Journal Article

A Consistent Way with Paradox

Laurence Goldstein
Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition
Vol. 144, No. 3 (Jun., 2009), pp. 377-389
Published by: Springer
https://www.jstor.org/stable/27734452
Page Count: 13
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A Consistent Way with Paradox
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Abstract

Consideration of a paradox originally discovered by John Buridan provides a springboard for a general solution to paradoxes within the Liar family. The solution rests on a philosophical defence of truth-value-gaps and is consistent (non-dialetheist), avoids 'revenge' problems, imports no ad hoc assumptions, is not applicable to only a proper subset of the semantic paradoxes and implies no restriction of the expressive capacities of language.