Coercion is a commonly used term with no agreed-upon meaning. This chapter is theoretical, with the intention of providing a foundation for the rest of the study that includes the perspective of the warfighter.

We begin by defining coercion and noting the relationships among the term’s many permutations. We then describe how to think better about this complex phenomenon, noting the value of a simple cost-benefit model and its many limitations. We then explore the limits in relevance and methodological problems common to previous studies of coercion.

Past studies of coercion that were based on unique geopolitical conditions are of...

Understanding the coercive use of air power demands insight into coercive diplomacy in general and the strengths and weaknesses of air power in particular. The successful coercive use of air power requires favorable conditions and often depends more on the strategy chosen by the adversary than on the overall might of the coercer. This chapter attempts to identify the conditions conducive to successful coercive diplomacy, paying particular attention to the potential contributions of air power. It also notes common challenges that may lead to failure.

The analysis reveals that the success of coercive operations is often a product of one...

Part Two examined factors that promote or inhibit successful coercive diplomacy. Occasional references were made in some of the historical vignettes to various domestic influences that complicated coercion or the coercive use of air power. Domestic factors can severely undermine coercive diplomacy by causing decisionmakers to restrict the scope and scale of a military campaign, place limits on escalation, and encourage adversaries to resist U.S. pressure.

This chapter looks at domestic constraints on coercion. It begins by exploring how, and under what conditions, domestic politics can complicate coercive diplomacy by restricting military operations. It then addresses how an adversary might...

The United States will frequently conduct coercive operations as part of a multinational coalition.¹ Crises in Kosovo, Bosnia, Somalia, and Iraq are only the latest instances where coalition unity (or the lack thereof) proved a key factor in the success or failure of coercion. Coalition partners may bring military, diplomatic, or other forms of support, but coalition-building and maintenance can also undermine coercive threats and offer adversaries counter-coercive options.

With a few exceptions, all coercive military operations carried out by U.S. forces since the end of the Second World War have been prosecuted under the auspices of international organizations or...

Humanitarian operations and crises involving confrontations with nonstate actors—communal militias, violent political movements, and other organized political actors that are not nation-states—are increasingly common in the post-Cold War world. In 1991, the United States intervened in post-Operation Desert Storm fighting in Iraq, providing aid and assistance to the country’s Kurdish and Shi’a populations. In 1992 and 1993, it sent combat troops to help stave off a humanitarian disaster in Somalia. And in 1995, it deployed forces to the former Yugoslavia to solidify a peace agreement between rival ethnic groups.

Coercion will be a critical foreign policy tool in...

Air power can play a vital role in successful coercion. Air power’s ability to destroy a range of targets, and its growing capabilities in intelligence and precision strike offer new options to military and political decisionmaking. These capabilities, however, do not always lead to more favorable outcomes for the United States. Even if a particular target is destroyed successfully, the change in behavior sought—the true object of coercion—often fails to occur. Understanding this relationship between a target’s destruction and the desired outcome is difficult and requires insights into culture, psychology, and organizational behavior.

Air power’s unique attributes allow...