Beyond al-Qaeda: Part 2, The Outer Rings of the Terrorist Universe

Beyond al-Qaeda: Part 2, The Outer Rings of the Terrorist Universe

Angel Rabasa
Peter Chalk
Kim Cragin
Sara A. Daly
Heather S. Gregg
Theodore W. Karasik
Kevin A. O’Brien
William Rosenau
Copyright Date: 2006
Published by: RAND Corporation
Pages: 215
https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mg430af
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  • Book Info
    Beyond al-Qaeda: Part 2, The Outer Rings of the Terrorist Universe
    Book Description:

    Examines violent terrorist groups that, while not formally allied with al-Qaeda, could pose a threat to Americans now or in the future and to the security of our friends and allies. The authors show how terrorists use criminal organizations and connections to finance their activities, and they identify distinct strategies to neutralize or mitigate these threats.

    eISBN: 978-0-8330-4105-0
    Subjects: Political Science

Table of Contents

  1. Front Matter
    (pp. i-ii)
  2. Preface
    (pp. iii-vi)
  3. Table of Contents
    (pp. vii-x)
  4. Figure and Tables
    (pp. xi-xii)
  5. Summary
    (pp. xiii-xxx)
  6. Acknowledgments
    (pp. xxxi-xxxii)
  7. Abbreviations
    (pp. xxxiii-xxxvi)
  8. CHAPTER ONE Introduction
    (pp. 1-4)

    Part 1 of this study describes and analyzes what has become of al-Qaeda after the removal of its safe haven in Afghanistan and the death or capture of a significant part of its leadership, as well as what we call the “al-Qaeda nebula.” This concept includes affiliated or associated militant groups that have adopted al-Qaeda’s worldview and vision of a global jihad and its methodology of mass-casualty terrorist attacks.¹

    Yet the “al-Qaeda universe” does not incorporate the entirety of the terrorist threat or potential threat. A number of other militant groups threaten U.S. regional interests or allies and pose a...

  9. CHAPTER TWO Hezbollah and Hamas
    (pp. 5-24)

    Hezbollah is perhaps the best known and the most capable of the Islamist militant organizations that employ terrorism yet are not affiliated with al-Qaeda. This group was responsible for the 1983 suicide attack against the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, which killed 241 U.S. and 58 French servicemen who were part of a multinational peacekeeping force in Lebanon at that time. In addition, since the early 1980s, Hezbollah has established a far-flung financial network, stretching from the tri-border area of Argentina, Paraguay, and Brazil to the United States and to Southeast Asia— Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines. Hezbollah thus has...

  10. CHAPTER THREE Other Islamist Groups Outside the al-Qaeda Network
    (pp. 25-50)

    Terrorism and revolutionary violence have played a significant role in the modern history of Algeria. From 1954 to 1962, the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) fought against the French colonial presence in this country and used terrorist attacks both in Algeria and in France as part of this war. Although the FLN was a predominantly nationalist organization, it used religious rhetoric in an effort to mobilize support. Once it came to power in Algeria, it began to restrict expressions of political Islam. Approximately 30 years later, an Islamist revolutionary organization, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), would institute a campaign against...

  11. CHAPTER FOUR The Iraqi Insurgency
    (pp. 51-60)

    The nonaffiliated part of the Iraqi insurgency, that is, the component that is outside the al-Qaeda and al-Zarqawi networks, is diverse and widespread. It is composed of groups of both nationalist and religious provenance.¹ The insurgency is almost exclusively Sunni. Both the Shi’ite and Kurdish communities have continued to rally around their new national leaders and, until the February 2006 bombing of the al-Askari mosque in Samarra—one of the holiest Shi’ite shrines²—refused to engage in sectarian revenge.

    We do not place the Shi’ite militiamen associated with Muqtada al-Sadr in the insurgent category because even though al-Sadr’s militiamen, organized...

  12. CHAPTER FIVE Non-Islamist Groups
    (pp. 61-84)

    Non-Islamist terrorist and insurgent groups fall into two basic categories:

    Marxist insurgencies, most of them Maoist, that follow a strategy of “people’s war” as defined in the writings of Mao Zedong and the Vietnamese revolutionaries.There are, of course, variations, and each of these insurgencies has its own specific characteristics, but they generally follow the same model.

    Separatist groups.Although some claim to be Marxist or Islamic, the separatists’ primary goal is to establish independent ethnically defined entities. This category includes such groups as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), also known as the Tamil Tigers; Basque Fatherland and...

  13. CHAPTER SIX Antiglobalization Movements
    (pp. 85-100)

    During the past ten years, political movements based on ideologies opposed to the spread of global capitalism, the destruction of the natural environment, and the growth of such transnational bodies as the European Union (EU) have taken root in Western Europe and North America, where the presence of international media has given these oppositionists a vast forum. At its core, this nascent ideological movement opposes corporate power and the assumed socioeconomic dislocations that may follow in the wake of the spread of globalized capitalism across the world.

    It is in this context that several commentators have described the antiglobalization movement...

  14. CHAPTER SEVEN The Convergence of Terrorism, Insurgency, and Crime
    (pp. 101-160)

    During the Cold War, many of the insurgent and terrorist organizations that proliferated throughout what was then known as the Third World were largely dependent on great power support. Even when these groups developed within a specific local context, they were quickly assimilated into one global camp or the other. The Soviets and the Cubans backed a number of so-called liberation movements in Africa and Central America, as well as Middle East terrorist organizations; while the United States supported groups such as the National Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) in Angola, the Afghan mujahidin, and the anti-Sandinista forces...

  15. CHAPTER EIGHT Conclusions and Recommendations
    (pp. 161-166)

    From a policy perspective, the first-order question is whether the trajectory of insurgent and terrorist groups outside the global jihadist movement will bring them closer to that movement. To answer this question, we examine what factors could affect this outcome and what the U.S. policy response should be. The second-order question is the level of threat these groups represent for U.S. regional interests, including the security of U.S. friends and allies, and what the U.S. policy response should be. Finally, we discuss how to harmonize U.S. policies to address these two questions.

    With regard to convergence with al-Qaeda, the groups...

  16. Bibliography
    (pp. 167-178)