Facing Death in Cambodia
Facing Death in Cambodia
Peter Maguire
Copyright Date: 2005
Published by: Columbia University Press
https://doi.org/10.7312/magu12052
Pages: 280
https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/magu12052
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Book Info
Facing Death in Cambodia
Book Description:

The Khmer Rouge regime took control of Cambodia by force of arms, then committed the most brazen crimes since the Third Reich: at least 1.5 million people murdered between 1975 and 1979. Yet no individuals were ever tried or punished. This book is the story of Peter Maguire's effort to learn how Cambodia's "culture of impunity" developed, why it persists, and the failures of the "international community" to confront the Cambodian genocide. Written from a personal and historical perspective, Facing Death in Cambodia recounts Maguire's growing anguish over the gap between theories of universal justice and political realities.

Maguire documents the atrocities and the aftermath through personal interviews with victims and perpetrators, discussions with international and NGO officials, journalistic accounts, and government sources gathered during a ten-year odyssey in search of answers. The book includes a selection of haunting pictures from among the thousands taken at the now infamous Tuol Sleng prison (also referred to as S-21), through which at least 14,000 men, women, and children passed -- and from which fewer than a dozen emerged alive.

What he discovered raises troubling questions: Was the Cambodian genocide a preview of the genocidal civil wars that would follow in the wake of the Cold War? Is international justice an attainable idea or a fiction superimposed over an unbearably dark reality? Did issues of political expediency allow Cambodian leaders to escape prosecution?The Khmer Rouge violated the Nuremberg Principles, the United Nations Charter, the laws of war, and the UN Genocide Convention. Yet in the decade after the regime's collapse, the perpetrators were rescued and rehabilitated-even rewarded-by China, Thailand, the United States, and the UN. According to Peter Maguire, Cambodia holds the key to understanding why recent UN interventions throughout the world have failed to prevent atrocities and to enforce treaties.

eISBN: 978-0-231-50939-8
Subjects: History, Political Science
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  1. Front Matter
    Front Matter (pp. i-vi)
  2. Table of Contents
    Table of Contents (pp. vii-viii)
  3. Acknowledgments
    Acknowledgments (pp. ix-xii)
  4. Introduction
    Introduction (pp. 1-6)

    This is a book with few heroes, plenty of villains, and no easy answers to some of the most vexing questions of our time. Those looking for the “glass half full” optimism that characterized much of the human rights scholarship during the 1990s should read no further. This is a sad story with an inconclusive ending. Its only certainty is an insistence on the necessity for humility when trafficking in the pain of others.¹

    I have spent much of the past decade searching for legal, historical, and moral forms of accountability for the three-year, eight-month, and twenty-day rule of Pol...

  5. 1 “So you’ve been to school for a year or two…”
    1 “So you’ve been to school for a year or two…” (pp. 7-33)

    In 1993, I ran into a friend from California in the Columbia University library. He told me that two mutual friends from high school, Chris Riley and Mark Norris, were going to Cambodia to restore the original Tuol Sleng prison photographs. I had been curious about Cambodia since I had first heard the name Pol Pot in the Dead Kennedys’1980 punk rock anthem “Holiday in Cambodia.” Their machine-gun lyrics described a hell on earth. While I knew that over one million Cambodians died during the reign of the Khmer Rouge, I had never heard of Tuol Sleng prison.

    Riley and...

  6. 2 “Do not kill any living creature, with the exception of the enemy.”
    2 “Do not kill any living creature, with the exception of the enemy.” (pp. 34-56)

    A single cannon shot marked the dawn of April 17, 1975 and the surrender of Cambodia’s capital, Phnom Penh, to Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge forces. The rebels controlled most of the country, and Phnom Penh’s population had grown to two million as rural peasants sought refuge from the fighting in the countryside. Fallen Prime Minister Long Boret and Deputy Prime Minister Prince Sirik Matak never imagined their American patrons leaving them to face the same battle-hardened soldiers the United States had failed to bomb into submission. Since 1970, the U.S.-backed Lon Nol regime had waged a brutal war against the...

  7. 3 “The Angkar is more important to me than my father and mother.”
    3 “The Angkar is more important to me than my father and mother.” (pp. 57-69)

    The head of S-21 prison was another former academic named Kang Keck Ieu, better known as Brother Duch. According to David Chandler,“Duch became one of the half dozen most important leaders in the country.”He ran a tight ship on which both guards and inmates feared for their lives.The torturers, guards, and other staff at S-21 numbered around 1,500 young men and women between the ages of 15 and 19, all recruited from what their intellectual leaders considered “pure” or “clean” peasant backgrounds. ¹

    Most of the young cadres at s-21 would not see their families for years; many would not...

  8. 4 “The weapon of the mouth”
    4 “The weapon of the mouth” (pp. 70-84)

    “I encouraged the Chinese to support Pol Pot,” Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Jimmy Carter’s national security advisor, announced in 1980. Brzezinski seemed to be enjoying the spectacle of inter-communist warfare. After Secretary of State Vance’s resignation that year, Brzezinski’s views ruled.¹ The remnants of the Khmer Rouge had settled in three main camps on the Thai border: Pailin, Phnom Malai, and Preah Vihear. The largest camp, Site 8, had a population of 50,000 scattered throughout the villages southeast of Aranyaprathet. Pol Pot was rumored to be in a secret jungle military base, dubbed Zone 87 after his Khmer Rouge alias, “87.”...

