The liberalization of transatlantic trade relations since the
Great Depression is one of the key developments in the global
political economy of the last hundred years. This period has seen
the negotiated reduction of both tariffs and nontariff barriers
among developed countries, which allowed for the rapid expansion of
trade flows, a driving force of economic globalization. In
Protection for Exporters, Andreas Dür provides a novel
explanation for this phenomenon that stresses the role of societal
interests in shaping trade politics. He argues that exporters lobby
more in reaction to losses of foreign market access than in pursuit
of opportunities, thus providing a rationale for periods of
acceleration and slowdown in the pace of liberalization.
Dür also presents hypotheses about the form in which protection
for exporters is provided (preferential or nonpreferential) and the
balance of concessions that is exchanged in trade negotiations.
Protection for Exporters includes case studies of major
developments in international trade relations, such as the passage
of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act in the 1930s, the creation
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in the 1940s, the
Kennedy Round in the 1960s, the debate over Fortress Europe in the
1980s, and U.S.-European competition over access to emerging
markets in the early 2000s.
Dür's rigorous argument and systematic empirical analyses not
only explain transatlantic trade relations but also allow for a
better understanding of the dynamics of international economic
Subjects: Political Science
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