CHINA’S WEIGHT is increasingly felt around the globe. Its booming economy, growing military might, and rising diplomatic clout are gradually changing the international landscape. As China rises, many observers are wondering how a rich and powerful China will behave in the world. International relations (IR) scholarship offers various answers to this important question, ranging from dangerous power transition to cooperative international integration and to peaceful identity transformation.¹ Yet, for Chinese civilian and military strategists, one argument repeatedly stands out: Because of its Confucian culture, China has not behaved aggressively toward others throughout history and will continue to be a pacific...

WHY DO states aggress? Why do states use force to settle external disputes? The history of international relations is replete with examples of states conquering territories, making threats against each other, resolving disputes with force, expanding war aims, and coercing others into submission. Why do states behave this way? There is no shortage of explanations in the international relations (IR) scholarship: domestic pathologies, leadership traits, unbalanced distribution of power, misperception of intentions, and miscalculation of capabilities, to name just a few. Scholarship on China, however, frequently uses culture to explain a state’s grand strategy and decision to use force: strategic...

THE SONG dynasty is known for its extraordinary cultural achievements in literature, art, and philosophy. Confucianism was refined and reinterpreted, thereby giving rise to neo-Confucianism, which became the orthodox ideology for statecraft and elite education. Dieter Kuhn calls this period “the Age of Confucian Rule.”¹ Cultural achievements aside, the Song made several advances in science and technology. The Song’s three great inventions—gunpowder, the compass, and printed books—would later have a profound impact on human history. The Song civilization was so ahead of the rest of the world that John K. Fairbank calls it “China’s greatest age.”² However, in...

DURING THE course of the Jurchen invasion, the Song dynasty was reconstituted in the south. In many respects, the Southern Song dynasty was a continuation of the Northern Song. The structure of the interstate system remained essentially bipolar, dominated by the Song and the Jin. Xi Xia ceased to be an important player and remained for the most part the Jin’s vassal state. The Jin Empire was the most powerful state in the system, with an estimated population of 44 million.¹ The Southern Song inherited what was left of the Northern Song state, about two-thirds of its territory, with most...

CHINA DURING the Ming dynasty was much more powerful than its neighbors, which was not so in the Song dynasty. For a good part of the region’s history, Ming China was the regional hegemon in East Asia. Yet it built the Great Wall, a defensive fortification that has become a national symbol of China. Proponents of Confucian pacifism assert that China did not pursue offensive strategies when it was powerful and that the Great Wall was the best proof of a consistently defensive posture even when Chinese power was preponderant. The extraordinary strength of Ming China permits us to test...

THE PRECEDING chapters deal with China’s security policy toward its primary adversaries: the Liao Empire, the Jin Empire, and the Mongols. This chapter will examine the Ming dynasty’s interactions with secondary states under the tributary framework. For proponents of Confucian pacifism, the tribute system—an idealized form of interstate interactions that put China at the center—symbolizes the nonviolent, noncoercive aspect of the Chinese world order. By entering the tribute system, foreign states accepted Chinese superiority not because of the overwhelming power of China but because of the cultural attractiveness of a higher civilization. The Confucian international order was benign...

CONFUCIAN CULTURE did not constrain Chinese use of force: China has been a practitioner of realpolitik for centuries, behaving much like other great powers have throughout world history. In general, China’s grand strategic choices were shaped by the country’s power position, with Chinese leaders having adopted an offensive posture when relatively strong and a defensive one when relatively weak. The historical record shows that Chinese leaders have been sensitive to the balance of power with their adversaries and adjusted military policy accordingly. What, then, are the implications of this study for understanding China’s strategic behavior today? What can we learn...