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Concept and Controversy

W. W. Rostow
Copyright Date: 2003
https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7560/771246
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    Concept and Controversy
    Book Description:

    A trusted advisor to Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson and one of America's leading professors of economic history, W. W. Rostow has helped shape the intellectual debate and governmental policies on major economic, political, and military issues since World War II. In this thought-provoking memoir, he takes a retrospective look at eleven key policy problems with which he has been involved to show how ideas flow into concrete action and how actions taken or not taken in the short term actually determine the long run that we call "the future."

    The issues that Rostow discusses are these:

    The use of air power in Europe in the 1940sWorking toward a united Europe during the Cold WarThe death of Joseph Stalin and early attempts to end the Cold WarEisenhower's Open Skies policyThe debate over foreign aid in the 1950sThe economic revival of KoreaEfforts to control inflation in the 1960sWaiting for democracy in ChinaThe Vietnam War and Southeast Asian policyU.S. urban problems in disadvantaged neighborhoodsThe challenges posed by declining population in the twenty-first century

    In discussing how he and others have worked to meet these challenges, Rostow builds a compelling case for including long-term forces in the making of current policy. He concludes his memoir with provocative reflections on the twentieth and twenty-first centuries and on how individual actors shape history.

    eISBN: 978-0-292-79784-0
    Subjects: Political Science

Table of Contents

  1. Front Matter
    (pp. i-vi)
  2. Table of Contents
    (pp. vii-viii)
  3. PREFACE
    (pp. ix-xiv)
    W. W. ROSTOW
  4. One A BACKWORD GLANCE: 1916–1938
    (pp. 1-26)

    My parents, Victor and Lillian, born respectively in 1886 and 1894, belonged to the generation before the First World War. They communicated their values and concerns to their three sons without pressure or preaching, mainly by how they lived. My elder brother, Eugene, was born in 1913; I came along in 1916; and my younger brother Ralph in 1920. Each of our parents had been the eldest child of a fairly large family: five children on my father’s side, six on my mother’s. They met their responsibilities, conventional at the time, as the first children of their respective families.

    A...

  5. Two THE USE OF AIR POWER IN EUROPE, 1942–1945: SHOULD THE ALLIES HAVE WON THE WAR IN EUROPE IN 1944?
    (pp. 27-58)

    Between coming home in 1938 to complete my thesis at Yale and going to Washington in the late summer of 1941, I was involved wholly in academic work. There was first of all a dissertation to complete and oral Ph.D. examinations to get through. I was a graduate proctor at Yale earning pocket money by tutoring and serving as a teaching assistant. It was the only conventional graduate student year I was to know. I remember it best as a period of hard work with clear-cut immediate objectives. There was a touch of magic—of holiday—about the two years...

  6. Three THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION, 1945–1989: THE HINGE WAS POLAND
    (pp. 59-95)

    It was suggested after V-E Day that I might go out to the Pacific and help bring our experiences in Europe to the war against Japan; but things seemed to be well in hand. After a brief stint in the OSS on British postwar problems, I accepted the post of assistant chief of the German-Austrian Economic Division (GA) in the State Department. As I will explain below, a number of us from EOU, London, were recruited. The chief of the GA division was Charles Kindleberger.

    I was soon out of uniform and plunged into the problems of postwar Europe. However,...

  7. Four THE DEATH OF STALIN, 1953: THE TIMING MAY HAVE BEEN OFF
    (pp. 96-136)

    As indicated in Chapter 3, I devoted the two years 1947–1949 to work on European reconstruction as special assistant to Gunnar Myrdal, executive director of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe in Geneva. I joined Myrdal after Molotov left Paris and was under no illusion that Geneva would be at the center of affairs. The Cold War was under way in earnest. While the annual meetings of the commission were the occasion for much Cold War rhetoric, by common agreement the work in the committees of the ECE was strictly businesslike. The ECE in its early years thus...

  8. Five OPEN SKIES, 1955: A USEFUL FAILURE
    (pp. 137-187)

    At 6:00 P.M. on Wednesday, July 20, 1955, President Eisenhower assembled an impressive group of American public servants in the library at the Chateau du Creux de Genthod, an eighteenth-century villa on Lake Geneva where he stayed while attending the summit conference of July 18–23. Those present included his major national security advisers, excepting the secretary of defense and the director of Central Intelligence who had remained in Washington: John Foster Dulles, secretary of state; Robert B. Anderson, deputy secretary of defense; Livingston Merchant, assistant secretary of state for European affairs; Arthur W. Radford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs...

  9. Six EISENHOWER AND KENNEDY ON FOREIGN AID, 1953–1963: THE WHITE HATS TRIUMPH AFTER A FASHION
    (pp. 188-253)

    The analysis of economic development in the underdeveloped regions and participation in the formation of public policy to achieve it was a gratifying endeavor—one of the great rewarding tasks of the 1950s and 1960s. It engaged many men and women in the governments, universities, in private sectors of Western countries to lay a firm foundation for systematic aid to the developing nations.

    First, there was the moral claim upon us which a good many felt as we contemplated men, women, and children caught up in poverty. We imagined what was possible if poverty was lifted from them: longer life...

  10. Seven THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA: MY MARGINAL ASSOCIATION WITH A MIRACLE
    (pp. 254-261)

    The crusading on foreign aid recounted in Chapter 6 was conducted at a rather abstract conceptual level typical of a struggle over policy in Washington and elsewhere. There was, however, another level of direct contact with the men and women actually engaged in development in the countries with which we were dealing. These human contacts cannot be weighed in their full consequences. But surely—whether they consisted, say, of an informal conversation with a foreign head of state in a capital city, or the support given by David Bruce and William Tomlinson to Jean Monnet during the implementation of the...

