Cruise Missile Penaid Nonproliferation

Cruise Missile Penaid Nonproliferation: Hindering the Spread of Countermeasures Against Cruise Missile Defenses

Richard H. Speier
George Nacouzi
K. Scott McMahon
Copyright Date: 2014
Published by: RAND Corporation
Pages: 62
https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt14bs4x4
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  • Book Info
    Cruise Missile Penaid Nonproliferation
    Book Description:

    An attacker’s missile-borne countermeasures to cruise missile defenses are known as penetration aids, or penaids. To support efforts to prevent the proliferation of penaid-related items, this research recommends controls on potential exports according to the structure of the international Missile Technology Control Regime.

    eISBN: 978-0-8330-8956-4
    Subjects: Political Science, Technology, History

Table of Contents

  1. Front Matter
    (pp. i-ii)
  2. Preface
    (pp. iii-iv)
  3. Table of Contents
    (pp. v-vi)
  4. Summary
    (pp. vii-viii)

    This research describes an approach to hindering the spread of countermeasures against cruise missile defenses. (Such countermeasures, when incorporated in an attacker’s missile or employed in conjunction with such a missile, are called penetration aids, orpenaids.) This approach involved compiling an unclassified list of penaid-relevant items that might be subject to internationally agreed-upon export controls.

    The list is designed to fit into the export-control structure of the current international policy against the proliferation of missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. This policy, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), sets rules agreed to by 34 governments for restricting...

  5. Acknowledgments
    (pp. ix-x)
  6. CHAPTER ONE Cruise Missile Penaid Nonproliferation
    (pp. 1-10)

    This research was designed to assist U.S. agencies charged with generating policies to discourage the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and cruise missile delivery systems. The objective was to develop new measures to restrict the proliferation of countermeasures (also known, when incorporated in or used with an attacker’s missiles, as penetration aids, orpenaids) against cruise missile defenses.

    It is necessary to identify the science and technology underpinning the development of penaids before policies can be designed to control the threat. Therefore, the research team focused on answering the following overarching research question: What technologies and equipment, if...

  7. CHAPTER TWO The Missile Technology Control Regime
    (pp. 11-18)

    The MTCR seeks to hinder the spread of rockets and UAVs—regardless of purpose (e.g., space launch, reconnaissance)—beyond a specified range/payload capability and sometimes only range capability, or regardless of range or payload capability if the systems are intended to deliver WMD.

    The MTCR’s Category I list consists of a relatively small number of items subject to the tightest export restrictions. The MTCR Guidelines state that such exports, if they occur at all, must be “rare” and subject to strong provisions with respect to supplier responsibility.

    The MTCR’s Category II list consists of items that can be used to...

  8. CHAPTER THREE Items Proposed for Penaid Export Controls
    (pp. 19-44)

    This report includes illustrations of some of the items suggested for MTCR controls. For example, as shown in slide 14, a given UAV or cruise missile may contain many penaid-related components.

    Slide 15 applies to all candidate MTCR items discussed in this report. Note that some penaid items, such as decoys, might not be carried on the UAV itself but may be deployed by another vehicle or system in conjunction with the operation of the UAV.

    The most obvious candidate for controls is the complete penaid subsystem. Slide 16 shows an integrated penaid on the left and some potential modules...

  9. CHAPTER FOUR Implementing Penaid Export Controls
    (pp. 45-46)

    Although penaid export controls present some definitional and structural issues, such issues are familiar matters in the implementation of the MTCR.

    For example, the problem of differentiating between appropriate and inappropriate uses of dual-use items is broadly addressed by the MTCR’s case-by-case review procedures, which apply the following six criteria (see MTCR, undated):

    A. Concerns about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;

    B. The capabilities and objectives of the missile and space programs of the recipient state;

    C. The significance of the transfer in terms of the potential development of delivery systems (other than manned aircraft) for weapons of...

  10. CHAPTER FIVE Concluding Observations
    (pp. 47-48)

    This report illustrated how the MTCR Annex could be modified to provide better controls on cruise missile and UAV penetration aids. If enacted, the MTCR modifications suggested here (and those in our previous report on ballistic missile penetration aids; see Speier, McMahon, and Nacouzi, 2014) would constitute one of the most significant adjustments to the regime since its inception in 1987. The recommended modifications, or some variant of them, would strengthen the regime’s ability to impede the spread of increasingly lethal cruise missiles capable of penetrating missile defenses and delivering WMD.

    Although policy considerations were beyond the scope of this...

  11. References
    (pp. 49-52)