yet been fully used. Because of the enormous size and complexity of the defense program and the strong...

  8. CHAPTER 3 Why Independent Analysts?
    (pp. 73-116)

    Very few people, with the possible exception of a few economists, believe that national economic policies should be decided mainly by economists. Very few people, except for a few welfare workers, believe that national welfare policies and programs should be determined primarily by welfare workers. Even fewer people believe that our nation’s educational programs and policies should be determined mainly by teachers and professors. These matters are all considered too important to be left to the experts. Indeed, what we need in these fields is more “civilian control.” And yet, ironically, many people believe that national military policies and programs...

  9. CHAPTER 4 NATO Strategy and Forces
    (pp. 117-164)

    One of the first major policy changes sought by the Kennedy administration in 1961 was to reduce the reliance on nuclear weapons for deterrence and defense and increase the reliance on conventional forces, especially in NATO. This change in strategy was not officially adopted by NATO until May 1967. During the interval, millions of words were written and spoken, both in this country and in Europe, regarding the merits and implications of this change. Much of the discussion in Europe sharply questioned American intentions in proposing it, causing persistent strains in the alliance. Why didn’t the Americans simply admit that...

  10. CHAPTER 5 Nuclear Strategy and Forces
    (pp. 165-196)

    In the Presidential campaign of 1960, John F. Kennedy made it clear that one of the priority items for review in his administration would be the doctrine of “massive retaliation.” Long before the campaign and its “missile-gap” oratory, Kennedy had aggressively attacked the basic assumption that strategic nuclear forces could be relied on as a universal deterrent to war. He called for recognition of the limited role of nuclear weapons and, in light of this, for major improvements in the U.S. nonnuclear forces. His reasons were clear and fundamental. The U.S. nuclear monopoly was gone. The Soviets had strong nuclear...

  11. CHAPTER 6 Yardsticks of Sufficiency
    (pp. 197-242)

    In April 1963, Secretary McNamara spoke to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, assembled at the Statler-Hilton Hotel in Washington, D.C., about how the Department of Defense was answering the timeless question, “How much is enough?”

    What I have been suggesting . . . is that the question of how to spend our defense dollars and how much to spend is a good deal more complicated than is often assumed. It cannot be assumed that a new weapon would really add to our national security, no matter how attractive the weapon can be made to seem, looked at by itself....

  12. CHAPTER 7 Three Controversial Program Decisions
    (pp. 243-266)

    In Chapter 2, we discussed the fundamental idea behind the Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS) as it was used in the Defense Department: to define explicitly, where possible, the national interest in defense programs and to insist that the national interest take precedence over local or institutional interests. Assured destruction and damage limiting are excellent examples of explicit criteria of the national interest which have been publicly stated and used as a measure of what defense planners have been trying to accomplish in the design of strategic forces. While recognizing the many qualitative factors that also must be considered, we believe that...

  13. CHAPTER 8 Some Problems in Wartime Defense Management
    (pp. 267-308)

    This chapter discusses the Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS) as it relates to decisions on Vietnam. More specifically, it focuses on the Systems Analysis office and Vietnam. It deals only with the effort to analyze and manage force deployments and a few related questions, not with the basic political, strategic, or moral issues of the war.

    PPBS was not involved in the really crucial issues of the Vietnam war. Should the United States have gone into Vietnam in the first place? Did we go in at the right time, in the right way, and on the right scale? What force levels should...

  14. CHAPTER 9 Unfinished Business, 1969
    (pp. 309-338)

    The work of improving the national defense program decision process calls for continuing effort. We have described the unfinished business of 1961. There was also much unfinished business when we left the Pentagon at the beginning of 1969. We have grouped the main items on the agenda under four general headings: (1) Need for More Effective and Balanced Outside Review and Interrogation, (2) Improving the Quality of Information Presented to the Secretary of Defense, (3) Lack of Adequate Financial Discipline, and (4) Strengthening Some Procedural Links. In what follows we make no pretense of treatingallthe many aspects of...

  15. Source Notes
    (pp. 339-348)
  16. Index
    (pp. 349-364)
  17. About the Authors
    (pp. 365-366)