The Stryker Brigade Combat Team

The Stryker Brigade Combat Team: Rethinking Strategic Responsiveness and Assessing Deployment Options

Alan Vick
David Orletsky
Bruce Pirnie
Seth Jones
Copyright Date: 2002
Edition: 1
Published by: RAND Corporation
Pages: 164
https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mr1606af
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  • Book Info
    The Stryker Brigade Combat Team
    Book Description:

    Examines alternative means to decrease the deployment time for the new Army medium-weight brigade, comparing air and sealift from the United States with air and fast (but short-range) sealift from forward bases or preposition sites. Historical experience and an assessment of U.S. regional interests are used to determine how much warning time the United States typically has before major force deployments and where it is most likely to deploy such forces

    eISBN: 978-0-8330-3403-8
    Subjects: Political Science

Table of Contents

  1. Front Matter
    (pp. i-ii)
  2. PREFACE
    (pp. iii-iv)
  3. Table of Contents
    (pp. v-viii)
  4. FIGURES
    (pp. ix-x)
  5. TABLES
    (pp. xi-xii)
  6. SUMMARY
    (pp. xiii-xviii)
  7. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
    (pp. xix-xxii)
  8. ACRONYMS
    (pp. xxiii-xxvi)
  9. Chapter One INTRODUCTION
    (pp. 1-12)

    Historically, to deter and defeat major threats in Europe and Asia, the United States has relied on forward-deployed Army and U.S. Air Force (USAF) forces, Navy and United States Marine Corps (USMC) forces afloat, long-range aircraft in the continental United States (CONUS), prepositioned unit sets in key regions, and reinforcing units from CONUS. For short-warning crises in other regions, Marine Expeditionary Units, the 82nd Airborne Division, Special Operations Forces, and USAF/Navy air would be combined as appropriate to provide a limited capability that was usually sufficient for noncombat evacuations and other lesser contingencies. The United States has not had the...

  10. Chapter Two DEPLOYING THE SBCTs
    (pp. 13-56)

    Many factors affect the time required to deploy units, including the location of deploying units; nearness to airfields or ports; the departure point; overflight rights; location of en route airbases (if such airbases are required); mobility assets allocated to deployment (i.e., number and types of airlifters, tankers, and cargo ships); composition of the SBCT; suitability of host-nation infrastructure (airports and seaports); quality of road network from port of debarkation to deployment location; and weather.¹ The SBCT deployment time will depend heavily on the specifics of the situation and will require detailed operational analysis to arrive at accurate answers. The objective...

  11. Chapter Three DECISIONS TO INITIATE OPERATIONS
    (pp. 57-78)

    In Chapter Two, we explored the challenge of rapidly moving a medium-weight Army brigade like the SBCT. Our analysis of three representative scenarios suggests that SBCT equipment sets or the units themselves would have to be forward-deployed in at least three regions to achieve response times of under 10 days. In this chapter and the next, we take a step back and try to understand how rapidly an SBCT would need to deploy to be considered a strategically responsive force. We do this by first considering the timelines associated with the political-military decision to initiate joint military operations. In Chapter...

  12. Chapter Four REGIONS OF INTEREST
    (pp. 79-114)

    The Air Force has global reach, operating through air and space. One of its core competencies israpid global mobility, defined as “the ability to rapidly position forces anywhere in the world.”¹ The Navy and Marine Corps define their capabilities in reference to the world’s oceans and littorals, particularly the capability to “project precise power from the sea.”² The Army intends to develop an Objective Force with “deployability that will enable us to place a combat-capable brigade anywhere in the world in 96 hours; put a division on the ground in 120 hours; and five divisions on the ground in...

  13. Chapter Five CONCLUSIONS
    (pp. 115-118)

    Army transformation efforts seek to turn the Army (first the Stryker Brigade Combat Team, then the Objective Force) into a force that can deploy globally in 96 hours. However, the analysis in this report suggests that a force with over 1,000 vehicles cannot be deployed by air from CONUS to the far reaches of the globe in four days. With some mobility enhancements, it will be possible to achieve deployment timelines on the order of one to two weeks, which is quite rapid for a motorized force. Specifically, this analysis found that the combination of CONUS bases (particularly Fort Polk),...

  14. Appendix A DEPTH OF U.S. OPERATIONS
    (pp. 119-122)
  15. Appendix B COMPONENTS OF DEPLOYMENT TIMES FOR ALL SCENARIOS FROM CHAPTER TWO
    (pp. 123-126)
  16. BIBLIOGRAPHY
    (pp. 127-138)