Analytic Support to Intelligence in Counterinsurgencies

Analytic Support to Intelligence in Counterinsurgencies

Walter L. Perry
John Gordon
Copyright Date: 2008
Edition: 1
Published by: RAND Corporation
Pages: 84
https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mg682osd
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  • Book Info
    Analytic Support to Intelligence in Counterinsurgencies
    Book Description:

    Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown that U.S. forces need more-effective techniques and procedures to conduct counterinsurgency. They will most likely face similar, irregular warfare tactics from future enemies. This monograph examines the nature of the contemporary insurgent threat and provides insights on using operational analysis techniques to support intelligence operations in counterinsurgencies.

    eISBN: 978-0-8330-4526-3
    Subjects: Political Science

Table of Contents

  1. Front Matter
    (pp. i-ii)
  2. Preface
    (pp. iii-iv)
  3. Table of Contents
    (pp. v-vi)
  4. Figures
    (pp. vii-viii)
  5. Tables
    (pp. ix-x)
  6. Summary
    (pp. xi-xxii)
  7. Acknowledgments
    (pp. xxiii-xxiv)
  8. Abbreviations
    (pp. xxv-xxvi)
  9. CHAPTER ONE Introduction
    (pp. 1-4)

    Insurgency is one of the oldest forms of conflict. Records of ancient regimes show that their rulers were frequently faced with revolts and insurrection. The mighty legions of Rome spent more time suppressing insurgency within the Empire’s borders than they did attempting to expand the limits of Rome’s control. The reality that insurgency is a continual problem has persisted into the modern era. The U.S. Army spent literally decades conducting what was, essentially, a counterinsurgency effort in the American West during the period after the Civil War. The U.S. Marine Corps’ primary mission in the decades before and after World...

  10. CHAPTER TWO The Nature of Modern Insurgency
    (pp. 5-12)

    Today, theorists and doctrine writers, those in charge of training and equipment purchases, and the political leaders of the nations faced with insurgencies and other nations considering coming to their assistance must all consider the nature of modern insurgency. This is a profoundly important issue, since how nations viewinsurgencieswill have significant influence on how their militaries and governments prepare for futurecounterinsurgencymissions.

    There is considerable discussion today about “what has changed.” Does the modern, interconnected, networked, cable-television world obviate the lessons from past counterinsurgency campaigns? Or is the nature of insurgency so enduring as to conclude that...

  11. CHAPTER THREE The Dominance of Intelligence
    (pp. 13-16)

    Although there are some similarities, the role of intelligence in conventional combat operations differs considerably from its role in irregular warfare, including insurgencies. Because the enemy in an insurgency is elusive, unknown, and most likely indistinguishable from the general population, intelligence operations are crucial. Analysis generally centers on developing evidence to support prioritized information requirements (PIRs)—what the commander needs to know to take action against the insurgents. Because it is important to understand how intelligence operations differ in counterinsurgency operations, we now compare intelligence in support of conventional and unconventional operations.¹

    In conventional combat operations, the intelligence mission is...

  12. CHAPTER FOUR The Analytic Questions
    (pp. 17-24)

    Analysis in support of counterinsurgencies (indeed in support of most unconventional wars) centers on contributing to intelligence production. That is, most questions asked by commanders have to do with understanding enemy intentions, organization, objectives, force disposition and alliances. In addition, because confrontation with the enemy is not direct, commanders require intelligence on the possible location of the next attack, the type of attack expected, weapons caches, and so forth. Clearly, the unifying theme is obtaining actionable intelligence. Therefore, we refer to analytic support in these cases asintelligence analysis. At each stage in the evolution of an insurgency (as depicted...

  13. CHAPTER FIVE Intelligence Analysis
    (pp. 25-50)

    The analytic tools needed to answer the research questions posed earlier are a mix of existing methods of analysis, some new approaches, and perhaps different ways to apply existing methods. What follows is a discussion of several techniques that might be used, based on our experience in supporting coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. Our emphasis is on suggesting what we consider to be plausible techniques designed to attack the research questions posed earlier. To our knowledge, not all have proven successful, but in some cases that may be because they have not yet been applied.

    The Multinational Command Iraq’s...

  14. CHAPTER SIX Conclusions
    (pp. 51-54)

    Our goal in this monograph has been to illustrate how operational analysis can be used to support counterinsurgency operations. Operational analysis has supported combat operations for quite some time.¹ In fact, operational research is generally thought to have begun in 1937 in the United Kingdom.

    . . . It began when, having developed radar, scientists were then asked to develop procedures for its use in a new, effective air defense system.”²

    Of course the application of mathematics to warfare predates operational analysis. Frederick Lanchester published his famous attrition model of combat in 1916.³ So it is only natural to examine...

  15. Bibliography
    (pp. 55-58)