Long considered the masters of counterinsurgency, the British
military encountered significant problems in Iraq and Afghanistan
when confronted with insurgent violence. In their effort to apply
the principles and doctrines of past campaigns, they failed to
prevent Basra and Helmand from descending into lawlessness,
criminality, and violence.
By juxtaposing the deterioration of these situations against
Britain's celebrated legacy of counterinsurgency, this
investigation identifies both the contributions and limitations of
traditional tactics in such settings, exposing a disconcerting gap
between ambitions and resources, intent and commitment. Building
upon this detailed account of the Basra and Helmand campaigns, this
volume conducts an unprecedented assessment of British military
institutional adaptation in response to operations gone awry. In
calling attention to the enduring effectiveness of insurgent
methods and the threat posed by undergoverned spaces, David H. Ucko
and Robert Egnell underscore the need for military organizations to
meet the irregular challenges of future wars in new ways.
Subjects: Political Science, History
Table of Contents
You are viewing the table of contents
You do not have access to this
on JSTOR. Try logging in through your institution for access.