From Stalemate to Settlement

From Stalemate to Settlement: Lessons for Afghanistan from Historical Insurgencies That Have Been Resolved Through Negotiations

Colin P. Clarke
Christopher Paul
Copyright Date: 2014
Published by: RAND Corporation
https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt5vjvv1
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  • Book Info
    From Stalemate to Settlement
    Book Description:

    A comprehensive review of historical insurgencies that ended in settlement after a military stalemate shows that these negotiations followed a similar path that can be generalized into a “master narrative” of seven steps executed in a common sequence. Such a narrative could help guide and assess the progress of a similar approach to resolving the conflict in Afghanistan as U.S. forces prepare to withdraw.

    eISBN: 978-0-8330-8244-2
    Subjects: Political Science, History

Table of Contents

  1. Front Matter
    (pp. i-ii)
  2. Preface
    (pp. iii-iv)
  3. Table of Contents
    (pp. v-vi)
  4. Figures and Tables
    (pp. vii-viii)
  5. Summary
    (pp. ix-xiv)
  6. Acknowledgments
    (pp. xv-xvi)
  7. Abbreviations
    (pp. xvii-xviii)
  8. From Stalemate to Settlement: Lessons for Afghanistan from Historical Insurgencies That Have Been Resolved Through Negotiations
    (pp. 1-64)

    Insurgency has been the most common form of armed conflict since at least the end of World War II. Over the past decade, scholars, observers, and theorists of insurgency and counterinsurgency (COIN)—amateur and professional alike—have fiercely debated the subject. While the emphasis on “how to win” in COIN is understandable, especially from the perspective of those engaged in the fighting, the historical record is definitive. Unambiguous military victory by either insurgents or counterinsurgents is far from the norm. Indeed, the data reveal that more than half of all insurgencies have been settled through negotiation. Yet, the question remains:...

  9. References
    (pp. 65-74)