Peace Process

Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967

William B. Quandt
Copyright Date: 2005
Edition: 3
Pages: 535
https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7864/j.ctt12879nn
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    Peace Process
    Book Description:

    Updated through the first term of President George W. Bush, the latest edition of this classic work analyzes how each U.S. president since Lyndon Johnson has dealt with the complex challenge of Arab-Israeli peacemaking. There have been remarkable successes -such as the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty -frustrating failures, and dangerous wars along the way. This book helps to situate the current Middle East crisis in historical context and point to some possible ways out of the impasse between Israelis and Palestinians. Quandt suggests a clear U.S. commitment to a two-state solution -one that would assure Israel of security and peace within the 1967 treaty-established borders, offer the Palestinians an early end to Israeli occupation of Gaza and most of the West Bank, and establish both a Jewish and Arab Jerusalem. Written especially for classroom use, Peace Process is also an invaluable resource for policymakers and anyone interested in this vital region of the world. Praise for previous editions of Peace Process "Clearly written, carefully balanced and comprehensive in scope... should prove invaluable to all serious students of American foreign policy." -New York Times Book Review "A major work, whether judged by the standards of classical diplomatic history or modern political science." -Foreign Affairs "Provides fresh insights into the complexities of creating the process and defining the substance of American foreign policymaking." -Survival "While objective to a fault, Quandt writes with an insider's knowledge of policymaking and decisions taken at the highest levels of government." -Middle East Policy "Both a history and analysis of an evolving relationship between Israel and its Arab opponents." -Choice "A major contribution to understanding the complexity of U.S. presidents' handling of the [Arab-Israeli] conflict. It should be compulsory reading for anyone studying the Middle East conflict, peacemaking and conflict resolution." -Journal of Peace Research

    eISBN: 978-0-8157-0385-3
    Subjects: History, Political Science

Table of Contents

  1. Front Matter
    (pp. i-vi)
  2. Table of Contents
    (pp. vii-viii)
  3. Preface to the Third Edition
    (pp. ix-xi)
  4. [Map]
    (pp. xii-xii)
  5. CHAPTER 1 Introduction
    (pp. 1-20)

    Sometime in the mid-1970s the termpeace processbegan to be widely used to describe the American-led efforts to bring about a negotiated peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors. The phrase stuck, and ever since it has been synonymous with the gradual, step-by-step approach to resolving one of the world’s most difficult conflicts.

    In the years since 1967 the emphasis in Washington has shifted from the spelling out of the ingredients of “peace” to the “process” of getting there. This procedural bias, which frequently seems to characterize American diplomacy, reflects a practical, even legalistic side of American political culture....

  6. PART ONE: The Johnson Presidency

    • CHAPTER 2 Yellow Light: Johnson and the Crisis of May–June 1967
      (pp. 23-52)

      Lyndon Baines Johnson brought to the presidency a remarkable array of political talents.¹ An activist and a man of strong passions, Johnson seemed to enjoy exerting his power. As majority leader in the Senate, he had used the art of persuasion as few other leaders had; building consensus through artfully constructed compromises had been one of his strong suits. His political experience did not, however, extend to foreign-policymaking, an area that demanded his attention, especially as American involvement in Vietnam grew in late 1964 and early 1965.

      Fortunately for the new president, one part of the world that seemed comparatively...

  7. PART TWO: The Nixon and Ford Presidencies

    • CHAPTER 3 Cross-Purposes: Nixon, Rogers, and Kissinger, 1969–72
      (pp. 55-97)

      Richard M. Nixon was, to say the least, an unusual president. By the time he resigned from office in disgrace on August 9, 1974, his domestic support had virtually disappeared. The Watergate scandal, exposed in exquisite detail by the press, Congress, and the tapes of the president’s conversations, revealed a suspicious man in the White House who lied, who was vindictive, and who appeared to be strangely indecisive and incoherent when it came to dealing with important policy issues. Many Americans, as well as foreigners, had difficulty reconciling this image with that of the Richard Nixon who was overwhelmingly reelected...

    • CHAPTER 4 Kissinger’s Diplomacy: Stalemate and War, 1972–73
      (pp. 98-129)

      With the end of the fighting in Vietnam, Kissinger was ready to turn his attention to the Middle East.¹ He had previously paid little attention to briefing materials prepared for him on that region; now he requested studies, perused long memoranda, and began to develop a detailed strategy of his own.

      Kissinger wanted to avoid endless debates over the meaning of Resolution 242, the Rogers Plan, and the Jarring memorandum. A legalistic approach was bound to bog down rapidly. The key demands of both parties were phrased in totally incompatible terms. The Israelis wanted peace and recognition; the Arabs wanted...

    • CHAPTER 5 Step by Step: Kissinger and the Disengagement Agreements, 1974–76
      (pp. 130-174)

      The eight months that followed the October 1973 war witnessed an unprecedented American involvement in the search for a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Henry Kissinger, before becoming secretary of state, had devoted little energy to the seemingly intractable issues dividing Israel and its Arab neighbors. Nor had he progressed far in his understanding of the “energy crisis” and the part played by Middle East oil in the international economy. Only the danger of confrontation between the superpowers growing out of tensions in the Middle East seemed capable of arousing in him a sustained interest in the affairs of the...

  8. PART THREE: The Carter Presidency

    • CHAPTER 6 Ambition and Realism: Carter and Camp David, 1977–78
      (pp. 177-204)

      Jimmy Carter came to the presidency with remarkably little experience in foreign affairs. He had served one term as governor of Georgia and had earned a reputation for his strong commitment to civil rights. But as far as the Middle East was concerned, he had no known record apart from a few comments made during the campaign that offered little guide to what his policies might be.

