If You Use a Screen Reader

This content is available through Read Online (Free) program, which relies on page scans. Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Journal Article

Reflexivity, Contradiction, Paradox and M. C. Escher

Laurence Goldstein
Leonardo
Vol. 29, No. 4 (1996), pp. 299-308
Published by: The MIT Press
DOI: 10.2307/1576313
https://www.jstor.org/stable/1576313
Page Count: 10
Were these topics helpful?

Select the topics that are inaccurate.

  • Read Online (Free)
  • Download ($19.00)
  • Subscribe ($19.50)
  • Cite this Item
Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Your search terms occurs 4 times in this item.
Reflexivity, Contradiction, Paradox and M. C. Escher
Preview not available

Abstract

The paradoxes that have been studied by philosophers and logicians are arguments that lead from plausible premises to impossible conclusions. For example, in the Liar Paradox, the assumption that "This statement is false" is either true or false leads to the conclusion that it is both true and false. Depictions of so-called "impossible objects" in the late works of M. C. Escher are visually paradoxical. There are deep similarities between visual and logico-semantic paradoxes. In the case of the visual paradoxes, knowledge of various means of representing distance enables us to explain how the paradoxical effect is achieved. A novel approach to solving the Liar and other logico-semantic paradoxes consists of coming to understand how the impossibility of their conclusions arises by means analogous to those by which visually impossible objects are produced.