After Saddam

After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq

Nora Bensahel
Olga Oliker
Keith Crane
Richard R. Brennan
Heather S. Gregg
Thomas Sullivan
Andrew Rathmell
Copyright Date: 2008
Edition: 1
Published by: RAND Corporation
Pages: 312
https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mg642a
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  • Book Info
    After Saddam
    Book Description:

    This monograph examines prewar planning efforts for the reconstruction of postwar Iraq. It then examines the role of U.S. military forces after major combat officially ended on May 1, 2003, through June 2004. Finally, it examines civilian efforts at reconstruction, focusing on the activities of the Coalition Provisional Authority and its efforts to rebuild structures of governance, security forces, economic policy, and essential services.

    eISBN: 978-0-8330-4638-3
    Subjects: Technology, Political Science

Table of Contents

  1. Front Matter
    (pp. i-ii)
  2. Preface
    (pp. iii-vi)
  3. Table of Contents
    (pp. vii-xii)
  4. Figures
    (pp. xiii-xiv)
  5. Tables
    (pp. xv-xvi)
  6. Summary
    (pp. xvii-xxx)
  7. Acknowledgments
    (pp. xxxi-xxxii)
  8. List of Acronyms and Abbreviations
    (pp. xxxiii-xxxviii)
  9. CHAPTER ONE Introduction
    (pp. 1-4)

    After more than 15 months of planning, Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) commenced in March 2003. Major combat operations in Iraq lasted approximately three weeks, but stabilization efforts in that country are, as of this writing, ongoing. The U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps are increasingly taxed by the demands of the continuing insurgency, with more than 100,000 troops expected to remain in Iraq for the foreseeable future. How did Iraq get to this point? Why was the United States so unprepared for the challenges of postwar Iraq?

    The evidence suggests that the United States had neither the people nor...

  10. CHAPTER TWO Military Planning Efforts
    (pp. 5-20)

    The rapid and decisive defeat of Iraq’s military forces, and the subsequent advance to Baghdad, Tikrit, Kirkuk, and Mosul, clearly demonstrated the dominance of the U.S. military on the battlefield. The success of its campaign plan during major combat operations ensured that coalition forces simultaneously attacked Iraqi forces throughout the depth and breadth of Iraq, including major operations in the north with the Kurds, in the western desert, along the eastern border with Iran, and throughout the central Tigris/Euphrates river valley from Umm Qasr to parts of the Sunni Triangle north of Baghdad. Initially, most Iraqis viewed coalition forces as...

  11. CHAPTER THREE Civilian Planning Efforts
    (pp. 21-40)

    In addition to the U.S. military, several civilian government agencies invested time and effort in thinking about the challenges of postwar Iraq during 2001 and 2002. This chapter starts by examining the official interagency process that guided postwar planning for Iraq, which started in the summer of 2002. It then examines the work of the four government agencies that conducted the broadest planning efforts for postwar governance and reconstruction: the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the State Department, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the National Security Council (NSC) staff. It concludes by examining several analyses...

  12. CHAPTER FOUR Task Force IV
    (pp. 41-52)

    In December 2002, CENTCOM sponsored a wargame called Internal Look, which exercised the plans for the invasion of Iraq.¹ The wargame focused almost exclusively on Phases I through III of the warplans involving major combat operations, with little attention paid to Phase IV, the postwar period.² Little consideration was given to ways in which postwar requirements might affect the conduct of combat operations.³ There was general discussion about the postwar period at the end of the exercise, which included broad statements that the State Department would largely be responsible during that time but did not include any specifics. Retired General...

  13. CHAPTER FIVE The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
    (pp. 53-72)

    On January 9, Douglas Feith, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, notified retired Army Lieutenant General Jay Garner that the Department of Defense was about to be tasked to stand up a new office to plan for the postwar administration of Iraq, and that Secretary Rumsfeld wanted Garner to lead this office and assemble its staff.¹ Garner’s background seemed ideally suited for this assignment: as a retired Army lieutenant general, he understood the military and the DoD bureaucracy, and as a former commander of Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, he knew a great deal about Iraq and maintained a network of...

  14. CHAPTER SIX Humanitarian Planning
    (pp. 73-80)

    The U.S. government conducted extensive planning for the humanitarian relief efforts that any war with Iraq might require. An interagency planning team started meeting in the fall of 2002 and worked with international organizations (IOs) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to generate detailed humanitarian relief plans for a wide range of possible scenarios. As it turned out, the war in Iraq did not generate a significant humanitarian emergency, largely because of the ways in which the war was fought. This does not mean that the humanitarian planning efforts focused on the wrong areas: they helped ensure that humanitarian concerns were factored...

