Developing Navy Capability to Recover Forces in Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Hazard Environments

Developing Navy Capability to Recover Forces in Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Hazard Environments

Adam C. Resnick
Steven A. Knapp
Copyright Date: 2013
Published by: RAND Corporation
Pages: 72
https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt5vjvk5
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  • Book Info
    Developing Navy Capability to Recover Forces in Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Hazard Environments
    Book Description:

    Recovering amphibious forces can be complicated if ashore forces come under attack from enemy weapons, particularly chemical, biological, or radiological weapons. This report assesses current policies and capabilities pertaining to the recovery and decontamination of ashore forces and identifies policy options the Navy could pursue to better perform this mission.

    eISBN: 978-0-8330-8550-4
    Subjects: History, Health Sciences, Technology

Table of Contents

  1. Front Matter
    (pp. i-ii)
  2. Preface
    (pp. iii-iv)
  3. Table of Contents
    (pp. v-vi)
  4. Figures
    (pp. vii-vii)
  5. Tables
    (pp. viii-viii)
  6. Summary
    (pp. ix-xiv)
  7. Acronyms
    (pp. xv-xvi)
  8. 1. Introduction
    (pp. 1-6)

    The mission to recover amphibious forces can be complicated if ashore forces come under attack from enemy weapons, particularly chemical, biological, or radiological (CBR) weapons. If ashore forces are attacked with CBR weapons, they may become contaminated and pose a cross-contamination risk to other forces with whom they come in contact. If contaminants spread to equipment and vehicles, creating persistent hazards, these items may pose an additional cross-contamination risk. Among the potential agents that may be used in CBR weapons, persistent liquid and solid chemical agents present the greatest challenge for physical decontamination.

    Navy military capability will be compromised when...

  9. 2. Current Navy Processes
    (pp. 7-17)

    The study reviewed current Navy processes to recover contaminated forces in amphibious missions (Appendix A). Extant military guidance, both Navy and multiservice, was referenced, including one draft document that is intended to be the authoritative guidance for recovering forces in CBR environments—NTTP 3-02.1.1M,Recovery Operations in a Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Environment. According to this guidance, forces should be decontaminated before returning to the ship, if possible. NTTP 3-20.3110should be referred to for additional details about how ships should individually prepare for CBR attacks, and how plans should be documented in ships’

    As mentioned in the...

  10. 3. Current Navy Capability
    (pp. 18-24)

    The assessment of current Navy capability is structured around the following mission functions:

    Transport contaminated and injured forces from shore to ship

    Decontaminate and treat litter-bound casualties at the sea base

    Decontaminate ambulatory and uninjured forces

    Return ships and connectors to full mission capability.

    Each of these functions is discussed in detail in the remainder of this chapter.

    The connectors included in this study range in capacity to carry litter and ambulatory passengers, and in speed (Table 3.1). The capacity to carry litter passengers ranges from 15 passengers in a CH-46 to 100 in an LCU. Similarly, capacity for ambulatory...

  11. 4. Methods to Increase Navy Capability
    (pp. 25-37)

    Chapter 3 discussed the capacity of the Navy to transport and decontaminate amphibious forces at the sea base and the prospects to return ships and connectors to full mission capability. This chapter considers the order in which policy decisions guiding each of the activities should be made and methods the Navy can employ to increase its capability. The section is organized around policy options to address the following five concerns:

    1.Which amphibious assault ship should receive contaminated forces? Each ship in the battle group has different decontamination and medical department capabilities, which must be well understood before recovery decisions are...

  12. 5. Conclusions
    (pp. 38-39)

    The Navy’s capability to recover contaminated and injured forces to the sea base during amphibious missions is limited by two primary factors. The first is lack of an efficient process to evaluate the operational environment and identify connectors and ships based on transportation requirements for the recovery operation. The second is limitations in the capacity and throughput to recover contaminated service members aboard ships.

    Both of these factors have significant impact on mission effectiveness, as described in the previous sections of this report. The results of RAND’s evaluation suggest that it is possible for the Navy to improve its capability...

  13. Appendix A. Navy Doctrine Relevant to CBRN Recovery Operations
    (pp. 40-40)
  14. Appendix B. Doctrine Supporting CBRN Recovery Operations
    (pp. 41-45)
  15. Appendix C. DOTMLPF Implications
    (pp. 46-53)
  16. References
    (pp. 54-56)