Strategy-Policy Mismatch

Strategy-Policy Mismatch: How the U.S. Army Can Help Close Gaps in Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction

Timothy M. Bonds
Eric V. Larson
Derek Eaton
Richard E. Darilek
Copyright Date: 2014
Published by: RAND Corporation
Pages: 156
https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt14bs2zp
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  • Book Info
    Strategy-Policy Mismatch
    Book Description:

    Although two successive presidents have determined that weapons of mass destruction (WMD) pose the greatest threat to the American people and have listed countering their proliferation as a top strategic priority, neither administration has followed through by allocating appropriate budgetary resources to it. This report addresses and analyzes the ground force capacity and capabilities needed to perform WMD elimination missions and tasks.

    eISBN: 978-0-8330-8989-2
    Subjects: Technology, History, Political Science

Table of Contents

  1. Front Matter
    (pp. i-ii)
  2. Preface
    (pp. iii-iv)
  3. Table of Contents
    (pp. v-vi)
  4. Figures
    (pp. vii-viii)
  5. Tables
    (pp. ix-x)
  6. Summary
    (pp. xi-xx)
  7. Acknowledgments
    (pp. xxi-xxii)
  8. Abbreviations
    (pp. xxiii-xxvi)
  9. CHAPTER ONE Introduction
    (pp. 1-6)

    Although two successive presidents have determined that weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—particularly nuclear weapons in the hands of violent extremists—pose the greatest threat to the American people, and have decided that countering their proliferation is a top strategic priority, their administrations have not made countering WMD a priority when it comes to allocating budgetary resources to that overarching national mission. On the one hand, for example, the Department of Defense (DoD) has proclaimed that countering the proliferation of WMD is a primary mission of the U.S. military. On the other hand, DoD has decided that countering the proliferation...

  10. CHAPTER TWO Gaps Between Countering WMD and Prioritizing Resourcess
    (pp. 7-18)

    In this chapter, we review national security strategy, policy, and planning documents to show that theendsof countering WMD have consistently been accorded the highest level of strategic importance by the United States.¹ In addition, DoD has developed some of the ways to counter WMD—in terms of doctrine; tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP); and concepts. DoD also has made efforts to improve some of themeansfor accomplishing this mission, in terms of specialized headquarters and technologies.

    However, DoD to date has generally failed to bring its policies—i.e., thewaysandmeansto accomplish strategic missions—into...

  11. CHAPTER THREE Counter-WMD Missions and WMD-E Operations
    (pp. 19-40)

    In Chapter Two we pointed out that DoD has identified countering WMD as one of its highest-priority missions and has developed new doctrine and some technical headquarters capabilities, but does not use requirements of the counter-WMD mission to drive military capacity.

    In this chapter, we assess counter-WMD operations—in particular, the WMD-E mission—from several perspectives. First, we review the historical record of U.S. counter-WMD operations in OIF. Second, we examine currently looming threats, including the time imperatives associated with them. Third, we explore the various counter-WMD mission areas, as well as the military operations and force structures they imply....

  12. CHAPTER FOUR Illustrative WMD-E Scenarios and Ground Force Requirements
    (pp. 41-76)

    The potential scope and scale of the WMD-E mission, as well as the challenges to accomplishing it that might be encountered, can be illustrated through scenario analysis. In this chapter, we describe two prospective cases of WMD-E operations that are of particular salience today: the collapse of the DPRK and the counterfactual case of the collapse of a CW-armed Syrian Arab Republic. In addition to representing two emergent real-world cases, these scenarios can provide important insights into potential WMD-E force requirements in other scenarios. We direct our efforts here to the WMD-E mission for several reasons: First, because we believe...

  13. CHAPTER FIVE Concluding Observations
    (pp. 77-80)

    As established at the beginning of this report and reiterated throughout, the past two administrations have consistently proclaimed countering WMDs—particularly nuclear weapons—to be the highest priority objective of national security and military strategy. The grave and urgent priority of these strategicendsare not in dispute. In addition, this report has shown that DoD has made important progress in developing some of thewaysof countering WMD—in particular, it has developed relevant doctrine, CONOPS, and organizational templates for counter-WMD missions.

    There is little comparable evidence, however, that DoD has adequately considered themeansthat may be required...

  14. APPENDIX A Selected National Security Documents and Joint and Service Doctrine
    (pp. 81-100)
  15. APPENDIX B DPRK and Syrian WMD Sites
    (pp. 101-112)
  16. APPENDIX C Scenario Context for DPRK Case Study
    (pp. 113-118)
  17. APPENDIX D Review of Available Estimates on Support Ratio in Iraq
    (pp. 119-122)
  18. Bibliography
    (pp. 123-130)