State and Local Intelligence in the War on Terrorism

State and Local Intelligence in the War on Terrorism

K. Jack Riley
Gregory F. Treverton
Jeremy M. Wilson
Lois M. Davis
Copyright Date: 2005
Edition: 1
Published by: RAND Corporation
Pages: 90
https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mg394rc
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  • Book Info
    State and Local Intelligence in the War on Terrorism
    Book Description:

    Examines how state and local law enforcement agencies conducted and supported counterterrorism intelligence activities after 9/11. The report analyzes data from a 2002 survey of law enforcement preparedness in the context of intelligence, shows how eight local law enforcement agencies handle intelligence operations, and suggests ways that the job of gathering and analyzing intelligence might best be shared among federal, state, and local agencies.

    eISBN: 978-0-8330-4094-7
    Subjects: Political Science

Table of Contents

  1. Front Matter
    (pp. i-ii)
  2. Preface
    (pp. iii-iv)
  3. Table of Contents
    (pp. v-vi)
  4. Tables
    (pp. vii-viii)
  5. Summary
    (pp. ix-xviii)
  6. Acknowledgments
    (pp. xix-xx)
  7. Acronyms
    (pp. xxi-xxii)
  8. CHAPTER ONE Introduction
    (pp. 1-6)

    State and local law enforcement agencies (LEAs) are valuable intelligence assets. They are the “eyes and ears” in the war on terrorism. For example, through their routine involvement in preventing and responding to crime, LEAs are believed to be well-positioned to develop information on crimes, activities, and organizations that support terrorist operations. Yet most attention remains focused on the federal level, and—good intentions notwithstanding—sharing intelligence and information among the levels of authority that make up the intelligence system remains haphazard.¹ As a recent Markle Foundation task force put it: “DHS [the Department of Homeland Security] has yet to...

  9. CHAPTER TWO The Response of Law Enforcement to 9/11: Survey Results
    (pp. 7-28)

    In this chapter we present selected results about law enforcement’s intelligence function from a 2002 RAND survey.¹ The chapter begins with a brief description of the survey methodology and then presents the following results with respect to state and local law enforcement:

    Prior experience with terrorism-related incidents

    Formation of specialized terrorism units

    Coordination and information-sharing activities

    Assessment activities

    Support needs

    The survey targeted a stratified, random sample of 209 local law enforcement agencies and a census of the 50 state law enforcement agencies in the United States. The stratified, random sample represents nearly 18,000 law enforcement agencies nationwide, including the...

  10. CHAPTER THREE Organizing for Intelligence: Case Studies of Law Enforcement Agencies
    (pp. 29-48)

    The survey results presented in Chapter Two offer an overall picture of how local and state police agencies have responded to changing demands resulting from an enhanced terrorist threat arising from the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. To complement this insight, we sought to gain a more in-depth look at recent changes in specific agencies by interviewing key respondents who were knowledgeable about counterterrorism intelligence operations in their organizations.

    In all, we studied eight police organizations: Charlotte-Mecklenberg (N.C.) Police Department (CMPD), Columbus (Ohio) Division of Police (CDP), Fairfax County (Va.) Police Department (FCPD), Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD), Los...

  11. CHAPTER FOUR Oversight and Its Implications
    (pp. 49-58)

    Oversight of state and local intelligence activities is mostly ad hoc and informal. It is generally conducted through the LEA’s chain of command, although some departments have “outside” review bodies, such the LAPD’s civilian committee approving undercover operations. The courts have not been active in overseeing state and local activities. That may be in large part because most intelligence gathering—especially that not predicated on a crime having been committed—is done by federal officials, through federal authorizations, which is only sometimes done in cooperation with state and local officials. Thus, this chapter first looks at one particular—and particularly...

  12. CHAPTER FIVE Policy Implications
    (pp. 59-64)

    Our survey revealed that counterterrorism intelligence activity, and the response to homeland security demands more generally, is concentrated in larger departments. The case studies provided details on how LEAs organize, manage, and resource these activities. LEAs are not generally engaged in substantive reorganizations around the issue of counterterrorism intelligence but are typically reallocating resources from other demands and functions. They generally report that they are not receiving explicit federal support and are paying for the activity out of internal reallocations. Finally, the chapter on oversight and its implications revealed that there has been a substantial increase in state and local...

  13. References
    (pp. 65-68)