Europe United

Europe United: Power Politics and the Making of the European Community

Sebastian Rosato
Copyright Date: 2011
Edition: 1
Published by: Cornell University Press
Pages: 280
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  • Book Info
    Europe United
    Book Description:

    The construction of the European Community (EC) has widely been understood as the product of either economic self-interest or dissatisfaction with the nation-state system. In Europe United, Sebastian Rosato challenges these conventional explanations, arguing that the Community came into being because of balance of power concerns. France and the Federal Republic of Germany-the two key protagonists in the story-established the EC at the height of the cold war as a means to balance against the Soviet Union and one another.

    More generally, Rosato argues that international institutions, whether military or economic, largely reflect the balance of power. In his view, states establish institutions in order to maintain or increase their share of world power, and the shape of those institutions reflects the wishes of their most powerful members. Rosato applies this balance of power theory of cooperation to several other cooperative ventures since 1789, including various alliances and trade pacts, the unifications of Italy and Germany, and the founding of the United States. Rosato concludes by arguing that the demise of the Soviet Union has deprived the EC of its fundamental purpose. As a result, further moves toward political and military integration are improbable, and the economic community is likely to unravel to the point where it becomes a shadow of its former self.

    eISBN: 978-0-8014-6098-2
    Subjects: Political Science

Table of Contents

  1. Front Matter
    (pp. i-vi)
  2. Table of Contents
    (pp. vii-viii)
  3. List of Tables
    (pp. ix-x)
  4. Acknowledgments
    (pp. xi-xii)
  5. Abbreviations
    (pp. xiii-xiv)
  6. 1. Introduction
    (pp. 1-19)

    Western Europe, observed Winston Churchill less than two years after World War II, was ʺa rubble-heap, a charnel-house, a breeding-ground of pestilence and hate.ʺ Like many of his contemporaries, the former prime minister attributed the continentʹs misery to the nation-state system. A region divided into sovereign states animated by ʺancient nationalistic feudsʺ could not remain reliably at peace. Indeed, his great fear was that the continent would never recover its past glories because the Europeans would ʺgo on harrying and tormenting one another by war and vengeanceʺ and ʺsquander the first fruits of their toil upon the erection of new...

  7. 2. Explaining International Cooperation
    (pp. 20-40)

    My central argument is that the balance of power largely determines whether and how states cooperate with one another. This chapter presents my balance of power theory of cooperation, paying particular attention to its assumptions and causal logics. I begin with a brief discussion of power—what it is, why states want it, and what strategies they can adopt to deal with stronger competitors. One of these strategies—balancing—involves cooperating with other relatively weak states against a common powerful rival. Therefore the following section outlines the conditions under which states can form balancing coalitions. Specifically, I argue that states...

  8. 3. Origins: Heavy-Industry Integration, 1945–1950
    (pp. 41-103)

    On May 9, 1950, Foreign Minister Robert Schuman of France announced that his government intended to place ʺFrench-German production of coal and steel . . . under a joint high authority, within an organization open to the participation of other European nations.ʺ He hoped that an arrangement of this sort would represent the first step toward a ʺEurope an federation.ʺ¹ Later that day, Konrad Adenauer, chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, called a press conference and endorsed the proposal unreservedly. The following year, on April 18, 1951, France and Germany, together with Italy and the Benelux states, signed the...

  9. 4. Setback: Military Integration, 1950–1954
    (pp. 104-167)

    On June 25, 1950, less than a week after delegates of the Six met in Paris to begin the negotiations that would lead to the creation of the ECSC, North Korea attacked South Korea. Because it was assumed that the Soviets had approved the invasion in advance, western planners feared that events on the peninsula foreshadowed Russian aggression in Europe. The American response was swift, and at the tripartite conference of foreign ministers in New York in September, Secretary of State Dean Acheson informed the British and the French that the United States intended to send a Supreme Allied Commander...

  10. 5. Triumph: Economic Integration, 1955–1957
    (pp. 168-226)

    In the early 1950s, the coal and steel pool was the exception: the Europeans preferred to cooperate rather than establish supranational institutions and integrate their economies.¹ Then in May 1955, only months after the French National Assembly had voted down the Europe an army project, the Benelux states called on their neighbors to ʺmake a fresh advance toward Europe an integrationʺ by constructing a common market and establishing common policies for transport, energy, and peaceful uses of atomic energy.² France, West Germany, and Italy took up the Benelux offer, and on June 3, 1955, the Six issued the Messina Resolution...

  11. 6. Beyond Postwar Europe
    (pp. 227-256)

    States balance against powerful competitors and in the context of the early cold war this drove France and the Federal Republic to establish the EC. Aware that they confronted an overwhelming opponent and that the Soviet Union derived its strength from a centralized organizational structure in addition to its formidable assets, the Europeans understood that they had to go beyond an alliance and establish a multistate coalition with a central governing authority in order to balance against it effectively.

    There is substantial evidence that decision makers in Paris and Bonn recognized the imperative of building a centralized balancing coalition to...

  12. Index
    (pp. 257-266)