The U.S. Army and the New National Security Strategy

The U.S. Army and the New National Security Strategy

Lynn E. Davis
Jeremy Shapiro
Copyright Date: 2003
Edition: 1
Published by: RAND Corporation
Pages: 330
https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mr1657a
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  • Book Info
    The U.S. Army and the New National Security Strategy
    Book Description:

    This book examines the Army's role in the war on terrorism; the Army's homeland security needs; the implications of increased emphasis on Asia; the Army's role in coalition operations; the unfinished business of jointness-the lessons learned from operations and how to prepare for the future; the Army's deployability, logistical, and personnel challenges; and whether the Army can afford its Transformation. These examinations are bracketed by an introduction, a description of the Army's place in the new national security strategy, and a summary of the authors' conclusions.

    eISBN: 978-0-8330-3413-7
    Subjects: Political Science, Management & Organizational Behavior

Table of Contents

  1. Front Matter
    (pp. i-ii)
  2. PREFACE
    (pp. iii-iv)
  3. Table of Contents
    (pp. v-xii)
  4. FIGURES
    (pp. xiii-xiv)
  5. TABLES
    (pp. xv-xvi)
  6. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
    (pp. xvii-xviii)
  7. ACRONYMS
    (pp. xix-xxii)
  8. Chapter One INTRODUCTION
    (pp. 1-6)
    Lynn E. Davis and Jeremy Shapiro

    The Bush administration issuedThe National Security Strategy of the United Statesin fall 2002, a little more than a year after the September 11 terrorist attacks and as it was gathering an international coalition to disarm Iraq. As in past national security strategies, the document describes lofty goals and principles but is vague with regard to how these will be achieved. The strategy assigns a myriad of new and demanding tasks to the military while relieving it of precious few old ones. It offers little specific guidance, stipulating only the need to acquire capabilities for intelligence warning, remote sensing,...

  9. Chapter Two THE NEW NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
    (pp. 7-26)
    Jeremy Shapiro and Lynn E. Davis

    The Bush administration arrived in Washington in January 2001 contemplating dramatic changes in the U.S. national security strategy. During the campaign, candidate Bush had articulated the view that the existing security strategy lacked coherence and focus. In this view, a failure to prioritize had led the previous administration to excessive use of the military for nonwarfighting tasks while neglecting key areas of the world, such as Mexico and India. As a result, the U.S. military had become overstretched and underfunded with no appreciable benefit for U.S. security. The administration intended therefore to shift the nation’s priorities toward dealing with new...

  10. Chapter Three THE U.S. ARMY AND THE OFFENSIVE WAR ON TERRORISM
    (pp. 27-60)
    Bruce R. Nardulli

    Shortly after the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, President Bush announced that the nation’s top security priority was now a war on terrorists with global reach, their organizations, and countries sponsoring or harboring them. The immediate objective following September 11, 2001, was securing the U.S. homeland directly against any further attacks. But military planning also began in earnest for operations against al Qaeda abroad, beginning with their leadership and infrastructure in Afghanistan. From the outset, both policy statements and subsequent U.S. actions stressed the importance of taking the fight to the perpetrators—attacking, disrupting, and destroying their...

  11. Chapter Four DEFINING THE ARMY’S HOMELAND SECURITY NEEDS
    (pp. 61-84)
    Lynn E. Davis

    The September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon brought home to Americans their serious vulnerabilities to terrorism. A new Department of Homeland Security has been established, and the broad outlines of a strategy for homeland security are evident (National Strategy for Homeland Security, 2002). Much still needs to be done, however, to define the specific plans and programs. In this time of uncertainty, the challenge for the U.S. military and for the Army in particular is to be prepared for whatever the political leadership may demand. In the area of homeland security, this challenge presents considerable difficulties,...

  12. Chapter Five THE SHIFT TO ASIA: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. LAND POWER
    (pp. 85-110)
    Roger Cliff and Jeremy Shapiro

    Reflecting its origins, the United States has long defined itself in reference to Europe. Since the “Europe first” strategy of World War II, Europe has always been the “central front”—the primary locus for policy attention and defense planning. Today, however, with the Soviet threat gone, Europe, while still critical to U.S. security, is for the most part peaceful and prosperous. There is every reason to believe it will remain that way. At the same time, as the quotations that open this paper reflect, a bipartisan political consensus now holds that Asia³ has gained and will continue to gain in...

  13. Chapter Six PREPARING FOR COALITION OPERATIONS
    (pp. 111-128)
    Nora Bensahel

    Many pressures come into play when the nation decides to go to war. One of the key questions confronting decisionmakers is whether to operate as part of a multinational coalition or act alone.The National Security Strategyrecognizes both. It stresses that “no nation can build a safer, better world alone” but also clearly states that “we will be prepared to act apart when our interests and unique responsibilities require” (National Security Strategy, 2002, pp. 29 and 32).

