Improving Capacity for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations

Improving Capacity for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations

Nora Bensahel
Olga Oliker
Heather Peterson
Copyright Date: 2009
Edition: 1
Published by: RAND Corporation
Pages: 104
https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mg852osd
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  • Book Info
    Improving Capacity for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations
    Book Description:

    U.S. experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated that improving U.S. capacity for stabilization and reconstruction operations is critical to national security. The authors recommend building civilian rather than military capacity, realigning and reforming existing agencies, and funding promising programs. They also suggest improvements to deployable police capacity, crisis-management processes, and guidance and funding.

    eISBN: 978-0-8330-4725-0
    Subjects: Political Science

Table of Contents

  1. Front Matter
    (pp. i-ii)
  2. Preface
    (pp. iii-iv)
  3. Table of Contents
    (pp. v-vi)
  4. Figure and Table
    (pp. vii-viii)
  5. Summary
    (pp. ix-xvi)
  6. Acknowledgments
    (pp. xvii-xviii)
  7. Abbreviations
    (pp. xix-xxii)
  8. CHAPTER ONE Why Stabilization and Reconstruction?
    (pp. 1-12)

    The experiences of the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan in recent years have underlined the importance of stabilization by demonstrating that ending conflict is not as easy as planners may have expected upon first undertaking military operations. These experiences have helped feed a debate over the role of stabilization and reconstruction—and, thus, just how much capacity the United States and other countries need to carry out these missions—in U.S. strategic interests in the 21st century.

    Specifically, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have bolstered arguments that efforts to advance political and economic development in countries experiencing conflict...

  9. CHAPTER TWO What Do Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations Entail?
    (pp. 13-32)

    By their nature, stabilization and reconstruction operations are complex undertakings that involve activities in many different issue areas and require extensive coordination among the wide range of actors identified in the previous chapter. Specific requirements will vary in different operations. Some operations will occur after conflict has ended, while others may be designed to prevent conflict from erupting in the first place. Some operations will occur under conditions of insurgency and continuing violence, while others may be more peaceful. Some operations will rely heavily on military personnel, while others may involve more civilian and nongovernmental actors because of requirements and...

  10. CHAPTER THREE Recent Efforts to Build Capacity
    (pp. 33-62)

    In the past few years, the U.S. government has undertaken a number of important initiatives to build capacity for stabilization and reconstruction operations. This chapter provides a brief overview of these efforts, starting with the creation of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) within the State Department and related presidential directives and legislation. It then briefly describes two S/CRS concepts for how the U.S. government should plan and conduct stabilization and reconstruction operations. Next, it discusses the current state of U.S. government deployable civilian capacity, including development of the Civilian Response Corps. The chapter concludes by...

  11. CHAPTER FOUR Conclusions and Recommendations
    (pp. 63-76)

    Decisions about whether and how to develop capacity for stabilization and reconstruction in coming years should reflect U.S. foreign-policy priorities and goals. If the United States sees its foreign policy as best assured, at least in part, by helping to end conflict and promote development around the world, priority attention should be given to these issues. If the United States sees a smaller role for itself in nation-building around the world, then other issues can take center stage and a smaller capacity may be acceptable.

    Most policy analysts believe that improved capacity is needed. Over the last eight years, many...

  12. Bibliography
    (pp. 77-82)