Counterinsurgency in Pakistan

Counterinsurgency in Pakistan

Seth G. Jones
C. Christine Fair
Copyright Date: 2010
Published by: RAND Corporation
Pages: 208
  • Cite this Item
  • Book Info
    Counterinsurgency in Pakistan
    Book Description:

    Pakistan has undertaken a number of operations against militant groups since 2001. There have been some successes, but such groups as al Qa'ida continue to present a significant threat to Pakistan, the United States, and other countries. Pakistan needs to establish a population-centric counterinsurgency that better protects the local population and addresses grievances. It also needs to abandon militancy as a tool of foreign and domestic policy.

    eISBN: 978-0-8330-4986-5
    Subjects: Political Science

Table of Contents

  1. Front Matter
    (pp. i-ii)
  2. Preface
    (pp. iii-iv)
  3. Table of Contents
    (pp. v-vi)
  4. Figures
    (pp. vii-viii)
  5. Tables
    (pp. ix-x)
  6. Executive Summary
    (pp. xi-xviii)
  7. Acknowledgments
    (pp. xix-xx)
  8. Abbreviations
    (pp. xxi-xxii)
  9. CHAPTER ONE Introduction
    (pp. 1-4)

    Since 2001, Pakistan has faced an increasingly serious threat from militant groups operating on its soil, as Figure 1.1 illustrates. In 2009, there was a 48 percent increase in terrorist attacks from 2008 levels, which killed 3,021 people and injured 7,334. The highest number of attacks occurred in the conflict zones of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), North West Frontier Province (NWFP), and Baluchistan Province. But other areas of Pakistan, including Punjab, were also targeted by a lethal campaign of bombings. Militant groups increasingly resorted to suicide attacks, which killed or wounded a growing number of civilians. There was...

  10. CHAPTER TWO The Militant Challenge
    (pp. 5-32)

    This chapter examines Pakistan’s historical practice of supporting militant groups to achieve its foreign and domestic policy objectives.¹ Pakistan’s first use of militant groups occurred in 1947, shortly after independence. Since then, Pakistan has relied on irregular fighters andrazakars(volunteers), as well as regular fighters drawn from the military, paramilitary, and intelligence agencies. These regular fighters have sometimes been dressed “in mufti” and disguised as irregular fighters, perhaps to convince domestic and international audiences that the operations were conducted by nonstate actors, rather than instruments of the state.

    The chapter argues that, while beginning to use asymmetric warfare in...

  11. CHAPTER THREE Pakistani Operations Against Militants
    (pp. 33-84)

    In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf helped target al Qa’ida and other foreign fighters operating in the country as part of the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom. Pakistan provided extensive land, air, and seaport accessibility, as well as a host of other logistical and security-related provisions. In early 2002, Pakistan’s security forces began conducting operations against foreign militants and their support networks in FATA. But as the war in Afghanistan spiraled, several indigenous insurgencies began to develop on the Pakistani side of the border. When Pakistan expanded its scope of operations, local insurgencies...

  12. CHAPTER FOUR Counterinsurgency and Persuasion
    (pp. 85-118)

    Pakistan’s operations against militants have been deeply affected by the capabilities and political will of its national security agencies. The army and Frontier Corps have at times struggled to clear and hold territory, as well as to secure local support in FATA and NWFP. In addition, Pakistan has been willing to target some militant groups but not others. These realities have enormous implications for the United States and its interests in Pakistan and the broader region. Some U.S. policymakers have expressed frustration that, despite giving the Pakistan government billions of dollars in assistance since September 2001, they cannot persuade Pakistan...

  13. CHAPTER FIVE A Population-Centric Strategy
    (pp. 119-142)

    The United States has at least two major interests in Pakistan. One is defeating al Qa’ida and other militant groups that threaten the U.S. homeland and its interests overseas. The second is preventing militant groups from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons. Pakistan has similar interests, especially protecting its homeland from militant and state-sponsored threats.

    Establishing a more-effective strategy will require Pakistan to shift its cost-benefit calculations and end support to militant groups as a tool of foreign policy. Pakistan views some groups as assets and others as adversaries, a policy that has backfired and undermined Pakistan’s own...

  14. About the Authors
    (pp. 143-144)
  15. Bibliography
    (pp. 145-168)
  16. Index
    (pp. 169-186)
  17. Back Matter
    (pp. 187-187)