Disjointed War

Disjointed War: Military Operations in Kosovo, 1999

Bruce R. Nardulli
Walter L. Perry
Bruce Pirnie
John Gordon
John G. McGinn
Copyright Date: 2002
Edition: 1
Published by: RAND Corporation
Pages: 160
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  • Book Info
    Disjointed War
    Book Description:

    An examination of the 1999 conflict in Kosovo, with afocus on joint military operations.The 1999 military operation against the Yugoslav Army in Kosovosuggests several areas in which Joint military operations weredeficient. This study examined all aspects of the Kosovo conflict,including its political and historical underpinnings, in an attempt tounderstand these deficiencies and to recommend improvements. Thisdocument--provided in both a classified and unclassified version--isbased on extensive original source documents and interviews with mostof the principal participants, and serves as the definitive Armyrecord on Kosovo. While the primary focus of the research was on U.S.Army involvement, it covered many other aspects of Operation AlliedForce. Topics included NATO objectives in Operation Allied Force, airand ground planning, evolution of the air operation and its effects onfielded Yugoslav forces, Task Force Hawk, and peace operations. The 1999 military operation in Kosovo suggests severalareas in which Joint military operations were deficient. This studyexamines all aspects of the Kosovo conflict, with a focus on U.S. Armyinvolvement, including its political and historical underpinnings, inan attempt to understand these deficiencies and to recommendimprovements.

    eISBN: 978-0-8330-3231-7
    Subjects: History, Political Science

Table of Contents

  1. Front Matter
    (pp. i-ii)
    (pp. iii-iv)
  3. Table of Contents
    (pp. v-viii)
    (pp. ix-x)
    (pp. xi-xii)
    (pp. xiii-xviii)
    (pp. xix-xx)
    (pp. xxi-xxiv)
  9. Chapter One INTRODUCTION
    (pp. 1-10)

    The Kosovo conflict was unique in the history of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). For the first time, the alliance conducted an offensive military operation to compel another country to accept its terms. For 78 days NATO waged a conflict under extremely demanding political and military conditions, ultimately forcing Yugoslavia to end Serb violence against the Kosovars, withdraw all Yugoslav forces from Kosovo, accept an international military presence in the province, and allow the unconditional return of all refugees. With the end of hostilities, NATO moved the Kosovo Force (KFOR) into Kosovo to establish basic law and order and...

  10. Chapter Two AT THE BRINK: APRIL 1998 TO MARCH 1999
    (pp. 11-20)

    Military planning in the twelve months before Operation Allied Force was driven by NATO’s limited political objectives—and the corresponding limited means it was willing to use—in dealing with the Kosovo crisis. The objective was to dampen the escalating hostilities by both the Serbs and the KLA in order to stop the mounting human suffering and to prevent the violence from spreading to neighboring countries. Of primary concern was the danger of spillover to Macedonia and Albania, as well as to the Yugoslav territory of Montenegro, risking larger Balkan instability. From the outset, NATO and the United Nations pursued...

  11. Chapter Three AIR OPERATION
    (pp. 21-56)

    Western leadership expectations for a brief bombing effort and rapid capitulation by Milosevic were instead met with Belgrade’s defiance. The regime severed diplomatic relations with Western powers and accelerated its “ethnic cleansing” of Kosovar Albanians. The test of political and military wills now began in earnest.¹

    Official NATO and U.S. statements announced the same goal in undertaking the air operation against Yugoslavia: to stop the violence against Kosovar Albanians.

    Just before NATO air strikes, NATO announced that its military action was “directed towards disrupting the violent attacks being committed by the Yugoslav army and Special Police Forces and weakening their...

  12. Chapter Four TASK FORCE HAWK
    (pp. 57-98)

    Task Force Hawk was intended to provide an additional means for hitting Milosevic’s fielded forces with a deep-strike capability using AH-64 Apache attack helicopters and the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS). But the concept of operations for TF Hawk raised difficult questions. How could a relatively small number of Apaches make an appreciable difference at acceptable risk to themselves? How could the MLRS, an element in suppressing Serb air defenses as part of deep-strike operations, be employed without risking collateral damage that would discredit NATO? Most senior military leadership in Washington was skeptical about the concept and opposed deployment of...

  13. Chapter Five ENFORCING THE PEACE
    (pp. 99-110)

    On June 12, 1999, NATO forces began entering Kosovo to conduct Operation Joint Guardian. The Kosovo Force (KFOR) continues to the present day. This chapter examines the planning and initial execution of Operation Joint Guardian and the U.S. contribution, Task Force Falcon.

    The planning and preparation that eventually led to Operation Joint Guardian, better known as KFOR, underwent many changes. Planning for KFOR began in the summer of 1998 but was halted during the October crisis. Planning began again in the lead-up to the negotiations held in Rambouillet, France, in February 1999. When the Rambouillet negotiations failed to produce a...

  14. Chapter Six CONCLUSION
    (pp. 111-122)

    The 1998–1999 crisis with Yugoslavia and Operation Allied Force provide rich experiences to draw on when considering future operations and force structure requirements. An important caveat is that all such events have their own unique strategic political context and operational military challenges. That said, a number of important issues arose that need to be considered as part of ongoing efforts to better prepare the U.S. military for future military operations.

    Perhaps the most important observation is on the level of joint and multinational operations. Integration of national and allied military assets into a joint campaign presents an adversary with...

    (pp. 123-126)
    (pp. 127-147)