    The U.S. military must therefore be capable of operating in coalition with others, while also maintaining the ability to achieve decisive victory...

  14. Chapter Seven TRANSFORMATION AND THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS OF JOINTNESS: LESSONS FOR THE ARMY FROM THE PERSIAN GULF, KOSOVO, AND AFGHANISTAN
    (pp. 129-162)
    Bernard Rostker

    One of the tenets of the modern Department of Defense isjointness.¹Implied by the creation of a single cabinet-level department in 1947 and strengthened by the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986—better known as the Goldwater-Nichols Act—military commanders and planners have been charged for years with setting aside their parochial service orientations and rivalries and building a newjointmilitary to achieve the synergy of a joint force. From the beginning of the unified Department of Defense, however, the decision to retain the three separate subcabinet military departments meant that the realities of jointness would be problematic, at...

  15. Chapter Eight PREPARING THE ARMY FOR JOINT OPERATIONS
    (pp. 163-190)
    Bruce Pirnie

    The National Security Strategystates that the military, which had been structured for operations against the massive armies of the Warsaw Pact, must be transformed to handle new adversaries. The administration wants a broad portfolio of military capabilities, including “transformed maneuver and expeditionary forces” (National Security Strategy,2002, p. 30).

    In the Army’s vision of future warfare, its forces will fight in radically new ways. They will arrive in theater very quickly, fighting their way in if necessary, proceed immediately into combat, and overwhelm the enemy through simultaneous, continuous, and widespread operations. Far more often than in the past, they...

  16. Chapter Nine MOVING RAPIDLY TO THE FIGHT
    (pp. 191-216)
    John Gordon and David Orletsky

    The leadership of the Department of Defense (DoD) has repeatedly called for improvements in the deployability of U.S. military forces, given the characteristics of future threats and contingencies. Chapter Three in this volume describes how the war on terrorism adds urgency to the need for rapid military responses.

    In reaction, all the military services are increasing their strategic responsiveness. The Air Force has devoted considerable effort to making the next generation of aircraft easier to maintain and more self-sufficient. It has established regional “hub” bases, such as the one at Andersen AFB on Guam, repositioned assets at bases where forces...

  17. Chapter Ten TAKING CARE OF PEOPLE: THE FUTURE OF ARMY PERSONNEL
    (pp. 217-238)
    Susan Hosek

    The quotation above echoes numerous statements by various senior military and civilian leaders on the importance of personnel for all of the U.S. military services. The U.S. Army, in particular, requires a steady flow of high-quality personnel to operate its equipment, maintain its complex machinery, and ensure its capacity to respond rapidly to a wide variety of contingencies around the world. Reflecting their importance, the cost of paying the Pentagon’s military and civilian employees is its single biggest cost—roughly $130 billion annually. While the enormous cost and importance of U.S. Army personnel has long been recognized and extolled, the...

  18. Chapter Eleven MAKING THE POWER PROJECTION ARMY A REALITY
    (pp. 239-254)
    Eric Peltz and John Halliday

    During the Cold War, the U.S. Army evolved into a powerful force but not necessarily a powerfulprojectionforce. Focused primarily on defending Europe against the threat of heavy Soviet forces, it enjoyed the luxury of stationing units, equipment, and a large supporting infrastructure in Europe, with a similar but smaller presence in the Republic of Korea as well. Its light forces provided some strategic mobility but lacked much staying power in the face of a serious enemy threat. The buildup to the Gulf War in 1990 epitomized this Army. Light forces moved quickly to Saudi Arabia in the first...

  19. Chapter Twelve RESOURCING THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY ARMY
    (pp. 255-292)
    David Kassing

    Military force planning is often described as a simple linear process. First national interests are identified. Then threats to U.S. interests and values are assessed. Next policy and strategy for meeting the threats are defined. Finally programs are developed to execute the strategy effectively and efficiently. While a certain fundamental logic underlies this formulation, in fact, the planning process is much more complex. Multiple, interacting processes function to ensure that the resulting forces are not only effective and efficient but also affordable and consistent with domestic and international political concerns. These goals sometimes clash, so compromises, somehow effected, determine resource...

  20. Chapter Thirteen REFINING ARMY TRANSFORMATION
    (pp. 293-310)
    Thomas L. McNaugher

    It is worth emphasizing again, as we conclude this report, just how far the security challenges facing the United States have evolved away from those of the Cold War. Gone are that era’s grim certainties—the obvious enemy, the geographic locus of the core confrontation—and the relatively sharp planning and procurement focus they afforded. Today’s challenges can emerge anywhere around the globe, including in our own homeland. Threats range from the Soviet-like conventional forces of Iraq and North Korea to guerrilla groups in Afghanistan or terrorist cells in the United States. Missions range from fighting wars to feeding people....