Improving Air Force Command and Control Through Enhanced Agile Combat Support Planning, Execution, Monitoring, and Control Processes

Improving Air Force Command and Control Through Enhanced Agile Combat Support Planning, Execution, Monitoring, and Control Processes

Robert S. Tripp
Kristin F. Lynch
John G. Drew
Robert G. DeFeo
Copyright Date: 2012
Published by: RAND Corporation
Pages: 218
https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt5hhvf1
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  • Book Info
    Improving Air Force Command and Control Through Enhanced Agile Combat Support Planning, Execution, Monitoring, and Control Processes
    Book Description:

    Many factors contribute to imbalances between needed agile combat support (ACS) resources and those available at any given time to simultaneously meet all requirements for contingency and training operations. This report describes ACS process gaps and recommends implementation strategies to facilitate changes needed to improve Air Force command and control through enhanced ACS planning, execution, monitoring, and control processes.

    eISBN: 978-0-8330-8311-1
    Subjects: Technology

Table of Contents

  1. Front Matter
    (pp. i-ii)
  2. Preface
    (pp. iii-x)
  3. Table of Contents
    (pp. xi-xiv)
  4. Figures
    (pp. xv-xviii)
  5. Tables
    (pp. xix-xx)
  6. Summary
    (pp. xxi-xxx)
  7. Acknowledgments
    (pp. xxxi-xxxiv)
  8. Abbreviations
    (pp. xxxv-xlviii)
  9. CHAPTER ONE Introduction, Background, and Motivation
    (pp. 1-10)

    Command and control (C2) of air and space power is a fundamental function of the Air Force that enables the United States to conduct operations that accomplish specific military objectives. According to Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, command and control is defined as

    the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. C2 includes both the process by which the commander decides what action is to be taken and the systems that facilitate planning, execution, and monitoring of those actions. Specifically, C2 includes the battlespace management...

  10. CHAPTER TWO Approach and Analytic Framework
    (pp. 11-18)

    This chapter begins by presenting the research approach used in this analysis (see Figure 2.1). It then outlines how the operational environment has evolved in the past several years.

    For this analysis, we begin by reviewing the PAF enterprise command and control OA developed in 2002 and expanded in 2006. We then examine the extent to which recent changes have affected both the AS-IS and TO-BE ACS planning, execution, monitoring, and control processes. For each area—process, doctrine, training, tools and systems, and organizations—we summarize the recommendations of the previous analyses and evaluate Air Force progress in addressing the...

  11. CHAPTER THREE Agile Combat Support Planning, Execution, Monitoring, and Control AS-IS Process Shortfalls
    (pp. 19-30)

    In this chapter, we begin by reviewing the process shortfalls that we identified in our 2009 gap analysis. Many of these gaps were identified previously in the 2002 and 2006 enterprise command and control OAs (Leftwich et al., 2002; Mills, 2006). We discuss Air Force progress in closing those gaps and consider the changing operational environment in which the OA would now function.

    The shortfalls and gaps in the AS-IS or current ACS system fall into the following five major categories:

    poor integration of enterprise combat support inputs into operational planning

    inability to configure supply chain activities to achieve specific...

  12. CHAPTER FOUR The Vision for Meeting Agile Combat Support Planning, Execution, Monitoring, and Control Shortfalls
    (pp. 31-54)

    This chapter describes a vision, vetted with Air Force combat support leadership, for meeting the shortfalls discussed in Chapter Three. We first summarize the major elements of that vision. Then we present the vision in more detail as we discuss its theoretical underpinnings.

    The ACS vision for addressing the shortfalls has three central elements. The first involvescreating standardized, repeatable processes to accomplish planning, execution, monitoring, and control of combat support activities within the Air Force command and control system to proactively manage scarce ACS resources across competing operational demands. These processes are conducted by means of partnerships between the...

  13. CHAPTER FIVE Agile Combat Support Planning, Execution, Monitoring, and Control Doctrine, Training, and Information Systems and Tools: AS-IS Shortfalls and TO-BE Improvement Options
    (pp. 55-74)

    In this chapter, we address three areas—doctrine, training, and information systems and tools. As in Chapter Three, we begin by identifying shortfalls from the 2002 and 2006 enterprise command and control OAs and then discuss Air Force progression toward eliminating those shortfalls, as well as the changing operational environment, for each area in turn. We use the nonmarket, resource-constrained strategies-to-tasks framework discussed in Chapter Four to evaluate each area, suggesting changes based on the strategies-to-tasks principles.

    We begin with doctrine. The Leftwich et al. (2002) analysis revealed several ACS doctrine shortfalls. They include the following:

    ACS objectives and functions...

  14. CHAPTER SIX Agile Combat Support Planning, Execution, Monitoring, and Control Organizational Structure: AS-IS Shortfalls and TO-BE Improvement Options
    (pp. 75-94)

    We begin this chapter by identifying shortfalls from the 2002 and 2006 analyses in ACS planning, execution, monitoring, and control organizational structure. We then discuss Air Force changes in organizational structure since the analyses and then address future options using the nonmarket, resource-constrained strategies-to-tasks framework as a guide.

    The Leftwich et al. (2002) and Mills et al. (2006) analyses revealed several ACS planning, execution, monitoring, and control organizational shortfalls, including the following:

    lack of clarity in warfighting roles and responsibilities when transitioning from steady state operations to contingency operations

    minimal staffing of warfighting organizations that relies on poorly trained augmentees¹...

  15. CHAPTER SEVEN Conclusions and Recommendations
    (pp. 95-98)

    Creating a process, clearly defined in doctrine, to specify ACS planning, execution, monitoring, and control supply, demand, and integrator roles, including what information flows, in what format, and to whom, could lead to better integration between combat support and operations. As part of the ACS planning, execution, monitoring, and control processes, the combat support community should be able to relate combat support resources and process performance to operational effects. Combat support personnel might need to continue to monitor each piece and pipeline within the system, but combat support parameters should be synthesized into metrics that are well understood by the...

  16. APPENDIX A The RAND Strategies-to-Tasks Framework
    (pp. 99-110)
  17. APPENDIX B Agile Combat Support Annotated Bibliography
    (pp. 111-152)
  18. APPENDIX C Joint and Air Force Command Structure
    (pp. 153-160)
  19. Bibliography
    (pp. 161-170)