Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence--The U.S. Military and Counterinsurgency Doctrine, 1960-1970 and 2003-2006
Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence--The U.S. Military and Counterinsurgency Doctrine, 1960-1970 and 2003-2006: RAND Counterinsurgency Study--Paper 6
Austin Long
Copyright Date: 2008
Edition: 1
Published by: RAND Corporation
Pages: 46
https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/op200osd
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Book Info
Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence--The U.S. Military and Counterinsurgency Doctrine, 1960-1970 and 2003-2006
Book Description:

By comparing modern counterinsurgency doctrine and operations to those of 1960s, this paper tests and ultimately disproves the assumption that doctrine as written and operations as conducted are tightly linked. Ingrained organizational concepts and beliefs have a much greater influence on operations than written doctrine, and altering these beliefs will require the U.S. military to reorient itself mentally as well as physically.

eISBN: 978-0-8330-4535-5
Subjects: Political Science, Management & Organizational Behavior
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Table of Contents
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  1. Front Matter
    Front Matter (pp. i-ii)
  2. Preface
    Preface (pp. iii-iv)
  3. Table of Contents
    Table of Contents (pp. v-vi)
  4. Summary
    Summary (pp. vii-viii)
  5. Acknowledgments
    Acknowledgments (pp. ix-x)
  6. Abbreviations
    Abbreviations (pp. xi-xii)
  7. Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence—The U.S. Military and Counterinsurgency Doctrine
    Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence—The U.S. Military and Counterinsurgency Doctrine (pp. 1-30)

    Many authors have noted the United States’ massive and pervasive difficulty in conducting effective large-scale counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. The country’s tendency to repeat the same mistakes during COIN has similarly generated a number of pithy analogies, with Bruce Hoffman’s comparison of the United States to the protagonist of the movieGroundhog Daybeing the most common and most apt.² This paper seeks to address this repetition from a different angle by comparing the development of the U.S. military’s doctrine for COIN in the 1960s with its development of a new COIN doctrine in the years after Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)....

  8. References
    References (pp. 31-34)
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