  11. Eight THE EISENHOWER, KENNEDY, AND JOHNSON EFFORTS TO CONTROL INFLATION, 1957–1972: INNOVATIONS SHOULD BE INSTITUTIONALIZED
    (pp. 262-278)

    Economists, as usual, were in disarray in the 1960s. To control inflation, some economists thought that short-run demand analysis was a sufficient framework for policy; others like myself believed long-run productivity factors should immediately be part of the mix. My stress on these factors begins with my academic commitment to the Marshallian long-period. In plain English this means a commitment to take account of the supply as well as the demand factors in the life of economies. This includes changes in the population and the workforce as well as technological change, which lies at the heart of expanding economic growth...

  12. [Illustrations]
    (pp. None)
  13. Nine CHINA, 1949–: WAITING FOR A DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION
    (pp. 279-294)

    There is a considerable literature that covers the contentious issues affecting engagement versus confrontation in U.S.-China relations. They embrace, for example, Taiwan, Tibet, and Hong Kong: security problems in Asia as seen from the various capitals; civil rights; the WTO and commercial diplomacy in general.¹ These are immediate and inescapable issues that belong legitimately on the current agenda of dialogue or negotiation between the United States and China. I shall deal here with some longer-run but relevant issues.

    But first my qualifications in this field and lack of qualification.² The Center for International Studies (CENIS) at MIT was asked by...

  14. Ten VIETNAM AND SOUTHEAST ASIA: SHOULD THE HO CHI MINH TRAIL HAVE BEEN CUT?
    (pp. 295-316)

    Much has been written about Vietnam. I have contributed something to that literature.¹ What is the case, then, for penning yet another essay on that subject? Two considerations led to my inclusion of this chapter.

    First, I was involved in Vietnam planning and policy toward Southeast Asia in part of the 1960s (1961 and 1966–1969). It would have been wrong to have left out the subject in an account such as this.

    Second, the voluminous literature on Vietnam has certainly permitted a large number of people to vent their feelings, offer insights, and pronounce judgments. But there is no...

  15. Eleven THE URBAN PROBLEM, 1991–: PREVENTION VERSUS DAMAGE CONTROL
    (pp. 317-331)

    When my family (wife, two teenage children, mother-in-law, standard poodle) moved to Austin in early 1969, my personal agenda was to teach and to write a series of books, the last of which wasTheorists of Economic Growth. As I pursued this congenial line of work, I became aware of an interesting transition with which all of Texas was grappling. The 1970s was both the last stand of Texas as a major source of oil and gas for the country and its dawning as one of the nation’s major centers of high-tech industry—the Lone Star Silicon Hills. I had...

  16. Twelve POPULATION, MODERN JAPAN’S FOURTH CHALLENGE: THE CENTRAL PROBLEM OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
    (pp. 332-345)

    My work on the world’s population in the twenty-first century has had three stages. First, I surveyed the global population scene inTheorists of Economic Growth(1990) mainly to capture the extent to which population growth in the years ahead would radically increase the proportion in the developing regions: from 71.5 percent in 2000 to an estimated 87.1 percent in 2100.¹

    After the population analysis of that book I continued to work on population and focused on the fall in gross fertility below the replacement rate. This forecast of a fall in population was not confined to rich countries but...

  17. Thirteen THE LONG AND SHORT PERIODS: A POSSIBLE BINDING THREAD
    (pp. 346-353)

    What can I say in general about the eleven policy issues in which I was involved from the 1940s to the 1990s? They embrace problems of war and arms control, aspects of foreign and domestic policy; and they range in scale from global population prospects to the lives of disadvantaged citizens in the capital of Texas.

    The first thing to be said about these cases is that they mirror the history of the last half century. A good many men and women of my generation found themselves engaged in a similar sequence of problems. We threw ourselves into each one...

  18. Fourteen TWO FINAL REFLECTIONS: ONE ABOUT THE TWENTIETH AND TWENTY-FIRST CENTURIES, THE OTHER ABOUT THE INDIVIDUAL AND HISTORY
    (pp. 354-358)

    There are two further reflections on the episodes set out in this book. The twentieth century has been marked by tragedy, and suffused with global conflict. Consider the drumroll of events since Kitty Hawk: the First World War; the unsatisfactory interwar period climaxed by the Great Depression; World War II; forty-five years of Cold War followed by an anxious era when the world’s longer-run problems, some military, asserted themselves, none yielding to a quick answer. From 1900 to the start of the new millennium, the years left their mark on the history of Russia and Japan, Western and Eastern Europe...

  19. Appendix A DRAFT OF PROPOSED U.S. PLAN FOR A EUROPEAN SETTLEMENT: FEBRUARY 1946
    (pp. 359-364)
  20. Appendix B THE QUESTION OF EAST GERMANY IMMEDIATELY AFTER STALIN’S DEATH
    (pp. 365-368)
  21. Appendix C TEXT OF W. W. ROSTOW’S SEOUL NATIONAL UNIVERSITY SPEECH
    (pp. 369-376)
  22. Appendix D ANDREWS AND ORTEGA ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS: TEXAS ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENT ANALYSIS, 1994–2001
    (pp. 377-378)
  23. NOTES
    (pp. 379-426)
  24. INDEX
    (pp. 427-454)