  9. 5 “Only the third person knows.”
    5 “Only the third person knows.” (pp. 85-106)

    After my first trip to Cambodia, I became interested in interviewing more Tuol Sleng guards, staff, and survivors—above all, the Tuol Sleng photographer, if he was even alive. Legitimate war crimes trials seemed so beyond the limits of the possible in 1994 that I turned my attention to the more practical tasks of historical accountability. Only about 6,000 of approximately 14,000 Tuol Sleng negatives had been recovered. My most reliable contacts continued to steer me toward the Vietnamese colonel who had created the Tuol Sleng Museum. During the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia, Colonel Mai Lam served as Vietnam’s “Cambodian...

  10. 6 “I am excellent survivor.”
    6 “I am excellent survivor.” (pp. 107-131)

    All of the clamor over leng Sary’s amnesty over-shadowed the defection of many of the men who had carried out his orders. One who emerged from the nameless, faceless ranks was an elite Khmer Rouge propaganda officer named Nhem En. In the predawn hours of November 15, 1995, En had slipped into the jungle armed with an AK-47, a walkie-talkie, and a videotape of the terrain surrounding the last Khmer Rouge stronghold of Anlong Veng. He claimed to have been one of the leaders of a secret, pro-democracy movement.When Ta Mok heard of this, he sent a team of twenty...

  11. 7 “Am I a savage person?”
    7 “Am I a savage person?” (pp. 132-145)

    At 8:30 a.m. on March 30, 1997, Sam Rainsy’s Khmer Nation Party had just begun a political rally in a Phnom Penh park when four grenades landed in the middle of the gathering of 150. Rainsy was shielded from the blast by bodyguards, one of whom was killed instantly by the explosions, along with dozens of other demonstrators. Two of the grenades were thrown from behind the crowd and one or two more were tossed from a passing car or motorcycle. When the crowd began to pursue the attackers on foot, they were stopped at gunpoint by soldiers loyal to...

  12. 8 “She is nice girl, but she is sick.”
    8 “She is nice girl, but she is sick.” (pp. 146-166)

    When I arrived in Cambodia in November 1999, Sok Sin picked me up at the airport. He was already anticipating a business boom and acting as if the war crimes tribunal was a fait accompli. Although I had no objections to seeing leng Sary and Nuon Chea in a defendant’s dock, I still doubted the Cambodian prime minister’s political will. Sok Sin drove to the Foreign Correspondents Club and we went upstairs. Three middle-aged American women sat in the shade of the third-story veranda, each fawning over her recently adopted or purchased Cambodian baby. Looking down at the park across...

  13. 9 “I am no longer HIV positive.”
    9 “I am no longer HIV positive.” (pp. 167-176)

    The Cambodian war crimes debate dragged on into the new millennium with basic questions still unresolved and both parties trading blame for the stalemate. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan wrote Prime Minister Hun Sen a threatening letter in February 2000 blaming Cambodia’s CPP government for the lack of progress. Neither side was willing to cede control. Furthermore, this was only a subsidiary of a larger conflict:“universal jurisdiction” versus national sovereignty.¹

    U.S. Senator John Kerry traveled to Phnom Penh again in April, attempting to restart negotiations between the United Nations and the Cambodian government. Led by Ambassador to Cambodia Kent Wiedemann and...

  14. 10 “I am not dead. I am alive.”
    10 “I am not dead. I am alive.” (pp. 177-190)

    By 2003, war crimes trials were still nowhere in sight. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan called Hun Sen’s bluff in February 2002 by withdrawing from the trial discussion. Annan accused the Cambodians of negotiating in bad faith, and stated that he believed they were neither interested in nor capable of conducting fair trials. But although the UN had officially pulled the plug, there were back-channel efforts to jump-start the negotiations. It seemed that Hun Sen might simply be using the trial issue as a public relations distraction, like he had in 1998.

    I returned to Cambodia in January to complete the...

  15. Conclusion: War Crimes Trials as a Welcome Distraction
    Conclusion: War Crimes Trials as a Welcome Distraction (pp. 191-196)

    After five years and eleven rounds of talks, Cambodian representative Sok An and UN representative Hans Corell initialed a provisional war crimes tribunal agreement on March 17, 2003. The Cambodian prime minister ceded very little. Under the unwieldy “mixed” tribunal plan, the Cambodians would have a 3–2 majority on the war crimes court and a 4–3 majority on the appeals court. All binding decisions would require a majority-plus-one vote. This so-called “supermajority” was meant to counter the possibility of the Cambodians voting as a bloc and ruling by majority. The co-prosecutors, one UN and one Cambodian, would prepare...

  16. Notes
    Notes (pp. 197-226)
  17. Glossary
    Glossary (pp. 227-230)
  18. Bibliography
    Bibliography (pp. 231-248)
  19. Index
    Index (pp. 249-268)
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