Means to an End

Means to an End: U.S. Interest in the International Criminal Court

LEE FEINSTEIN
TOD LINDBERG
Copyright Date: 2009
Pages: 178
https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7864/j.ctt6wpgkm
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  • Book Info
    Means to an End
    Book Description:

    The International Criminal Court remains a sensitive issue in American foreign policy circles. It was agreed to at the tail end of the Clinton administration, but with serious reservations. In 2002 the Bush administration ceremoniously reversed course and "unsigned" the Rome Statute that had established the Court. But recent developments in Washington and elsewhere indicate that the United States may be moving toward de facto acceptance of the Court and active cooperation in its mission. InMeans to an End: U.S. Interest in the International Criminal Court, Lee Feinstein and Tod Lindberg reassess the relationship of the United States and the ICC, as well as American policy toward international justice more broadly.

    The authors argue that the United States should actively support the ICC for the simple reason that it serves U.S. interests while being consistent with the values that America publicly espouses. The authors also show how participation could be beneficial in terms of national security and foreign policy generally, and they make the moral case for acceptance as well. They evaluate the ICC's potential to advance international justice and how American participation can improve that potential.

    eISBN: 978-0-8157-0394-5
    Subjects: Political Science, Law

Table of Contents

  1. Front Matter
    (pp. i-iv)
  2. Table of Contents
    (pp. v-vi)
  3. Acknowledgments
    (pp. vii-xii)
  4. CHAPTER ONE The Opportunity
    (pp. 1-10)

    The time is at hand for a major reassessment of the relationship between the United States, the International Criminal Court, and the broader issue of U.S. policy toward international justice. Long opposed by the senior U.S. military leadership, signed onto only with grave reservations by the United States during the administration of President Bill Clinton, and ceremoniously unsigned by the administration of President George W. Bush, the ICC has been a political third rail in the United States. Yet recent developments in Washington, New York, and The Hague suggest that a policy of formal U.S. government opposition to the Court...

  5. CHAPTER TWO U.S. History and International Justice: Idealism and Ideology
    (pp. 11-36)

    Many of the concerns that have arisen over the Rome Statute that created the International Criminal Court were previewed in halting U.S. support for a variety of international judicial schemes dating back to the Civil War and beyond. Concerns about surrendering sovereignty to an international judicial body have long been in competition with an American impulse to foster the rule of law everywhere.

    Idealistic schemes were proposed and opposed by successive U.S. government officials over the years. Europe and the United States frequently exchanged roles as the main proponents of or skeptics about various judicial proposals. Over the course of...

  6. CHAPTER THREE American Policy toward the ICC: From Antagonism to Acquiescence
    (pp. 37-60)

    The United States has had an ambivalent and tentative relationship with the International Criminal Court from the beginning. Although the United States supported the creation of a permanent international criminal tribunal early on, this support waned as negotiations toward a concrete institution progressed.¹ During the Clinton administration, official policy eventually settled on a formal but weak mandate to seek the establishment of a permanent international court. President Clinton expressed this desire repeatedly, most notably in a speech before the UN General Assembly in September 1997. “The United Nations must be prepared to respond, not only by setting standards,” he said,...

  7. CHAPTER FOUR The ICC’s Record
    (pp. 61-90)

    Since its birth in 2002 the International Criminal Court has won respect in fulfilling its mission to bring those responsible for the most heinous crimes to justice. Although the prosecutor’s investigations have progressed fitfully, where the Court has acted it has generally garnered support. The Court’s judges have protected the rights of defendants and worked to enhance the ability of states to bring perpetrators of mass atrocities to justice in their own countries without resort to the ICC. The Court has also demonstrated an intention to protect victims and provide them with a voice in proceedings. The Court has rejected...

  8. CHAPTER FIVE The American Interest in International Justice
    (pp. 91-102)

    There are numerous potential perspectives from which to view the International Criminal Court. Some of its most ardent advocates, for example, see the Court as an essential element in the architecture of global governance. If the United Nations (at least in aspiration) serves as “the parliament of man” (the phrase of Lord Tennyson that the scholar Paul Kennedy selected for the title of his book celebrating the promise of the United Nations), then the ICC is the supreme court of accountability for violation of international criminal law.

    Others would go still further: in the long run, the United Nations Security...

  9. CHAPTER SIX Recommendations for Washington: End Hostility and Cooperate
    (pp. 103-124)

    The United States should cease its hostility to the International Criminal Court, adopting instead a policy of cooperation with the institution and its mission. For too long the options toward the Court have been framed as ratifying the Rome Statute or actively opposing it. That is a false choice. There is a range of ways in which the United States can cooperate effectively with the Court without ratifying the statute and subjecting the United States to the Court’s jurisdiction. A decision on deepening U.S. cooperation, including whether to seek Senate approval of the Rome Statute, and if so, when, ought...

  10. APPENDIX A Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Excerpts)
    (pp. 125-146)
  11. APPENDIX B Signing Statement of President Bill Clinton
    (pp. 147-149)
  12. APPENDIX C “The Bolton Letter”
    (pp. 150-150)
  13. APPENDIX D Security Council Resolution 1593, March 31, 2005
    (pp. 151-153)
  14. APPENDIX E Security Council Resolution 1828, July 31, 2008
    (pp. 154-158)
  15. Notes
    (pp. 159-170)
  16. Index
    (pp. 171-178)
  17. Back Matter
    (pp. 179-181)