Confucianism has shaped a certain perception of Chinese security
strategy, symbolized by the defensive, nonaggressive Great Wall.
Many believe China is antimilitary and reluctant to use force
against its enemies. It practices pacifism and refrains from
expanding its boundaries, even when nationally strong.
In a path-breaking study traversing six centuries of Chinese
history, Yuan-kang Wang resoundingly discredits this notion,
recasting China as a practitioner of realpolitik and a ruthless
purveyor of expansive grand strategies. Leaders of the Song Dynasty
(960-1279) and Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) prized military force and
shrewdly assessed the capabilities of China's adversaries. They
adopted defensive strategies when their country was weak and
pursued expansive goals, such as territorial acquisition, enemy
destruction, and total military victory, when their country was
strong. Despite the dominance of an antimilitarist Confucian
culture, warfare was not uncommon in the bulk of Chinese history.
Grounding his research in primary Chinese sources, Wang outlines a
politics of power that are crucial to understanding China's
strategies today, especially its policy of "peaceful development,"
which, he argues, the nation has adopted mainly because of its
military, economic, and technological weakness in relation to the
Subjects: Political Science, History
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