Friendly Fire

Friendly Fire: The Near-Death of the Transatlantic Alliance

ELIZABETH POND
Copyright Date: 2004
Pages: 140
https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7864/j.ctt127wt5
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  • Book Info
    Friendly Fire
    Book Description:

    Relations between the U.S. and Europe have declined in recent years, and today they are worse than at any time since the 1950s. In Friendly Fire, a veteran reporter known for her shrewd observations of political behavior in Europe examines the widening gulf and worsening acrimony between the U.S. and its traditional allies on the European continent. Elizabeth Pond examines a number of disputes -chronic trade quarrels, the International Criminal Court, the Kyoto Protocol, Israeli-Palestinian violence, and Iraq -and identifies the ways in which they reinforce and exacerbate one another. European governments have accepted a rhetorical responsibility for global (and not just European) security, but the dearth of defense funding in Europe, disagreements over tactics, and the bad American temper toward the Europeans have added to the estrangement.

    eISBN: 978-0-8157-9624-4
    Subjects: Political Science

Table of Contents

  1. Front Matter
    (pp. i-iv)
  2. Table of Contents
    (pp. v-vi)
  3. Foreword
    (pp. vii-viii)
    Martin A. Schain

    This is the fifth monograph in the European Union Studies Association’s U.S.-EU Relations Project series, and it comes at a time of continuing crisis. Elizabeth Pond began this book during the buildup to the war in Iraq. She presented the first draft at a roundtable at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., on January 24, 2003, a moment when relations between the United States and France and Germany had taken a particularly bad turn. Around the table were discussants from all of the major European embassies, as well as from the U.S. Departments of State and...

  4. Preface
    (pp. ix-xvi)
  5. CHAPTER ONE Pax Americana The Shock of 9/11
    (pp. 1-20)

    In the beginning were Paul Wolfowitz, Robert Kagan, and their soul mates. Or so it seemed, once the U.S. deputy secretary of defense announced the death of permanent coalitions like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) at the high-powered Munich Security Conference in February 2002 and the relatively unknown policy wonk published his essay on “Power and Weakness” a few months later and captivated the chattering classes.¹

    U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who skipped the previously mandatory conference to pursue the al Qaeda terrorists who had been identified as the 9/11 perpetrators, had already declared that from now on the...

  6. CHAPTER TWO Pox Americana? 2002 Polemics
    (pp. 21-44)

    As Europeans absorbed the double blow of Bush’s “axis of evil” shot and Wolfowitz’s scorn for permanent coalitions in early 2002, the transatlantic polemics broke out, over both policy substance and what the Europeans had come to regard in previous decades as their right to a voice in Washington’s decisionmaking.

    The immediate trigger was the resurgence of American talk, in the glow of the quick military triumph in Afghanistan, about finishing at long last the job begun by Bush senior and overthrowing Iraqi strongman Saddam Hussein. Now it seemed that earlier European relief over Bush’s rejection of war on an...

  7. CHAPTER THREE The Franco-German-American War Fall 2002 to Spring 2003
    (pp. 45-74)

    In the late summer of 2002, Iraq moved to center stage.

    Europeans generally read Saddam Hussein’s behavior as that of a quite rational tyrant whose drive to preserve power restrained him from launching WMD arbitrarily or getting close to jihadists who despised his secular regime. They thought that the containment effected by embargoes, no-fly-zones, and periodic bombardments by American and British planes had for a decade effectively deterred him from acquiring usable nuclear weapons or repeating the terrible chemical poison attacks he had unleashed in the 1980s on Iranian soldiers and Iraqi Kurd civilians. The one time when deterrence had...

  8. CHAPTER FOUR Postwar Europe
    (pp. 75-96)

    Even without any pincer of American ground troops from the north, Saddam Hussein was defeated in a swift, three-week march on Baghdad. What was billed in advance as a “shock and awe” campaign of overwhelming military power worked, if not in precisely the way planned. Night goggles and other Buck Rogers wizardry enabled the infantry and air support to fight not only in darkness, but also in the sandstorm that engulfed the troops early in the campaign. Hussein fired no chemical or biological weapons at the approaching armies or at Israel. There were no columns of refugees streaming into Turkey...

  9. Notes
    (pp. 97-118)
  10. Persons Interviewed
    (pp. 119-122)
  11. Suggestions for Further Reading
    (pp. 123-130)
  12. Index
    (pp. 131-141)