Corporations and Counterinsurgency

Corporations and Counterinsurgency

William Rosenau
Peter Chalk
Renny McPherson
Michelle Parker
Austin Long
Copyright Date: 2009
Edition: 1
Published by: RAND Corporation
Pages: 55
https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/op259
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  • Book Info
    Corporations and Counterinsurgency
    Book Description:

    Multinational corporations can be significant actors in zones of violent conflict. Corporate actions to shape their environment can sometimes mitigate conflict, but as the authors show in their case studies, corporate activities can help generate and sustain violence.

    eISBN: 978-0-8330-4901-8
    Subjects: Political Science

Table of Contents

  1. Front Matter
    (pp. i-ii)
  2. Preface
    (pp. iii-iv)
  3. Table of Contents
    (pp. v-vi)
  4. Figures and Table
    (pp. vii-viii)
  5. Acknowledgments
    (pp. ix-x)
  6. Abbreviations
    (pp. xi-xii)
  7. CHAPTER ONE Introduction
    (pp. 1-2)

    The insurgencies, civil wars, and humanitarian interventions of the 1990s introduced U.S. military planners, strategists, and analysts to the important roles played in internal conflicts by unofficial entities, such as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and private military companies (PMCs).¹ Today, in countries as diverse as Colombia, Nigeria, and the Philippines, multinational corporations (MNCs) are shaping zones of conflict in significant ways. However, although academic specialists have noted the growing governance and security roles of MNCs, U.S. strategy and policy have been slow to acknowledge the significance of these corporate actors.² For example, the U.S. Army–Marine Corps counterinsurgency manual (Field Manual...

  8. CHAPTER TWO Doing Business in Zones of Conflict
    (pp. 3-8)

    For most MNCs, a highly violent operating environment, and with it, the prospect of the death or injury of employees and the destruction of corporate infrastructure, is a powerful incentive to depart—or indeed, not to enter in the first place. Advocacy groups and the broader international community frequently demand that MNCs in conflict zones halt their operations and remove themselves from the affected country, arguing that the continued presence of these firms helps maintain a “war economy” that sustains combatants.¹ Service firms and manufacturers with comparatively light investments either do not face these obstacles and issues or have assets that...

  9. CHAPTER THREE Royal Dutch Shell in the Niger Delta
    (pp. 9-16)

    Nigeria is Africa’s most significant oil producer, the sixth-biggest producer of petroleum within the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, and the fourth-largest exporter of crude to the United States.¹ The petroleum sector is the backbone of the Nigerian economy and is the state’s financial mainstay, providing 74 percent of government revenues in 2006 (the last year for which figures are available.)² The Niger River Delta, an area of some 70,000 km² in the country’s south, is the nation’s oil heartland. ExxonMobil, Chevron, TotalFinaElf, and other large multinational oil companies operate in the region, but the oldest and largest corporate actor...

  10. CHAPTER FOUR Firestone in Liberia
    (pp. 17-24)

    During the early 20th century, the British enjoyed a monopoly over the world rubber trade. Harvey Firestone, the owner of one of four giant U.S. rubber corporations, wanted to break the monopoly by having America develop its own rubber industry. With the encouragement of the U.S. government, Firestone sent company agents to find suitable land for investment. He originally focused on the Philippine Islands; however, he determined the political environment was not stable enough to sustain operations and looked elsewhere. By the 1920s, after discovering its feasibility for growing rubber, Firestone settled on Liberia (see Figure 2), a West African...

  11. CHAPTER FIVE Placer Dome in Papua New Guinea
    (pp. 25-32)

    The Porgera Mine is, by global standards, a large gold-extraction concession. It is situated in the highland province of Enga, roughly 600 km northwest of Port Moresby, the capital of Papua New Guinea (PNG) (see Figure 3). At an altitude of 2,200 to 2,700 m and surrounded by rugged and unstable mountainous terrain, the valley site sits on highly remote land that is 98 percent owned through traditional local clan lines.

    Exploration of the area commenced in earnest in 1979 as a joint venture between Placer Pacific Proprietary Limited, Renison Goldfields Pty. Ltd., and Mount Isa Mines Ltd. Following the...

  12. CHAPTER SIX Conclusion
    (pp. 33-36)

    Large MNCs can play significant roles in contemporary zones of conflict, so understanding these roles should be a part of any comprehensive conflict analysis. The topic is of more than academic interest. Security in the oil-rich Niger Delta is of concern to U.S. policymakers, as demonstrated by the number of joint U.S.-Nigerian training and equipment programs designed to counter violence against oil facilities in the region.¹ Although U.S. policy stresses the dual use nature of such assistance—for example, officials describe the aid as potentially useful for addressing fishery violations, environmental degradation, and other woes—its orientation is heavily military.²...

  13. APPENDIX Responses in Conflict Zones
    (pp. 37-38)
  14. References
    (pp. 39-43)