Money in the Bank--Lessons Learned from Past Counterinsurgency (COIN) Operations

Money in the Bank--Lessons Learned from Past Counterinsurgency (COIN) Operations: RAND Counterinsurgency Study--Paper 4

Angel Rabasa
Lesley Anne Warner
Peter Chalk
Ivan Khilko
Paraag Shukla
Copyright Date: 2007
Edition: 1
Published by: RAND Corporation
Pages: 102
https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/op185osd
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  • Book Info
    Money in the Bank--Lessons Learned from Past Counterinsurgency (COIN) Operations
    Book Description:

    Six historic counterinsurgency (COIN) operations are examined to determine which tactics, techniques, and procedures led to success and which to failure. The Philippines, Algeria, Vietnam, El Salvador, Jammu and Kashmir, and Colombia were chosen for their varied characteristics relating to geography, historical era, outcome, type of insurgency faced, and level of U.S. involvement. Future U.S. COIN operations can learn from these past lessons.

    eISBN: 978-0-8330-4283-5
    Subjects: Political Science

Table of Contents

  1. Front Matter
    (pp. i-ii)
  2. Preface
    (pp. iii-iv)
  3. Table of Contents
    (pp. v-vi)
  4. Figures and Tables
    (pp. vii-viii)
  5. Summary
    (pp. ix-xvi)
  6. Acknowledgments
    (pp. xvii-xviii)
  7. Abbreviations
    (pp. xix-xxii)
  8. CHAPTER ONE Introduction
    (pp. 1-6)

    The Global War on Terror (GWOT) is being waged in multiple theaters possessing a wide spectrum of social dynamics, regional relationships, histories, political cultures, strengths and weaknesses, and salient grievances. In the post-9/11 world, many policymakers refer to GWOT as the “Long War,” in which proficiency in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations could be the difference between defeat and victory on a timetable that is more in harmony with U.S. capabilities to counter prolonged threats in several parts of the world. As global threats are in a state of constant flux, U.S. capabilities must strive to stay ahead of the curve. Because...

  9. CHAPTER TWO The Philippines (1899–1902)
    (pp. 7-16)
    Ivan Khilko

    The Filipino insurgency has its roots in the waning days of Spanish occupation as a revolutionary organization called the Katipunan,¹ started in 1892. The Katipunan accomplished little during their time under the Spanish, largely because there was a great deal of infighting within the organization. This is best exemplified by the assassination of the organization’s leader, Andres Bonifacio, in 1897 by Emilio Aguinaldo, a member of the politically activeprincipaleclass of landed gentry. By removing his rival, Aguinaldo assumed power of the largest rebel factions in the country and would go on to lead the insurgency against the United...

  10. CHAPTER THREE Algeria (1954–1962)
    (pp. 17-26)
    Peter Chalk

    Known as the “First Algerian War,” the anticolonial struggle that was conducted by theFront de Libération Nationale(FLN) against France is often portrayed as a model of classic insurgent warfare that effectively combined guerrilla strategies with a highly brutal campaign of urban terrorism to discredit and ultimately destroy Paris’s stated conviction of the need to hold onto its North African outpost. Indeed, the lessons derived from the Algerian experience were to greatly influence many later ethnonationalist insurgent campaigns, including those conducted by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the African National Congress (ANC).¹ (See Figure 3.1 for a map...

  11. CHAPTER FOUR Vietnam (1959–1972)
    (pp. 27-38)
    Lesley Anne Warner

    This chapter will discuss the insurgency in Vietnam, starting with a brief background on the origins of the conflict. Special attention will be paid to the years 1959–1965 and 1968–1972, as these were the years in which the United States made several attempts at pacification in South Vietnam, which met with mixed success. For the purpose of this paper, North Vietnam is discussed in conjunction with the insurgent forces because that country supported and directed the insurgency in the south and recognized the inseparability of the political and military aspects of the war. The part of the war...

  12. CHAPTER FIVE El Salvador (1980–1992)
    (pp. 39-48)
    Angel Rabasa

    El Salvador has a long history of social violence. The country is the most densely populated mainland country in the Western hemisphere.² Demographic pressures and restricted access to land generated a great deal of social unrest. In 1932, a communist-inspired uprising claimed at least 10,000 lives.³ Since the overthrow in 1944 of General Maximiliano Hernández Martínez, the last of the traditional Salvadoran military dictators, the armed forces as an institution became the predominant political actor in El Salvador. The traditional landed elite—the so-called “oligarchy”—had not exercised power directly since the 1920s, although it continued to have an important...

  13. CHAPTER SIX Jammu and Kashmir (1947–Present)
    (pp. 49-58)
    Paraag Shukla

    Sovereignty over the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) has been disputed ever since India and Pakistan gained their independence in August 1947. As laid out by the plan for partition under the Indian Independence Act of 1947, rulers of the princely states were allowed to choose either to stay within India or move to Pakistan. (See Figure 6.1 for a map of Jammu and Kashmir.)

    On October 22, 1947, armed tribesmen and troops from Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province crossed the border into Kashmir, aiming to capture Srinagar, the capital of J&K. Unable to deal with this invasion, Maharaja...

  14. CHAPTER SEVEN Colombia (1963–Present)
    (pp. 59-68)
    Angel Rabasa

    Insurgency has been endemic to Colombia. For most of the country’s history, political transitions came about as the result of successful insurrections by the party out of power. The 20th century saw two major civil wars or periods of extreme political violence: the War of the Thousand Days (1898–1900) and the period known asLa Violencia(literally, the violence), from 1948–1953, which is estimated to have resulted in 300,000 deaths.La Violencia, and the subsequent military dictatorship of General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, were brought to a close by the National Front in 1957, in which the country’s two...

  15. CHAPTER EIGHT Conclusions: Lessons Learned for Future Counterinsurgencies
    (pp. 69-76)
    Lesley Anne Warner

    In an age when insurgencies have worldwide reach, counterinsurgents can ill affordnotto examine the complexities of past cases and the continuities among them, especially since the complexities of the insurgency that the counterinsurgents are facing may not be elucidated until much later. There is more to gain than to lose by examining past insurgencies; as insurgents learn from other insurgencies, counterinsurgents should continue to learn from the successes and mistakes of other counterinsurgencies to avoid the repetition of mistakes. This may especially be true as the United States continues to confront a variety of mutating threats in several...

  16. Bibliography
    (pp. 77-80)