Band of Brothers or Dysfunctional Family?

Band of Brothers or Dysfunctional Family?: A Military Perspective on Coalition Challenges During Stability Operations

Russell W. Glenn
Copyright Date: 2011
Published by: RAND Corporation
Pages: 156
https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mg903jfcom
  • Cite this Item
  • Book Info
    Band of Brothers or Dysfunctional Family?
    Book Description:

    During stability operations, coalitions must incorporate participation by government agencies other than the military, the indigenous government, and its population more than is expected during conventional combat operations. This book investigates challenges confronting coalitions today and considers potential solutions that include questioning the conception of what constitutes a coalition in today's world.

    eISBN: 978-0-8330-5986-4
    Subjects: Political Science, History

Table of Contents

  1. Front Matter
    (pp. i-ii)
  2. Preface
    (pp. iii-iv)
  3. Table of Contents
    (pp. v-vi)
  4. Figures
    (pp. vii-viii)
  5. Table
    (pp. ix-x)
  6. Summary
    (pp. xi-xvi)
  7. Acknowledgments
    (pp. xvii-xviii)
  8. Abbreviations
    (pp. xix-xxiv)
  9. CHAPTER ONE Introduction
    (pp. 1-10)

    The United States is the land of Eisenhower, the man who led the most successful alliance of the 20th century—indeed, one of the most notable in the history of warfare. The United States is the nation privileged by its partners to lead the coalition that swept the Iraqi Army from the field in a matter of hours in 1991 and again in a matter of days a dozen years later. What value could there be in contemplating how such a proven exemplar might improve its performance as leader of coalitions at the dawning of the 21st century?

    The United...

  10. CHAPTER TWO Supporting Case Studies: East Timor and the Balkans
    (pp. 11-30)

    This summary of events in East Timor draws from a range of sources beyond those specifically cited elsewhere.¹

    Timor-Leste (known as East Timor prior to formal recognition of the country as an independent state on May 20, 2002) is a nation occupying portions of the island of Timor, off the northwest Australia coastline. (See Figures 2.1 and 2.2. The lighter color in the second figure designates the two noncontiguous parts of Timor-Leste.) After a lengthy colonial history and more than a decade of restive efforts to gain independence in the aftermath of Indonesia’s usurpation of the land and peoples, Indonesian...

  11. CHAPTER THREE Coalition Leadership: The Influence of Structure
    (pp. 31-68)

    Such conflicts as World War II threaten national survival and bind alliances and coalitions. Even more limited conflicts, such as that of March–May 2003 in Iraq put large numbers of a country’s men and women at life’s risk. Not so in stability operations. Not only are countries rarely mortally threatened when undertaking such ventures; chances are good that participation in a coalition means putting citizens in harm’s way to no particularly vital end. Little wonder that withdrawal of continued support from populations at home can lead to a country’s precipitous departure. The challenge for a coalition leader is one...

  12. CHAPTER FOUR Unity of Command During Coalition Operations
    (pp. 69-82)

    Unity of command, another of the U.S. Army’s principles of war, is an ideal seldom met aside from when a single country’s armed forces conduct operations together (and, even in those cases, service parochialism or personalities may impinge on the ideal). Its achievement becomes increasingly difficult as the number and type of participants increases. Little wonder that it existed neither in East Timor nor in Bosnia and Herzegovina nor in Kosovo. It also does not exist in Iraq or Afghanistan. National and other organizational interests take precedence over the benefits that alliance or coalition members would accrue were they to...

  13. CHAPTER FIVE Selecting Coalition Leaders: Key Abilities
    (pp. 83-94)

    The Chapter Two case studies of East Timor and the Balkans make it evident that the effectiveness of those in leadership positions rests on considering C2 more in terms of cooperation and compromise than command and control. So how can our senior political and military leaders identify the right men and women for coalition leadership during stability operations, individuals possessing Medal of Honor winner Calvin Titus’s recommended blend of political, diplomatic, and warrior skills? Given that we have a plan, as recommended by Field Marshal Montgomery and substantiated by the discussion in Chapter Three, how can we ensure that we...

  14. CHAPTER SIX Recommendations and Conclusions
    (pp. 95-108)

    The opening lines of this book cited operations in Afghanistan and Iraq as opportunities to improve U.S. leadership of coalitions. Operational success in Iraq demonstrates that shortcomings in collective partnerships do not preclude achieving sought-after ends. Even a cursory study of coalition operations there demonstrates that there are lessons available for any leader wishing to make similar future enterprises more efficient, more effective, and less a strain on relationships with countries that include those that have long been among the United States’ most reliable of international partners. That the United States continues to dig at the selfinflicted wound of suboptimal...

  15. Bibliography
    (pp. 109-132)