Latin America represents a theoretical puzzle for the study of international relations. International relations analysts are usually attracted to the region because of its purported “long peace.¹” They are intrigued that this pacific outcome occurs despite the absence of what have been identified in the literature as possible determinants of a “long peace”: nuclear weapons,² democracy,³ economic interdependence,⁴ western culture,⁵ or an advanced level of economic development.⁶

A detailed examination of the empirical record in chapter 2, however, indicates that there has not been a long peace in the region, whether one defines peace as the absence of “war” (defined...

Analysts of international conflict tend to ignore Latin America, believing that little military conflict exists and that whatever wars in which these nations may engage are minor.¹ Even those who specialize in the politics of the region, including Latin Americans themselves, tend to perceive interstate conflict as sporadic and generally, a non-issue.² This chapter examines the historical record to demonstrate that the use of violence across national boundaries has been a consistent trait of Latin America’s international politics. In fact, violence in the region escalates to war in much the same proportion as in the rest of the world, with...

In searching for an understanding of conflict dynamics in Latin America, we first examine the only region-specific theory—namely, the view that the U.S. has managed interstate relations, particularly conflict, in Latin America.¹ The outcome is purportedly regional interstate peace and internal civil violence directed against those social groups which would oppose either the U.S.’ paramount position in the hemisphere or the economic system the U.S. champions. Hegemonic management of conflict is a myth that dies hard. It is based on wishful thinking (e.g., Monroe Doctrine); a selective reading of history (e.g., a focus on interventions to overthrow governments with...

Many academic analysts and policy advocates focus on domestic institutions as key to understanding the use of force in foreign policy. In this conceptualization, democratic polities “rarely wage war on one another;” consequently, promoting democracy increases the level of international security among democratic states. (Democracy is valued for other reasons as well, but here we are focusing on its alleged implications for conflict management.) Secure in this belief, numerous inter-American analysts and policymakers propose sanctions on those polities that, while still peaceful and cooperative internationally, restructure domestic institutions in such a way as to undermine democratic institutions. The OAS recently...

Does the distribution of power affect the likelihood of militarized conflict? The bumper sticker debate between “If you want peace, prepare for war” and “Arms are made for hugging” resonates in the halls of government as well as in the towers of academia. Yet there is another major debate on the issue. If power matters, is parity or preponderance more likely to lead to peaceful competition among states?

The claim that military power is a fundamental contributor to interstate stability is contentious, especially in the Latin American context. By the early twentieth century U.S. and British diplomats in South America...

The model of militarized bargaining developed in chapter 1 provides a fourth framework by which to analyze the use of force in interstate relations. Five factors related to the costs inherent to the use of force, the costs acceptable to the public, and the public’s ability to hold its leaders accountable are hypothesized to determine whether the use of military force is a rational policy option. This chapter examines a military dyad to explore the utility of the militarized bargaining model.

Military governments are often seen as quick to utilize military force to resolve conflicts. Not only is the application...

Can democracies fight against each other? Chapters 2 and 5 demonstrated that in Latin America democracies use force against one another and with increasing frequency as their numbers increase. This chapter explains the decision to use force among democracies through the framework of the militarized bargaining model. In doing so it sheds light not only on why democracies can fight, but also demonstrates that a focus on the costs of using force is a useful way of thinking about militarizing disputes even when decisionmakers are not military dictators.

The chapter begins with a brief discussion of the territorial dispute between...

This book proposed that thinking about international politics as a bargaining situation and the use of military force as a policy option available to decisionmakers gives insight into the dynamics of militarized conflict. As one of numerous options, the decision to use force was hypothesized to respond to a cost-benefit analysis. The factors considered in the analysis were identified as the political-military strategy for using force (S), the strategic balance (SB), the characteristics of force to be used (CF), the willingness of constituencies to accept costs (CC), and the level of accountability of the decisionmaker to her constituency (A). The...