What is the role of intelligence agencies in strategy and
policy? How do policymakers use (or misuse) intelligence estimates?
When do intelligence-policy relations work best? How do
intelligence-policy failures influence threat assessment, military
strategy, and foreign policy? These questions are at the heart of
recent national security controversies, including the 9/11 attacks
and the war in Iraq. In both cases the relationship between
intelligence and policy broke down-with disastrous
In Fixing the Facts, Joshua Rovner explores the complex
interaction between intelligence and policy and shines a spotlight
on the problem of politicization. Major episodes in the history of
American foreign policy have been closely tied to the manipulation
of intelligence estimates. Rovner describes how the Johnson
administration dealt with the intelligence community during the
Vietnam War; how President Nixon and President Ford politicized
estimates on the Soviet Union; and how pressure from the George W.
Bush administration contributed to flawed intelligence on Iraq. He
also compares the U.S. case with the British experience between
1998 and 2003, and demonstrates that high-profile government
inquiries in both countries were fundamentally wrong about what
happened before the war.
Subjects: Political Science
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