Aid During Conflict

Aid During Conflict: Interaction Between Military and Civilian Assistance Providers in Afghanistan, September 2001-June 2002

Olga Oliker
Richard Kauzlarich
James Dobbins
Kurt W. Basseuner
Donald L. Sampler
John G. McGinn
Michael J. Dziedzic
Adam Grissom
Bruce Pirnie
Nora Bensahel
A. Istar Guven
Copyright Date: 2004
Edition: 1
Published by: RAND Corporation
Pages: 154
https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mg212osd
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  • Book Info
    Aid During Conflict
    Book Description:

    Description and evaluation of relief, reconstruction, humanitarian, and humanitarian-type aid efforts in Afghanistan during the most intense phase of military operations, from September 2001 to June 2002. The efforts were generally successful, but there were serious coordination problems among the various civilian and military aid providers. Critical issues, both positive and negative, are identified, and a list of recommendations is provided for policymakers, implementers, and aid providers, based on lessons learned.

    eISBN: 978-0-8330-4059-6
    Subjects: Political Science

Table of Contents

  1. Front Matter
    (pp. i-ii)
  2. Preface
    (pp. iii-vi)
  3. The RAND Corporation Quality Assurance Process
    (pp. vii-viii)
  4. Table of Contents
    (pp. ix-x)
  5. Summary
    (pp. xi-xvi)
  6. Acknowledgments
    (pp. xvii-xviii)
  7. Glossary
    (pp. xix-xxiv)
  8. CHAPTER ONE Introduction
    (pp. 1-4)

    The broad international humanitarian assistance effort in Afghanistan during the initial stages of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), from October 2001 to June 2002, was generally successful. A major—and anticipated—catastrophe was averted by the hard work of many actors, governmental and nongovernmental, civilian and military. Refugee flows were handled effectively, food was delivered to the hungry, and the first steps were taken toward stabilizing a country that had endured decades of war. But the overall success does not mean that the process could not have been improved or that there were not difficulties along the way. The perennial questions...

  9. CHAPTER TWO Assistance in Times of Conflict: The Pre–September 11 Experience
    (pp. 5-22)

    Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. military has participated in efforts to help disaster-stricken populations, end ongoing conflicts, and reform and rebuild post-conflict societies. This involvement has brought the military into frequent contact with the civilian missions operating in the areas in question. The civilian-military interaction has varied from cooperation and coordination in some cases to friction and contention in others. This chapter highlights the major historical points of friction between the civilian and military components of humanitarian assistance missions.

    Lack of a common terminology has often led to misunderstandings, and even distrust, in humanitarian assistance efforts....

  10. CHAPTER THREE Afghanistan Before Operation Enduring Freedom
    (pp. 23-37)

    The massive humanitarian problems of Afghanistan long preceded the post-9/11 American military campaign. Indeed, the U.S. attacks in Afghanistan represented the beginning of improvements in what was a very bleak humanitarian situation. As a UN official reported: “The basic facts of the Afghanistan humanitarian crisis by now are well known. Six to seven million people are estimated to be extremely vulnerable due to three years of severe drought and more than twenty years of war. The economy is shattered and offers very few employment opportunities.”¹

    The UNDP/UNOCHA (United Nations Development Program/United Nations office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) Weekly...

  11. CHAPTER FOUR Civil-Military Operations: Planning and Cooperation Between September 11 and October 31, 2001
    (pp. 38-43)

    During the initial planning and execution stages of OEF, CENTCOM’s primary goals were the elimination of al Qaeda elements in Afghanistan and the concomitant destruction of the Taliban regime that harbored them. The limited nature of these objectives was strongly reinforced by the conventional wisdom throughout the U.S. policymaking community that the Afghan people would not tolerate a large coalition presence inside Afghanistan. Such a presence, it was believed, would trigger the Afghans’ legendary wrath against occupiers and invaders.

    These concerns, which were reflected in important strategic choices regarding the nature of the coalition military campaign in Afghanistan, stemmed from...

  12. CHAPTER FIVE Assistance Efforts Between October 7 and December 5, 2001
    (pp. 44-65)

    One of the most visible forms of early assistance by the U.S. military was the airdrop of humanitarian daily rations (HDRs) throughout Afghanistan. These drops began the same day the fighting did, October 7, 2001.

    HDR drops have long been controversial. Opponents argue that they are an inefficient, ineffective, and expensive means of providing food aid. The international NGO/IO humanitarian assistance community objects to them on practical and philosophical grounds, claiming that HDR drops are ineffective in practice and inherently political in concept. Proponents assert that HDR drops are often the only way to get food to difficult-to-reach areas and...

  13. CHAPTER SIX Humanitarian Assistance and Reconstruction Efforts Between December 5, 2001, and June 1, 2002
    (pp. 66-96)

    U.S. military civil-affairs personnel were involved in a broad range of activities that supported humanitarian assistance and reconstruction. These included participation in planning at CENTCOM, coordination between military forces and IOs and NGOs, direct support to Special Forces teams throughout Afghanistan, and the coordination of specific assistance projects.

    Chains of command were critically important. CENTCOM, in both Tampa and Qatar, had overall authority for OEF (under the guidance of the President and the Secretary of Defense). ARCENT was the component command responsible for Army operations. The forces that deployed belonged to a variety of other commands, such as the 377th...

  14. CHAPTER SEVEN Conclusion: Issues and Recommendations
    (pp. 97-112)

    The experience of civil-military relations in the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan represents a major evolution in a continuing post–Cold War trend. Humanitarian assistance has become a challenging process in which development and security goals are pursued by many actors in concert and in conflict during CCOs.¹ The very nature of the war on terror has pushed the military into sectors that until recent times have not been its major concern, e.g., direct provision of humanitarian and humanitarian-type assistance in the midst of ongoing combat. The assistance itself is not novel, but the circumstances and motivations that lie...

  15. APPENDIX: International Involvement in Afghanistan
    (pp. 113-124)
  16. References
    (pp. 125-130)