  15. CHAPTER SEVEN Combat Operations During Phase IV
    (pp. 81-100)

    Military plans for Phase IV included three different stages. Phase IVa would commence immediately after major combat operations and would focus on stability, security, and the emergency restoration of essential services. Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) would be the supported military headquarters during this stage, which was envisioned to last approximately 90 days. Phase IVb, reconstruction, would be marked by a handover of military control from CFLCC to Combined Joint Task Force-Iraq, commanded by the U.S. Army’s V Corps. During this stage, military forces would provide support to a coalition-led transitional civilian agency. Finally, Phase IVc would be initiated...

  16. CHAPTER EIGHT The Coalition Provisional Authority
    (pp. 101-120)

    In May 2003, the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) was officially replaced by the new Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). CPA had a much wider mandate than ORHA. Under the direction of Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, CPA was tasked with creating new and democratic institutions throughout Iraq. Before discussing the substantive activities of CPA—which are addressed in the next four chapters of this report—it is important to start by examining the origins, goals, structure, and functioning of CPA itself. This chapter also addresses the relationship between CPA and CJTF-7, the coalition military authority in Iraq during the...

  17. CHAPTER NINE Building New Iraqi Security Forces
    (pp. 121-158)

    Certain assumptions lay at the core of prewar and pre-occupation planning for the creation of new Iraqi security forces.¹ One of the most significant of these was that not very much would have to be done. It was expected that police forces, being largely non-Ba’ath Party and professional, would remain cohesive and be able to maintain law and order in occupied Iraq with limited involvement from the coalition. It was further expected that certain units of the Iraqi armed forces would stand aside from the fight and could later be used to assist in reconstruction and security efforts. CENTCOM PSYOP...

  18. CHAPTER TEN Governance and Political Reconstruction
    (pp. 159-194)

    This chapter addresses governance issues in Iraq before, during, and after major combat operations. It starts by examining prewar planning for postwar governance. It then assesses each of the major national developments during the occupation period: the formation of the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), the November 15 agreement and the transfer of authority, and the adoption of the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL). The chapter also examines governance efforts at the provincial and city levels, and concludes with several lessons learned about establishing governance structures in the aftermath of major combat.

    Prior to the beginning of combat operations on March 19,...

  19. CHAPTER ELEVEN Economic Policy
    (pp. 195-210)

    This chapter describes economic conditions at the time of invasion, the economic problems facing the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), and the policies that CPA adopted to solve these problems. The chapter concludes with a discussion of tasks that were not fully implemented by the transition to Iraqi rule at the end of June 2004.¹

    Iraq’s economy was in poor shape at the time of invasion, as a consequence of economic mismanagement on the part of the Iraqi regime, a quarter of a century of conflict, and more than a decade of economic sanctions. Output and incomes had fallen dramatically from...

  20. CHAPTER TWELVE Essential Services and Infrastructure
    (pp. 211-232)

    This chapter describes the condition of Iraq’s infrastructure at the time of the invasion, the problems facing CPA and coalition forces in reconstructing this infrastructure and restoring essential services, the means that CPA and the U.S. government employed to achieve these goals, and their accomplishments in terms of restoring basic services through June 28, 2004.¹

    Before the onset of combat operations in 2003, Iraq’s infrastructure was in such disrepair that electricity was available for only a few hours a day, and many Iraqis no longer had access to piped, potable water. Before the 1991 Gulf War, times were better. In...

  21. CHAPTER THIRTEEN Assessing Postwar Efforts
    (pp. 233-244)

    The United States did not plan well for the complexities and violence of post-Saddam Iraq. Although many U.S. government agencies invested a lot of time and effort in identifying possible reconstruction requirements for postwar Iraq, the basic plan for war largely pushed these requirements aside. Indeed, in overlooking the need to enforce security in the immediate aftermath of Saddam’s fall, the warplan may well have contributed to the problems U.S. forces face.

    How did this happen? More important, what can be done to avoid the flaws of the OIF warplan in the future? After all, Iraq and Afghanistan may not...

  22. APPENDIX Strategic Studies Institute’s Mission Matrix for Iraq
    (pp. 245-254)
  23. Bibliography
    (pp. 255-274)