Counterinsurgency Scorecard
Counterinsurgency Scorecard: Afghanistan in Early 2011 Relative to the Insurgencies of the Past 30 Years
Christopher Paul
Copyright Date: 2011
Published by: RAND Corporation
Pages: 26
https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/op337osd
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Book Info
Counterinsurgency Scorecard
Book Description:

A core finding of previous RAND research on 30 years of insurgencies worldwide was that a conflict's overall score on a scorecard of 15 equally weighted good and 12 equally weighted bad counterinsurgency factors and practices perfectly predicted the ultimate outcome. Using the scorecard approach and an expert elicitation (Delphi) exercise, a RAND project sought to extend the findings to the case of Afghanistan in early 2011.

eISBN: 978-0-8330-5813-3
Subjects: Technology, Political Science
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Table of Contents
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  1. Front Matter
    Front Matter (pp. i-ii)
  2. Preface
    Preface (pp. iii-iv)
  3. Abstract
    Abstract (pp. v-vi)
  4. Findings from Previous Research on 30 Years of Insurgency
    Findings from Previous Research on 30 Years of Insurgency (pp. 1-12)

    The previously published RAND monographVictory Has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of Success in Counterinsurgencyused detailed case studies of the 30 insurgencies begun and completed worldwide between 1978 and 2008 to analyze correlates of success in counterinsurgency (COIN). That study produced six key findings regarding success in COIN in recent history:

    Effective COIN practices tend to run in packs.

    The balance of good versus bad practices perfectly predicts outcomes.

    Of 20 COIN approaches tested, 13 received strong support, while three were not supported by the evidence.

    Repression wins phases but usually not cases.

    With...

  5. APPENDIX Details of the Expert Elicitation
    APPENDIX Details of the Expert Elicitation (pp. 13-18)
  6. References
    References (pp. 19-20)
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