The events of 9/11 again focused Washington’s attention on Pakistan, a country that had been subjected to layers of sanctions and had teetered precariously toward international pariah status because it had tested nuclear weapons, been engaged in the proliferation of nuclear and missile technologies, been subjected to several military coups, and supported militant groups that terrorized its neighbors. The 9/11 attacks and the subsequent U.S. decision to oust the Taliban regime in Afghanistan permitted Pakistan to become, virtually overnight, one of the United States’ most important allies in what has become known as the “global war on terror” or “overseas...

This chapter identifies several impediments to a stable, secure Pakistan and discusses how each of these may develop over the coming ten-year time horizon. Admittedly, other outcomes are possible; however, the outcome explored in this volume is perhaps the optimal one. The first section of this chapter details the problematic history of constitutionalism in Pakistan. The second section addresses a particularly important derivative problem of the failure of Pakistan’s elites to agree on a constitutional framework: the imbalance in power between civilians and the military, especially the army’s extensive role in making political decisions. The third section explores in some...

There are many potential outcomes for Pakistan’s future. It could become an authoritarian, praetorian state along the lines of Egypt. It could become a nuclear-armed, dysfunctional, and failing state held together by the sinews of the army, provided that the army itself remains coherent. It could over time become an increasingly Islamist or even theocratic state. The state could even break away along ethnic fissures or fail to resurrect itself after a devastating war with India. Arguably, these different scenarios have their own degrees of possibility and their own pathways for emerging.¹ However, this book contends that the future that...

The United States has several policy goals that it seeks to advance through its engagement with Pakistan. First, and foremost, the U.S. government wants Pakistan to be an effective partner in the war on terror. The United States wants to ensure continued use of Pakistani military, police, and intelligence assets to eliminate al Qaeda leadership and cells within the territory of Pakistan. The United States would also like Pakistan to make it more difficult for al Qaeda and other militants to recruit and train new members. The United States would like Pakistan to deny these groups the ability to operate...

Since September 11, 2001, Pakistan has become increasingly unstable. Terrorist and insurgent groups operating out of Pakistan threaten the United States, the United States’ NATO allies, Pakistan’s neighbors, and Pakistan itself. The U.S. government will need to work assiduously to help stabilize Pakistan. It should have no illusions about the difficulties of the task. Financial aid alone will be inadequate: Massive amounts of foreign aid, most of which have gone to Pakistan’s military, have failed to stabilize the country.

To create more-effective U.S. policies for dealing with Pakistan, the U.S. government will need to draw several lessons, not only from...