      If Carter’s specific views on Arab-Israeli issues were difficult to anticipate, he had displayed certain habits of mind that might be revealing of his basic approach. Trained as an engineer, Carter seemed to...

    • CHAPTER 7 Forging Egyptian-Israeli Peace
      (pp. 205-242)

      The two agreements reached at Camp David marked an important watershed in the peace negotiations, but much remained to be done before peace would actually be achieved. Many of the blanks in the Camp David Accords had to be filled in, and many of the ambiguities had to be resolved one way or another. Along the way there would be pauses, detours, some backtracking, and many dead ends. Egypt and Israel would finally reach their goal of a formal peace treaty, but the broader objective of finding a peaceful resolution to the Palestinian question remained elusive.

      The phase of detailed...

  9. PART FOUR: The Reagan and Bush Presidencies

    • CHAPTER 8 Cold War Revival: Who’s in Charge?
      (pp. 245-268)

      The election of Ronald Reagan as president in November 1980 was a watershed event in American politics. Rarely had a campaign pitted against each other two such different candidates as Reagan and Jimmy Carter. Reagan, a two-term governor of California and a moderately successful movie actor, came from the conservative wing of the Republican party. He propounded two main themes: the federal government was too big and inefficient, and communism was an evil that should be fought relentlessly. Increases in defense spending were central to his foreign-policy program.

      Apart from these broad principles, it was hard to know what Reagan...

    • CHAPTER 9 Back to Basics: Shultz Tries Again
      (pp. 269-289)

      From the moment he became secretary of state in 1982, George Shultz had been the dominant architect of the Reagan administration’s approach to the Arab-Israeli peace process. But on related matters in the Middle East, such as Lebanon and the Iran-Iraq war, he was not able to get his way so easily. Secretary of Defense Weinberger had persuaded the president to withdraw American troops from Lebanon early in 1984, a move that Shultz had opposed; and Casey, McFarlane, Poindexter, and North had been able to conduct the covert “arms-for-hostages” operation in 1985 and 1986, to which both Shultz and Weinberger...

    • CHAPTER 10 Getting to the Table: Bush and Baker, 1989–92
      (pp. 290-318)

      Rarely, if ever, has a president assumed office with a more impressive foreign affairs résumé than George Bush. Before coming to the White House in January 1989, he had been director of Central Intelligence, head of the American diplomatic mission to China, and ambassador to the United Nations, and he had spent eight years as vice president under Ronald Reagan, with special responsibility for crisis management for the National Security Council. In addition, Bush was from a political family, had served with distinction as a pilot in World War II, was a graduate of Yale, had been elected to Congress,...

  10. PART FIVE: The Clinton Presidency

    • CHAPTER 11 Clinton the Facilitator
      (pp. 321-341)

      No president ever came to office with a more promising set of circumstances for promoting peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors than did Bill Clinton. Peace between Egypt and Israel was already well anchored, having endured the regional turmoil of the 1980s. Radical Arab nationalism, as represented by Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, had been discredited. Israeli hard-liners had lost the 1992 election, returning the experienced pragmatist Yitzhak Rabin to power. True, Islamic militants were hostile to the notion of Arab-Israeli peace negotiations, but they still represented primarily an opposition current, and governmental authority in most Arab states was still...

    • CHAPTER 12 Clinton’s Finale: Distractions, Hesitation, and Frustration
      (pp. 342-382)

      The news in late May 1996 of Benjamin Netanyahu’s election as prime minister of Israel must have been something of a shock to President Bill Clinton and his closest foreign policy advisers. They had forged close links with Yitzhak Rabin, and subsequently with Shimon Peres, and their policy for promoting Arab-Israeli peace rested solidly on the assumption that Israel would eventually relinquish most of the territories it had taken in 1967 once it could be assured of peace and security from its neighbors. Now, with a Likud-led government back in power, Clinton would have to figure out how to deal...

  11. PART SIX: The Second Bush Presidency

    • CHAPTER 13 “With Us or Against Us”: The Warrior President in His First Term
      (pp. 385-412)

      George W. Bush became the forty-third president of the United States in the strangest of circumstances. When the votes were tallied in November 2000, the Democratic candidate, Al Gore, had won the popular vote by about 500,000 ballots. But the Electoral College, that strange artifact of early American constitutional history, was another matter. There, Bush seemed to have won with one more electoral vote than needed—depending, however, on the accuracy of the count in the state of Florida, where Gore had received only 500 votes less than Bush. For some weeks, disputes about the Florida count and the construction...

  12. PART SEVEN:: Conclusion

    • CHAPTER 14 Challenges Facing Future Administrations
      (pp. 415-428)

      With alarming regularity since 1967, American presidents have found themselves dealing with Middle East crises for which they were poorly prepared. Many, but not all, of these crises have been related to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The June 1967 war, the war of attrition in 1969–70, the Jordan crisis of September 1970, the October 1973 war, the Iranian revolution in 1978–79, the Iran-Iraq war from 1980 to 1988, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982–83, the early years of the Palestinianintifadain 1987–88, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the subsequent war against Saddam Hussein...

  13. Notes
    (pp. 429-508)
  14. Selected Bibliography
    (pp. 509-516)
  15. Index
    (pp. 517-536)
  16. Back Matter
    (pp. 537-539)