Reintegrating Afghan Insurgents

Reintegrating Afghan Insurgents

Seth G. Jones
Copyright Date: 2011
Published by: RAND Corporation
Pages: 38
https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/op327mcia
  • Cite this Item
  • Book Info
    Reintegrating Afghan Insurgents
    Book Description:

    Examines reintegrating Taliban and other insurgents into their local communities in Afghanistan and outlines steps to facilitate that reintegration process. The author discusses the factors that increase the likelihood of reintegrating fighters and the key options for fighters as they consider reintegration. Finally, he outlines operational and tactical steps that should be taken when insurgents consider reintegration.

    eISBN: 978-0-8330-5158-5
    Subjects: Political Science, History

Table of Contents

  1. Front Matter
    (pp. i-ii)
  2. Preface
    (pp. iii-iv)
  3. Table of Contents
    (pp. v-vi)
  4. Figures and Table
    (pp. vii-viii)
  5. Summary
    (pp. ix-x)
  6. CHAPTER ONE Factors That Enable Reintegration
    (pp. 1-10)

    Over the past several decades of warfare in Afghanistan, low-, mid-, and even senior-level fighters have regularly changed sides. Indeed, reintegration is an integral part of Afghan culture. The concept of truce is encompassed in the Pashto wordtiga, which means “placing the stone.” The word symbolizes the process of utilizing a respected elder or peacemaker to mediate a dispute among disagreeing parties.¹

    There are at least three types of reintegration: noncompliance, informing, and switching sides. Noncompliance involves such actions as evading taxes from insurgents and fleeing from insurgent-controlled areas. While it is the most benign form of defection, it...

  7. CHAPTER TWO Reintegration Procedures
    (pp. 11-20)

    There are several options for ISAF and Afghan forces once fighters consider reintegration, some of which require immediate decisions. Reintegration should ideally be led by the Afghan government, as well as managed by local communities and their leaders. The goal must be to facilitate the Afghan government’s ability to reintegrate former combatants. However, the weakness of the central government in rural areas makes reintegration challenging in some cases, and it is sometimes poorly synchronized with local officials. Tactical units cannot always wait for the central government to act in a timely manner. Consequently, effective reintegration may require tactical units to...

  8. CHAPTER THREE Conclusions: Reintegration from the Bottom Up
    (pp. 21-22)

    Amilar Cabral, a nationalist leader from Guinea-Bissau, once noted that an insurgency is like a train journey. At every stop, some people get on and others get off.¹ Afghan and ISAF units that engage in reintegration need to be cognizant of the tremendous difficulties involved. Reintegration is inherently controversial because it requires working with individuals who have been fighting—and perhaps killing—Afghan and Coalition forces. In some cases, these challenges can be mitigated by reintegrating insurgents in out-of-area locations where the reintegration candidates have not committed any crimes or been involved in tribal feuds. As past insurgencies demonstrate, however,...

  9. Notes
    (pp. 23-28)