Toward Integrated DoD Biosurveillance
Toward Integrated DoD Biosurveillance: Assessment and Opportunities
Melinda Moore
Gail Fisher
Clare Stevens
Copyright Date: 2013
Published by: RAND Corporation
Pages: 152
https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt5vjwvg
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Book Info
Toward Integrated DoD Biosurveillance
Book Description:

In the context of the 2012 National Strategy for Biosurveillance, the Office of Management and Budget asked the Department of Defense (DoD) to review its biosurveillance programs. DoD biosurveillance supports three strategic missions and four desired outcomes. More near-real-time analysis and better internal and external integration could enhance its performance and value. Improvements are needed in key enablers, including funding.

eISBN: 978-0-8330-8466-8
Subjects: Health Sciences, Technology, History
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Table of Contents
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  1. Front Matter
    Front Matter (pp. i-ii)
  2. Preface
    Preface (pp. iii-iv)
  3. Table of Contents
    Table of Contents (pp. v-vi)
  4. Figures
    Figures (pp. vii-viii)
  5. Tables
    Tables (pp. ix-x)
  6. Summary
    Summary (pp. xi-xviii)
  7. Acknowledgments
    Acknowledgments (pp. xix-xx)
  8. Abbreviations
    Abbreviations (pp. xxi-xxiv)
  9. 1. Introduction
    1. Introduction (pp. 1-12)

    Public health surveillance is a cornerstone of public health, just as national security surveillance and analysis is a cornerstone of national security.

    Health security is at the nexus where public health and national security meet. The 2009 National Health Security Strategy defineshealth securityas

    a state in which the Nation and its people are prepared for, protected from, and resilient in the face of health threats or incidents with potentially negative health consequences. (HHS, 2009)

    One of the most widely cited definitions ofpublic health surveillanceis

    Thesystematic collection,analysis,interpretation, and dissemination of data regarding a health-related...

  10. 2. OMB Task 1—Missions and Outcomes
    2. OMB Task 1—Missions and Outcomes (pp. 13-36)

    The first task from OMB was to identify a prioritized list of DoD biosurveillance programs, missions, desired outcomes, and associated performance measures and targets.

    To identify DoD missions related to biosurveillance and/or the key DoD entities involved in the biosurveillance enterprise, the study team drew from reports and, where possible, authoritative sources. The project team then organized these in tiers from strategic down to operational levels. The team then developed and applied criteria to prioritize strategic-level missions. They selected the strategic-level missions for priority setting because all other relevant missions flow up to them.

    To identify DoD biosurveillance programs, the...

  11. 3. OMB Task 2—Performance
    3. OMB Task 2—Performance (pp. 37-72)

    The second task from OMB was to evaluate how the current array of program assets contributes to achieving the prioritized missions. To address this task, the study team defined and applied criteria to assess performance of DoD biosurveillance systems and assets, drawing from relevant published guidance and other sources. The team characterized DoD biosurveillance systems and assets according to these criteria and applied the criteria to assess performance. They then defined and applied criteria to assess inputs – enabling functions that support DoD biosurveillance, using a DOTMLPF-like structure (doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities). Finally, they...

  12. 4. OMB Task 3—Funding
    4. OMB Task 3—Funding (pp. 73-84)

    To complete the funding assessment called for in OMB Task 3, the study team first developed criteria for assessing the appropriateness and stability of the DoD biosurveillance funding system. This is explained later in this section.

    Next, the team examined budget documents provided by AFHSC along with information provided by NCMI and the office of the ASD(NCB). An examination of the DoD budget for the past three years also provided details for understanding the funding streams and systems.

    Specifically, the team examined the AFHSC budget request documents provided by the AFHSC and the July 15, 2013, Tricare Management Activity (TMA)...

  13. 5. Conclusions
    5. Conclusions (pp. 85-88)

    This report reflects facts and insights gleaned by the RAND team mainly during May–June 2013. The results may be limited by the relatively short time frame of the study.

    The study team was able to speak with some key stakeholders from the CCMDs, ASD(HA), ASD(NCB), and NCMI, but might have benefitted from opportunities to speak with more of them and with staff from Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to gain their perspectives as the consumers and budget holders of biosurveillance enterprise.

    DoD did not appear to have consolidated and accurate documentation in one place of all of the...

  14. Appendix A. Documents Reviewed
    Appendix A. Documents Reviewed (pp. 89-96)
  15. Appendix B. Mission Authorities
    Appendix B. Mission Authorities (pp. 97-98)
  16. Appendix C. DoD Biosurveillance Systems and Assets
    Appendix C. DoD Biosurveillance Systems and Assets (pp. 99-114)
  17. Appendix D. GEIS Network and Partners
    Appendix D. GEIS Network and Partners (pp. 115-118)
  18. Appendix E. DMSS Data Feeds
    Appendix E. DMSS Data Feeds (pp. 119-120)
  19. Appendix F. Biosurveillance Outputs
    Appendix F. Biosurveillance Outputs (pp. 121-124)
  20. References
    References (pp. 125-128)
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