Penaid Nonproliferation

Penaid Nonproliferation: Hindering the Spread of Countermeasures Against Ballistic Missile Defenses

Richard H. Speier
K. Scott McMahon
George Nacouzi
Copyright Date: 2014
Published by: RAND Corporation
https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt5vjw5t
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  • Book Info
    Penaid Nonproliferation
    Book Description:

    An attacker's missile-borne countermeasures to ballistic missile defenses are known as penetration aids, or penaids. To support efforts to prevent the proliferation of penaid-related items, this research recommends controls on potential exports according to the structure of the international Missile Technology Control Regime.

    eISBN: 978-0-8330-8471-2
    Subjects: Political Science, Technology, History

Table of Contents

  1. Front Matter
    (pp. i-ii)
  2. Preface
    (pp. iii-iv)
  3. Table of Contents
    (pp. v-vi)
  4. Summary
    (pp. vii-viii)
  5. Acknowledgments
    (pp. ix-x)
  6. CHAPTER ONE Penaid Nonproliferation
    (pp. 1-14)

    This research was designed to assist U.S. agencies charged with generating policies to discourage the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile delivery systems, thereby strengthening deterrence. The objective was to develop new measures to restrict the proliferation of countermeasures (also known, when incorporated in an attacker’s missile, as penetration aids, orpenaids) against ballistic missile defenses. It is necessary to identify the science and technology underpinning the development of penaids before policies can be designed to control the threat. Therefore, the study team focused on answering the following overarching research question: What technologies and equipment, if...

  7. CHAPTER TWO The Missile Technology Control Regime
    (pp. 15-22)

    The MTCR seeks to hinder the spread of rockets and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)—regardless of purpose (e.g., space launch, surveillance)—beyond a specified range-payload capability, or regardless of range-payload capability if intended to deliver WMD.

    The MTCR’s Category I list consists of eight classes of items subject to the tightest export restrictions. The MTCR guidelines state that such exports, if they occur at all, must be “rare” and subject to strong provisions with respect to supplier responsibility.

    The MTCR’s Category II list consists of items that can be used to make Category I items, as well as other missile...

  8. CHAPTER THREE Items Proposed for Category I
    (pp. 23-32)
  9. CHAPTER FOUR Items Proposed for Category I but Possible Inclusions in Category II
    (pp. 33-54)

    This chapter discusses ten items that are specifically applicable to penaids and, therefore, proposed for inclusion in Category I, Item 2.

    There may be a reluctance to widen the strict restrictions of Category I to a large number of additional items. For that reason, this report acknowledges the possibility of placing the items under the case-by-case review provisions of Category II. Because these ten items are lower-level subsystems than the three items discussed in the previous chapter, they could arguably be placed into either category. For each of these ten items, we identify possible locations in Category II. An obvious...

  10. CHAPTER FIVE Items Proposed for Category II
    (pp. 55-64)
  11. CHAPTER SIX Implementing Penaid Export Controls
    (pp. 65-66)

    Although penaid export controls present some definitional and structural issues, such issues are familiar matters in the implementation of the MTCR.

    For example, the problem of individualizing the decisions on the export of dual-use items is broadly handled by the MTCR’s Category II list, which consists of items subject to case-by-case review rather than a strong presumption of export denial. Category II items (and, indeed, all MTCR items) are reviewed by the following six criteria (see MTCR, undated, para. 3):

    A. Concerns about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;

    B. The capabilities and objectives of the missile and space...

  12. CHAPTER SEVEN Concluding Observations
    (pp. 67-68)

    This research illustrates how the MTCR Annex can be modified to provide better controls on missile defense penetration aids. If enacted, the MTCR modifications suggested here would constitute one of the most significant adjustments to the regime since its inception in 1987. The recommended modifications, or some variant of them, would strengthen the regime’s ability to impede the spread of increasingly lethal ballistic missiles capable of delivering WMD and penetrating missile defenses.

    Although policy considerations were beyond the scope of this research, moving a complex regime modification to fruition would obviously require careful diplomacy by the United States and like-minded...

  13. References
    (pp. 69-72)