Nuclear Deterrence in Europe

Nuclear Deterrence in Europe: Russian Approaches to a New Environment and Implications for the United States

James T. Quinlivan
Olga Oliker
Copyright Date: 2011
Published by: RAND Corporation
Pages: 110
https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mg1075af
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  • Book Info
    Nuclear Deterrence in Europe
    Book Description:

    Through a variety of policies and actions--and most recently in a new military doctrine adopted in February 2010--Russia has indicated the types of situations and threats that might cause it to resort to using nuclear weapons. This volume examines Russia's evolving framework for nuclear deterrence and its implications for U.S. military operations in Europe.

    eISBN: 978-0-8330-5244-5
    Subjects: Political Science, History

Table of Contents

  1. Front Matter
    (pp. i-ii)
  2. Preface
    (pp. iii-iv)
  3. Table of Contents
    (pp. v-vi)
  4. Figures and Tables
    (pp. vii-viii)
  5. Summary
    (pp. ix-xiv)
  6. Acknowledgments
    (pp. xv-xvi)
  7. Abbreviations
    (pp. xvii-xviii)
  8. CHAPTER ONE Introduction
    (pp. 1-4)

    Starting with the end of the American nuclear monopoly in 1949, two nuclear–armed adversaries labored to produce nuclear weapons as protection for their interests and their existence in the face of their opponent’s apparently implacable hostility. Harnessed within “deterrent” strategies, the large nuclear arsenals of the Cold War were the ultimate insurance policies for balance–of–force politics between the two blocs from 1949 until the demise of the Soviet Union. While deterrence and its nuclear underpinnings seemed an undoubted success in the Cold War context, after the fall of the Soviet Union former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger...

  9. CHAPTER TWO Elements of a Deterrent Framework
    (pp. 5-10)

    During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the United States established a deterrent framework that served to protect their vital, clearly stated interests and that involved the deployment of large numbers of conventional and nuclear weapons. Through presidential statements, formal alliance, and military deployments, the United States and the Soviet Union extended deterrence to include their NATO and Eastern European allies, respectively. Military doctrine was written and exercises undertaken to demonstrate the capacity of the weapon systems. We describe these claims and demonstrations of the willingness to defend them as elements of a deterrent framework.

    The inter–German border...

  10. CHAPTER THREE Russia’s Claimed Interests and Military Planning in Europe
    (pp. 11-64)

    This chapter uses the elements in the past deterrent framework plus the element of endorsement by political authorities to examine why and how the Russians may be working to set up a deterrent framework with respect to the United States and the extent to which nuclear weapons figure in this framework. See Table 3.1 for a description of the framework. In developing and presenting this framework, we note the importance of remaining sensitive to any presumptions and biases inherited by the analyst from the old way of doing things.

    During the Cold War, the Soviet Union asserted its interests in...

  11. CHAPTER FOUR An Emerging Russian Deterrent Framework?
    (pp. 65-70)

    Based on the evidence, some inferences can be drawn with respect to the evolving Russian deterrent framework in Europe and elsewhere.

    For claimed interests, Russia is using the traditional mechanisms of formal alliances, security treaties, and agreements to joint measures to consolidate its relationship with some of the former member states and portions of the USSR. In addition, the so–called Medvedev Doctrine asserts Russian willingness to protect “privileged interests” and Russian citizens in regions where Russia shares particular historical relations. The doctrine gives fuller expression to behaviors exemplified by the long-standing willingness of the Russians to retain troops in...

  12. ChAPTER FIVE Implications for the United States
    (pp. 71-80)

    In the Cold War era, the most absolute statement of American interests in Europe was the North Atlantic Treaty, particularly Article 5, which states that an armed attack on any of the parties to the treaty in Europe or North America will be considered an attack against them all. NATO created the military-political apparatus to plan and execute any military responses required under the treaty. NATO continues in force and represents the sole existing treaty-level mechanism committing the United States to military responses in Europe. American claims of interests in Europe are most strongly made by the admission of countries...

  13. References
    (pp. 81-91)